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Abstract 
Secured by Design (SBD) is an award scheme, managed by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) and supported by the Home Office, which aims to encourage house 
developers to design homes so as to minimise the crime opportunities which they present. 
Unlike many crime reduction measures, particularly those addressing the behaviour of 
offenders or potential offenders, the SBD initiative is proactive - the aim being to intervene 
prior to a crime problem emerging as opposed to reacting after the event. The implementation 
of SBD requires the co-operation of a variety of agencies, from police and local authorities to 
architects and housing developers, and the mechanisms through which it aims to reduce crime 
have the potential to impact upon the victim, the offender and the location. Recent legislation, 
in the form of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, have placed 
crime reduction on the agenda of many agencies for whom the issue had historically been of 
little importance. In the current climate of multi-agency working, initiatives such as SBD have 
the potential to flourish, but do they actually impact upon crime, disorder and the fear of 
crime, and are they being used to their maximum potential? This thesis addresses the past 
(history), present (current practice) and future (potential refinements) of SBD. How did 
planning become encapsulated into criminology? Does SBD reduce crime, disorder and the fear 
of crime? What are the current weaknesses within SBD and how can the initiative be improved? 
The findings presented within the thesis reveal that properties built to the SBD standard 
experience lower levels of crime (and their resident's lower levels of fear of crime) than Non- 
SBD estates matched according to age, housing tenure, location and environmental factors. 
Whilst the difference in crime rates is not strongly statistically significant, the improving 
performance of the scheme suggests that a more recent sample would reveal a stronger 
relationship between SBD status and crime levels. 
Having established that SBD estates confer a crime reduction advantage, the thesis focuses upon 
identifying how the scheme can be improved as well as the enablers and constraints which exist 
for those within the social and private sector in deciding whether (or not) to build to the SBD 
standard. Areas of improvement include ensuring that the scheme implements its own 
principles, incorporating repeat victimisation packages into its standards and considering the 
threat to revoke the scheme for estates found failing to maintain the SBD standards. Levers to 
encourage social and private sector developers to build to the SBD standard include enhanced 
funding from the Housing Corporation, the appeal of additional security for homebuyers and 
the savings incurred through reduced levels of crime and disorder. 
Continuing its improvement orientation, the thesis presents a risk assessment mechanism to be 
used by crime reduction practitioners as a means of idenffying which properties will become 
vulnerable to crime if built (therefore allowing them to dhallenge planning applications) or in 
the case of properties already developed, allowing resources to be directed towards properties 
at most risk. The environmental factors which emerge as associated with elevated crime levels 
(and therefore score highly on the checklist presented) suggest that higher levels of movement 
past a property are generally associated with higher levels of risk. Thus in the somewhat heated 
debate about the role of permeability in enabling crime, the general thrust of the data suggests 
that high permeability (as proxied by the presence footpaths, levels of pedestrian and vehicular 
movement and road network) is indeed associated with higher levels of crime. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Chapter One - Part One 
Principal Themes 
Recent Tbinking about Crime Reduction: 
The last two decades have seen a major change in the perception of how a reduction in crime in 
England and Wales is to be achieved. This change can be characterised as having two primary 
facets, which are closely linked. The first is the advance of situational crime prevention (SCP), 
following the demonstration that crime trends are more readily understood in terms of the 
supply of crime opportunities than the distribution of criminal propensity across the population 
(Mayhew et a], 1976; Felson, 1998; Felson and Clarke, 1998). This insight has been reinforced 
by the demonstration that the regulation of opportunities will impact on rates of crime (Clarke, 
1992). The doctrine of SCP, and the contributions which diverse applied sciences can 
contribute to the discipline of crime reduction, has been exemplified by the founding of the Jill 
Dando Institute of Crime Science at University College London, under the direction of 
Professor Gloria Laycock. Crime Science, as Laycock (2001) suggests, involves the application 
of scientific principles to the reduction of crime. It is outcome focused, evidence based and aims 
to enhance the knowledge of crime and its control through the engagement of academics from a 
variety of disciplines. 
The second facet of the change in the perception of crime reduction flows from the first, but in 
fact developed alongside it, with its first expression being found in the Morgan Report of 1991 
(Home Office, 1991). This is the recognition that the supply of crime opportunities is under the 
control of agencies other than the police, such that the historic reliance upon the police as the 
primary crime reduction functionaries was misguided, and certainly unfidr. 
The domain of crime reduction historically comprised its detection (for which responsibility 
predominantly lies with the police), the apprehension and incapacitation of offenders following 
detection and the prevention of recidivism (which involves agencies such as the police, the 
prison and probation services as well as the judiciary). These traditional responses focused upon 
offenders rather than the supply of criminal opportunities and were predominantly reactive in 
nature. Intervention prior to a crime taking place has historically taken a back seat to detection 
and apprehension. Although the prevention of crime was the principal duty of the police service 
when first established in 1829, in reality, this role involved prevention through the targeting of 
high crime areas and of particular individuals and groups, rather than by arranging the 
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environment so that crime opportunities were limited (Hughes, 1998). It was in the period 
following World War 11 that some police officers came to be designated as having a special 
responsibility for crime reduction, specifically following the recommendation by the Cornish 
Committee on the Prevention and Detection of Crime (1965) that an officer of at least 
Inspector rank should be designated force crime prevention officer. However, even with this 
recognition, those responsible for crime prevention have never represented more than a small 
minority within the police service, with this position being viewed as one of low status and low 
interest when compared to those involving detection or apprehension (Graef, 1989). As 
Weatheritt (1986) suggests, the role of crime reduction officer is often viewed as one in which 
pre-retirement officers serve out their time. 
"Until recently, when the figure has fallen to about fifteen years, the 
average length of service of constables and sergeants attending the basic 
training course for newly appointed crime prevention officers at the 
Crime Prevention Centre was twenty years, just five years short of 
the period at which police officers become eligible for pensionable 
retirement on half pay" (Weatheritt, 1986 p. 49-SO). 
The numbers of police officers designated as responsible for crime reduction is, although 
interesting, a side issue. The real change came with the assumption of responsibility for crime 
reduction of those outside the police service, a recognition which saw relevant authorities 
becoming responsible for considering the crime and disorder implications of every decision that 
they made, be that awarding planning permission to a new nightclub or the decision not to 
install street lighting within a high crime area. The Crime and Disorder Act (in particular, 
sections 5,6 and 17) recognised that those who supply criminal opportunities can and should be 
responsible for their control. The changing landscape of crime reduction is discussed in Byrne 
and Pease (2003) who recognise that an increasing number of individuals and agencies are 
becoming interested in crime prevention because they have a stake in it and are jointly 
responsible for the failure to reduce or prevent it. 
As crime prevention becomes the princess who finally makes the ball, and leaves behind its 
Cinderella of the service label (Byrne and Pease, 2003), the belief that crime reduction is more 
d= detection, apprehension and incarceration and that crime control requires the intervention 
of more agencies than the police and judiciary, have become more commonplace. As Pease 
(1997) suggests- 
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"Because an action is a crime, this does not mean that the best way 
to control it is through the police and the courts. The behaviour itself 
must be understood, to determine where change can be best brought 
in" (p. 963). 
The importance of this statement is highlighted by figures which show the attrition through the 
Criminal Justice System. Barclay and Tavares (1999) estimate that of the 100% of offences 
which are committed, approximately 45.2% are actually reported to the police by victims of 
these crimes; 24.3% are recorded by the police (i. e. these crimes become a statistic); S. 5% are 
cleared up by the police; 3% result in a caution or conviction and 0.3% result in a custodial 
sentence. The last decade has seen an increase in partnership approaches to crime reduction and 
a growing recognition that relying upon the criminal justice system will leave a large amount of 
crime untouched, the most significant demonstration of this viewpoint being the introduction of 
the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). 
The introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), described by Laycock (2001) as "one 
of the most significant pieces of legislation in support of crime reduction" (p. 2 1), represented 
the culmination of the process begun by the Morgan Report and informed by the scholarly 
literature on situational crime reduction. This act has gone some way towards addressing the 
mismatch between control over crime opportunities and responsibility for crime reduction. In 
particular, Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), which places a responsibility upon 
the 'relevant authorities" to consider the crime and disorder implications of every decision that 
they make and states that "it shall be the duty of each authority ... to exercise its various 
functions with due regard to the likely effect of those fimctions on ... crime and disorder in its 
area" (Great Britain, 1998a). This section of the Crime and Disorder Act requires a variety of 
agencies (for whom crime and its prevention may never have crossed their minds) to consider 
crime and disorder in every decision that they make. Moss and Pease (1999) suggest that "... it 
is difficult to conceive of any decision which will remain untouched by s 17 considerations" 
(p. 16), and provide examples of decisions which may be influenced by this legislation. These 
. planning permission 
to a new housing estate and the extent to w ch those include grantine hi 
homes are built to the Secured by Design (SBD) standard; local authority policies relating to the 
1 Local Authorities, joint Authorities, National Park Authority, Broads Authority and the Police were defined as 
relevant authorities in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. The Police Reform Act 2002 stated that relevant 
authorities would extend to Primary Care Trusts (April 2004), Fire Authorities (April 2003) and Police 
Authorities (April 2003). 
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repair of council homes which have been burgled, or a council's failure to upgrade street 
lighting within a residential area. All of which (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
two, part five) could result in legal action against the local authority. 
The earlier claim that this act has only gone some way towards addressing the mismatch 
between control over crime opportunities and responsibility for crime reduction, relates to the 
exclusion of both central Government and the private sector from the provisions of the Act. 
This was recognised as a problem by the second report of the Government's Foresight 
committee on crime, with a recommendation (Recommendation 4) that the principles of 
Section 17 should be extended to cover the actions of central Government (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2000). The specific problems regarding the separation of responsibilities in 
the planning process are identified by Moss (2001) who highlights the legal loophole which has 
left government bodies such as the Planning Inspectorate exempt from the provisions of this 
Act. In cases such as Aquariam Entertainments Ltd. Y Brighton and Hove Council, this loophole in the 
legislation has allowed developers, denied planning permission on the grounds of crime 
prevention, with the opportunity to appeal to the Planning Inspectorate who, exempt from 
Section 17 considerations, grant permission for the original development. Moss (2001) 
identifies how in 2001 there were already 20 cases which had been contested on this basis, a 
figure likely to have risen substantially in the ensuing three years. Moss (2001) highlights the 
consequences of this loophole which has not only frustrated Crime and Disorder Partnerships 
(CDRPs), but has left developments permitted which police and local authorities consider to be 
potentially criminogenic. 
'Me interpretation pf S. 17 by the Planning Inspectorate has essentially 
created a bizarre situation where Local Authorities make decisions based 
on crime and disorder criteria they have to consider. If developers (who 
have their own agendas) disagree with these decisions, this then goes 
to the Planning Inspectorate who reverse these decisions because they 
say that these same criteria are irrelevant. What is more, all this is carried 
out at public cost7 (Moss, 2001 p. 8). 
How to Reduce Crime: 
The method through which agencies choose to reduce crime is dependent upon their view of 
the causes of crime, and it is probably fair to say that the balance of effort made by local 
authorities over-emphasises traditional above situational approaches more than the research 
literature would justify. This is evident in the three-yearly audits and strategies which CDRPs 
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must conduct under the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. 
Analysis of local crime and disorder data, as well as consultation with service users and 
providers helps to shape the priorities assigned within the Strategy which is submitted to the 
regional Government Office. On interrogation of the local data, partnerships must ask 
themselves, is a particular crime problem related to an individual offender? In that case, action 
might be taken to remove the particular offender (such as incarceration or diversion activities) 
or remove their desire or need to commit that crime (for example treatment for drug use). Is 
the crime problem related to the victim? In which case, action may be taken to reduce the risks 
of vulnerable people becoming victims. Or is the crime problem related the environment in 
which that crime is taking place? In that case, action may be taken to address issues such as poor 
lighting or building design. 
Although many criminological theories (and therefore crime prevention interventions) focus 
solely upon one of these elements, in reality, much crime prevention activity is often holistic in 
nature, aiming to address the offender, the victim and the environment (albeit not always in 
equal balance). As Levi and Maguire (2004) suggest "modem crime reduction approaches are 
not based solely upon situational principles: they have tended to mix victim and target 
protection with interventions aimed at actual and potential offenders, using 'cocktails' of 
multiple techniques and agencies" (p. 16). Findings from Tilley and laycock (2002) as well as 
Bullock and Tilley (2003) suggest that co-ordinated, multiple interventions are often more 
effective than those which focus upon one element of the criminal event. There are, however, 
different views about this. For example Byrne and Pease (2003) rail against the balance between 
the demonstrably effective and the demonstrably ineffective in local strategies, which they 
imply is caused by the vested interests of well-established agencies such as the probation service 
exerting an influence. Whatever the truth, the reality on the ground for the foreseeable future 
is that local partnerships will proceed on the basis of a mixture of approaches. 
Models such as the Problem Analysis Triangle (Leigh et aL, 1996) and Ekblom's (2000) 
Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (adapted from Felson's Web of Informal Control, 1998) 
go some way towards explaining the increasing popularity of crime reduction interventions 
which consider all elements of the crime event. As Byrne and Pease (2003) suggest, 
frameworks such as Ekblom's help crime reduction practitioners to integrate different 
approaches to crime reduction. Each conceptualises crime into the different elements which 
must be present for it to occur. For example, Felson (1998) suggests that for a crime to take 
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place there must be motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. 
To prevent a crime taking place their must be an intervention to remove the target (be that a 
person, item, building etc. ), introduce a capable guardian (be that formal such as CCTV, police 
or security guards, or informal such as neighbours, shoppers or passers by) or remove the likely 
offender (either through physical barriers to keep them out or interventions to change their 
motivation to offend). The Problem Analysis Triangle identifies how a response to a crime 
problem requires interventions to address the offender, the victim or the location. The 
intervention must alter the situation which was conducive to the crime taking place by 
addressing at least one of these three elements. For example, the problem of high levels of 
violence in a town centre nightclub may require interventions to address the offender - barring 
them from the dub, the victim - educating them in self defence, or the location - re- designing 
the layout of the dub to minimise the opportunities for violence. This may include ensuring 
that chairs are positioned away from the bar to avoid customers being disturbed as people queue 
for their drinks, or clarifying the position in which people should stand when queuing for 
drinks. 
Multi-Agency Crime Reduction: 
In light of legislative requirements to show that they are working together to reduce crime and 
disorder, many agencies looked towards existing crime prevention initiatives and research 
relating to what works in crime and disorder. One particular initiative which requires the 
intervention of a variety of agencies such as architects, police and local authority planning 
departments, and works upon all elements of Felson's (1998) Web of Informal Control 
(removing suitable targets, introducing capable guardians and removing likely offenders), is the 
SBD initiative, which is the focal concern of this thesis. 
SBD is an award scheme, established in 1989, which aims to encourage housing developers to 
design out crime at the planning stage. The scheme is managed by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) and supported by the Home Office. The scheme sets standards for 
compliance (drawn up in consultation with the Department of Transport, Local Government 
and the Regions - now the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as trade, industry and 
standards organisations) which are based largely upon the principles described below. A more 
comprehensive description of both principles and specific standards can be found on the official 
SBD website. 
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Physical Security: 
SBD sets standards of physical security for each property and its boundaries. The aim is not to 
create a fortress in which residents are constantly reminded of the risk of victimisation, but to 
combine effective target hardening measures into the original build of the estate. For example, 
windows must meet the standard BS7950: 1997 and doors must meet both PAS 24-1 (physical 
security) and PAS 23 -1 (fit for purpose). 
Surveillance: 
SBD estates are designed to achieve maximum natural surveillance without compromising the 
need for privacy. For example, houses are positioned to allow neighbours to view each other's 
properties without obstructions from shrubbery or high walls. The informal social control 
which emerges from the design of SBD estates is accentuated through ensuring that each estate 
contains a mix of dwellings designed for the needs of a variety of resident types (i. e. elderly, 
families, young couples). In doing so, the likelihood that at least one neighbour will be at home 
throughout the day and night is increased. 
Access/Egress: 
SBD estates are designed to include a minimal number of access/egress points in an attempt to 
avoid unnecessary entry onto the estate by non-residents and potential offenders. Through- 
routes and footpaths provide the opportunity for offenders to attach an area to what Beavon et 
a] (1994) refer to as their awareness space. like everybody else, offenders become familiar with 
locations they frequent whilst travelling between work, school, home and leisure activities. 
Giving an offender reason to pass through an estate not only increases their familiarity with the 
area, but also provides a justification to be there. 
Territoriality: 
In an attempt to achieve maximum informal social control, SBD. draws upon Newman's 
principles of Defensible Space (1973). This states that if space has a clearly defined ownership, 
purpose and role, it is evident to residents within the neighbourhood who should, and more 
importantly who should not be in a given area. SBD actileves this by ensuring a clear 
demarcation between public, semi-public, semi-private and private space. For example, a 
change in the road colour and texture will act to highlight the move from a public space 
(outside the estate) to a semi-public space (inside the estate). A gate or hedge surrounding the 
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front garden marks the change from senii-public space (within the boundaries of the estate) to 
semi-private space (a resident's front garden) and a front door, fitted with appropriate security 
measures, marks the change from semi-private to private space. 
Management and Maintenance: 
The management and maintenance of SBD estates is an issue of continuing importance. Several 
studies have suggested that if crime and disorder is not addressed, it can act as a catalyst for 
more serious crimes. Skogan (1990) refers to this as the "Contagion theory", suggesting that the 
"presence of vandalism stimulates more vandalism" (p. 3 9). This is supported by studies such as 
7finbardo (1970) and Finnie (1973) which found that the presence of disorder such as 
vandalism, rubbish or criminal damage leads directly to more anti-social behaviour. Kelling and 
Coles (1997), in reference to an article by Wilson and Kelling (1982), refer to this as the 
"Broken Windows Theory" (p. 16). In their original article, Wilson and Kelling (1982) used the 
image of broken windows to describe how neighbourhoods may decline into disorder if they are 
not managed and maintained. 
"if a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the rest 
of the windows will soon be broken ... One unrepaired broken window 
is a signal that no one cares, so breaking more windows costs 
nothing ... Untended property becomes fair game"(Wilson and Kelling, 
1982 p. 31). 
"Me suggestion being that an area with existing deterioration such as graffiti and vandalism 
conveys the impression that a) nobody cares so apprehension is less likely, and b) the area is 
already untidy so one more act will go unnoticed. Because of its existing deterioration the area 
is not only an easy target, it is also fair game. Kelling and Coles (1997) suggest that low level 
disorder such as graffiti, squeegeeing and fare-dodging, although small-scale when taken as 
single offences, can lead to more serious crimes as wen as increased levels of fear of crime. 
Kelling and Coles (1997) use several examples to highlight the crime reduction benefits of this 
theory. These include the Clean Car Program which involved removing subway trains from use 
until graffiti had been removed, the idea being that "Graffitists would never see their tags on 
clean trains again" (p. 116); Operation Enforcement, which succeeded in reducing crime in 
general within the subway system, and the reduction of squeegee merchants within New York 
City. 
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"And while change is dearly evident in terms of quality of life and a 
reduction in low-level crimes and incidents of disorder, a new 
development is the dramatic reduction as well in index crime, as 
reflected not only by what citizens experience but also in the crime 
statistics" (Kelling and Coles, 1997 p. IS 1). 
Although there is very little written regarding the emergence of SBD and the principles which 
underpinned its formation, it is suggested by several authors (Cozens et a], 2001; Pascoe and 
Topping, 1997) that the initiative is based largely upon Newman's theory of defensible space 
(1973) as well as other theories relating to SCP and offender decision making. Newman's 
theory of defensible space (which will be discussed in more detail throughout Chapter two) 
argues that the physical design of a neighbourhood can either release or inhibit people's latent 
sense of control over the spaces in which they live. This is achieved through four elements - 
territoriality, natural surveillance, image and, milieu. Pascoe and Topping (1997) make some 
attempt to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the SBD scheme and suggest that the 
"claims of the SBD authors straddle two lines of thinking - environmental criminology ... and a 
behavioural approach looking at the decision making of oftenders" (p. 163). Although Cozens et 
a] (2001) reiterate the suggestion that defensible space played a large part in the development of 
the SBD scheme, they also recognise that its influence is somewhat surprising given the 
widespread criticism which Newman's theory had received in the years leading up to SBD's 
inception. Authors such as Mawby (1977), Bottoms (1974), Wilson (1978) and Merry (198 1) 
have criticised Newman on the grounds of methodological weaknesses as wen as the 
presentation of findings. Others suggest that the term defensible space contains a "rat's nest of 
intertwining hypotheses" (Rubenstein et al, 1980 p. 6) making it difficult to measure and define 
(Cozens et a], 2001) and that Newman over-emphasised the physical environment at the 
expense of socio-economic and demographic variables (Wilson, 1978; Mayhew, 1979; Poyner, 
1983; Moughtin and Gardner, 1990). Although in the case of the latter point, Wilson (1978), 
Heck (1987) and Cozens et a] (2001) highlight how Newman's later work (1975,1976) 
recognised the need for both social and physical crime reduction measures even suggesting that 
the influence of social factors (such as the percentage of residents receiving welfare and per 
capita income of estate residents) actually exceed that of physical design. 
As was mentioned earlier within the thesis, legislative changes such as the Crime and Disorder 
Act (1998) placed a requirement upon agencies to show that they were worldng together to 
reduce crime and disorder. Short timescales and the lack of financial assistance led many 
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agencies to look towards existing initiatives and research relating to 'what works' to help meet 
this legislative requirement (Byrne and Pease, 2003). The SBD initiative appeared to be a 
perfect example of a crime reduction measure which required multi agency collaboration. 
However, research to assess its effectiveness was lacking. 
The introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and the requirement (Sections 5 and 6 
of the Act) placed upon key agencies Oocal authorities, police, fire authorities, police 
authorities) to form partnerships to reduce crime and disorder within their area, has been a 
positive step for crime reduction in that, as noted earlier, it partially reconciled the supply of 
crime opportunities with the responsibility for crime reduction. However, whilst the last two 
decades have seen an increasing recognition of the contribution that both multi-agency working 
and design/planning can make to crime reduction, three obvious weaknesses still remain. It is 
these weaknesses which this thesis aims to address. 
1. First, at the time when the research on which this thesis was based began, the 
SBD initiative, which was already being used as a tool to encourage multi- 
agency worldng, had not been independently evaluated. Whether for this or 
other reasons (in the writer's view other reasons predominated, since many 
person-oriented crime reduction measures have proven remarkably robust in 
the face of unflattering research evidence), confidence in its ability to reduce 
crime was low. It became evident that although criminological research had 
shown that the individual prmciples of the scheme - minimising access 
(Brantingham. and Brantingham, 197S, 1993,2000; Brantingharn et a], 1977; 
Brown and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and Rohe, 1984; 
Cromwell el a], 1991; Bevis and Nutter, 1997; Mirlees-Black et a], 1998), 
increasing physical security (Brown and Altman, 1983; Cromwell et A 1991) 
and increasing territoriality (Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 
1993) each worked to reduce crime and disorder, it was unclear whether the 
initiative as a package was acting as an effective crime reduction measure. 
2. Second, those worldng within crime reduction are not the same people who a) 
design houses and b) make the decisions about planning applications. It was 
clear that research findings must begin to transcend these two fields. 
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3. Finally, complacency is used to describe those who are contented or self 
satisfied to a fault, and any initiative which does not contain within itself the 
mechanism for self-improvement, risks complacency. To become complacent 
about the merits of any crime prevention measure, would be to ignore the 
evolving nature of crime and those who take part in it. Criminals change and 
what may act to deter them from offending against a property in 1998, may no 
longer prevent their offending in 2001. As Ekb1orn (2002) suggests 
"Knowledge of what works becomes a wasting asset that needs constant 
replenishment" (p. 38). For this reason, the final aim of the thesis was to 
identif y the particular environmental factors which increase a property's 
vulnerability to crime as well as those which act to protect it. It is hoped that 
these findings can be used to maximise understanding of criminal behaviour as 
well as to improve the performance of the SBD standard. 
As a response to these three areas of weakness, the aims of this thesis fall largely into the 
categories of past, present and future considerations. 
Past 
" To investigate the emergence of planning and design issues within criminology; 
" To outline what the SBD initiative is and how it has developed; 
Present 
To investigate the criticisms of SBD; 
To highlight contradictory legislation/guidance; 
To establish whether SBD housing experiences lower levels of crime and disorder than 
control sample housing; 
To establish whether SBD can reduce the fear of crime amongst residents; 
0 To investigate whether SBD has evolved as a standard. 
Future 
0 To identify weaknesses within SBD and highlight areas for modification/improvement; 
To develop a practitioners' checklist to enable crime reduction resources to be directed 
towards the most vulnerable properties. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
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Chapter Two - Part One 
Crime and Criminology 
The SBD scheme is just one initiative which aims to reduce crime through the design of the 
environment. The principles behind SBD incorporate elements from many criminological 
theories and perspectives. These principles are based upon the following assumptions. 
e Crime and criminality are not inevitable. Consequently interventions to reduce the 
incidence of crime can succeed; 
Individuals offend in response to opportunity. VvUle they may bring varying levels of 
criminal propensity to any situation, they make choices about their offending behaviour 
based upon the information available to them; 
One of the most influential factors in an offender's decision maldng process relates to 
the environment surrounding that individual. For this reason, the manipulation of the 
environment can act to reduce crime. 
Is Crime inevitable? 
There is an abundance of theories as to why individuals offend. Consequently there are many 
intervention points for the reduction of offending - some of which focus upon the offender 
(programmes to reduce drug use), some the victim (crime prevention publicity) and others the 
location in which crimes take place (street lighting, CCTV). But to what extent can crime be 
controlled? 
Early exponents of the suggestion that criminality can be explained (at least in part) through 
biological or developmental factors include Cesare Lombroso and his scuola positive in the late 
nineteenth century whose focus lay upon distinguishing the characteristics of the born criminal. 
More recently, biolog ' ical and developmental crin-dnologists' have identified factors associated 
with increased risk of criminality. Although these do not focus exclusively upon the biological, 
factors such as hyperactivity and impulsivity (Satterfield and Schell, 1997; Klinteberg a A, 
1993), low birth weight (McGee et a], 1984; Kolvin et a], 1990) and brain damage (Brennan et 
a], 1991; Michaud et a], 1993) have been identified as risk factors associated with criminal and 
anti-social behaviour. 
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Authors such as Caspi and Moffit (1995) also emphasise both biological and social processes in 
crime causality, suggesting that transient, delinquent behaviour can be linked to social factors 
such as a desire for autonomy and peer delinquency and that the factors distinguishing these 
short-term offenders from long-term, persistent offenders lay within neurodevelopmental 
processes. Moffit's (2003) review of the causes of anti-social behaviour distinguishes between 
two prototypes - life-course-persistent and adolescence-limited. According to Moffit (2003), 
the former has its origins in neurodevelopmental processes, begins in childhood, and continues 
into adulthood. The risk emerges from "inherited or acquired neuropsychological variation7 
(Moffit, 2003 p. SO) and is exacerbated by a high-Tisk social environment, including factors such 
as inadequate parenting, disrupted family bonds and poverty. The latter has its origins in social 
processes, begins in adolescence and desists in young adulthood. Moffit (2003) suggests that this 
type of anti-social behaviour emerges in puberty in the period referred to as "the maturity gapr 
(p. SO), this representing the "role-less years between their biological maturation and their 
access to mature privileges" (p. 50). According to both Moffit (1990,1993,1994,1997 and 
2003) and Caspi and Moffit (199S), life-course-persistent antisocials are few, persistent and 
pathological, whilst adolescence-limited antisocials are common. 
The focus upon genetic factors in criminality, and in particular the recent work of Moffit 
(2003), does not focus exclusively upon the biological at the expense of situational factors. In 
fact, the suggestion that life-course-persistent anti-social behaviour has its origins in early life, 
but is exacerbated by a high-risk social environment, with adolescent-limited anti-social 
behaviour emerging in puberty as a response to the maturity gap (Moffit, 2003), is entirely 
consistent with the need to limit criminogenic opportunities, thus minimising the likelihood 
that those with a propensity to offend will be provided with that opportunity. The view that 
crime and criminality is abnormal or unusual has declined in popularity over the last half of the 
twentieth and early part of the twenty-first century, and this decline in popularity has not been 
limited to the more obvious theorists (see below). In fact, Moffit (2003) hypothesises that 
abstainers from delinquency are rare and that adolescent-limited delinquency is "normative 
adaptational social behaviour" (p. 60). 
Many theories emerging over the last 30 years (often referred to as the New Opportunity 
Theories) view cdminals not as pre-determined or different, but simply as individuals who give 
in to temptation when faced with opportunities to do so. Although still popular in the early 
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twenty-fir-st century, these theories which include Routine Activity Theory, Rational Choice 
Theor)r and Crime Pattern Theory as well as their practical applications (SCP and Crime 
Prevention through Environmental Design - CPTED) are not new, and as laycodc (2003) 
highlights, the Home Office (Mayhew et a], 1976) were publishing research on crime and 
opportunity more than quarter of a century ago. The paper by Mayhew et a] (1976) made a 
significant distinction between opportunities which are attached to people (opportunities to 
commit crime, or to become a victim of crime vary according to age, gender and lifestyle) and 
those which relate to objects (opportunities are affected by the supply of goods, the physical 
security of particular products and the levels of surveillance and supervision surrounding a 
product). Mayhew et a] (1976) also highlighted how opportunity can relate to the occasion as 
well as the temptation for action. It is clear from this brief discussion that the findings discussed 
within this paper formed the basis for many theories which followed, including those discussed 
throughout this chapter. 
Crime as a response to Opportunity: 
Since the early 1970s much evidence-based criminological theory has been moving towards a 
focus upon criminal events as opposed to the offender. Although these theories differ in their 
focus, many share the theme that opportunity generates crime and begin from the premise that 
crime is normal as opposed to something unusual which has to be explained. 
"Crime becomes a risk to be calculated (by the offender and the 
potential victim) or as an accident to be avoided, rather than 
a moral aberration which needs to be specially explained" (Garland 
1996 p. 4SO-4S 1). 
The New Opportunity Theories suggest that opportunities play a role in causing crime. Based 
upon this premise, the reduction of crime must focus upon the reduction of opportunities for 
crime to occur. Examples of interventions to reduce opportunities include locidng the door 
when you leave the house, removing valuables from sight, educating children not to talk to 
strangers and leaving lights on when the house is empty after dark. These simple measures are 
collectively thought of as SCP and CPTED (to be discussed in more detail throughout this 
chapter). Although they differ slightly in their focus (routine activity focuses upon society, 
rational choice focuses upon the offender and pattern theory the local area), the three 
criminological theories Routine Activity Theory, Rational Choice Theory and Pattern Theory 
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have been grouped together under the title New Opportunity Theories because of the themes 
which they share. 
Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) considers how the structure of modem 
society and the routine activities of everyday life have created more opportunities for criminal 
activities. Opportunities in the form of an increase in easily accessible consumer products, 
opportunities in the form of surplus time and energy as well as the dispersal of individuals into 
more households, travellers into more vehicles and activities away from the home. The first 
point refers to the correlation between rises in crime and the availability of easily accessible, 
valuable consumer products such as televisions and videos. Cohen and Felson (1979) used the 
acronym VIVA (Value, Inertia, Visibility and Accessibility) to describe suitable targets. Clarke 
(1999) expands upon this using the acronym CRAVED (Concealable, Removable, Available, 
Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable) to identify hot products. For example, a laptop computer 
would be concealable and removable (weighing approximately 3k), it would be widely 
available, valuable (approximately L9003) , enjoyable for personal use and disposable should the 
offender choose to sell the product. On the other hand, a fiidge freezer would be available 
(with most households containing one), reasonably valuable (costing approximately L2404), but 
would be very difficult to remove, conceal or dispose of without drawing too much attention to 
yourself (a fridge freezer would weigh approximately 47 kg, with a height of 140 cm, a depth of 
60 cm and a width of SS cms). According to these theories, a laptop would make a much more 
suitable target than a fridge freezer, thus the increase in the use and availability of small, 
valuable products such as mobile phones, i-pods, game boys, cam-corders and hand-held 
computers have fuelled the opportunities for crimes to be committed. The second point refers 
to the changes within modem society which have left adolescents with time and energy to 
spare, thus increasing the likelihood that they may become involved in crime and anti-social 
behaviour. For example fewer jobs require physical strength, academic qualifications are pre- 
requisites (thus delaying entry into energy and time consuming jobs) and the widespread 
availability of consumer products such as dishwashers, microwaves, ready-made meals and 
washing machines, free adolescents from chores or household tasks which would have 
previously tied them to the home. The final point refers to the changes in individuals' living and 
working arrangements. A growing number of people work long distances from their home, 
2 The Advent 7035 weighs 3.4 kg, it is 39.5 nim high, 332 nun wide and 288 mm deep. 
3 The Advent 7035 was available from Currys on the 5th December 2003 for L899. 
4The Zanussi Z57 was available from EmpireDirectco. uk on the 5th December 2003, priced E247.99. 1 The Zanussi Z57 weighs 47 kg, has a height of 140 cm, a depth of 60 cm and a width of 55 cm. 
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thus increasing the time which their home stands empty. The last few decades have also seen an 
increase in the number of women going out to work (as well as their husbands/partners), again 
increasing the likelihood that homes stand empty for perhaps eight hours of the day. As well as 
work drawing people away from their homes, changes in leisure activities have also seen an 
increase in individuals spending their leisure time away from their home, for example, 
attending a gym, eating out or late night shopping. All of these changes increase opportunities 
for crimes to be committed against residential properties in the absence of capable guardians. 
Cohen and Felson (1979) state that the increase in crime in the United States since 1960 is not 
so much an indicator of social breakdown, as a "by-product of the freedom and prosperity 
within the routine activities of our everyday live? (p. 605) and Garland (2000) states that 
"Crime is a supply-side phenomenon -a consequence of the production and delivery of 
opportunities to commit offences" (p. 217). As noted earlier, from the perspective of Routine 
Activity Theory, for a crime to be committed there must be a 'motivated offender', a 'suitable 
target' and the absence of a 'capable guardian'. A situation in which a motivated offender comes 
into contact with a suitable target, with the absence of a capable guardian is likely to lead to the 
committal of a crime. Therefore, an intervention which removes/de-motivates the offender, 
deems the target unsuitable, or introduces a capable guardian, is likely to prevent crime taking 
place. 
Another perspective, grouped into the New Opportunity Theories is Rational Choice Theory. 
This perspective is influenced by economic thinking and assumes that offenders seek to 
maximise the benefits of offending and in doing so make rational choices or decisions based 
upon the information or cues available to them at the time of offending. Decision processes are 
likely to vary according to the different stages of criminal involvement, between offenders 
(based upon age, experience etc. ) and between different offence categories. Preventive 
suggestions seek to influence an offender's decision or choice to commit a crime through 1) 
increasing what they perceive to be the risks involved in committing that offence (installing a 
burglar alarm, designing housing estates to maximise natural surveillance), as well as 2) 
reducing the rewards should that crime occur (property marking). The aim is to ensure that for 
the offender the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits of offending. 
Pattern Theory suggests that crimes "do not occur randomly in time or space or society" 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993 p. 264). For example, as Brantingharn and Brantingharn 
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(1993) suggest, bar fights are more likely to occur in Friday nights than Tuesday afternoons, 
income tax evasions are likely to cluster around the dates in which payments are due and 
pilfering of office supplies is likely to cluster geographically around areas with a high density of 
offices. Pattern Theory suggests that crimes win cluster around nodes (the places where people 
travel to and from), along pathways (the paths along which people travel to get to dfferent 
nodes) and at the boundaries to both nodes and pathways (edges). If offenders are viewed as 
being no different to everybody else (other than their readiness to commit crime), the way in 
which they select a target against which to commit a crime is much the same as the method we 
use to select a service station in which to fill our car with petrol. We a) pass the petrol station 
just as we realise we need some petrol or b) have passed the petrol station on a previous 
occasion and know that it offers good value for money, therefore making a particular journey 
back to that area as and when we need petrol. If the same goes for offending patterns, offenders 
will select their target because a) they pass it on their way to school/work, to visit a friend or 
attend a leisure facility (it is in their activity/awareness space) and realise it has poor security, 
looks unoccupied or has valuable goods on show (or all of the above), therefore selecting to 
offend against the target there and then or b) they have passed/noticed the target on a previous 
occasion and decided to offend against the target at a later date. One of the key points of this 
theory is that offenders are not abnormal. Like everybody else they spend much of their time 
travelling between the places they live and the places they attend as part of their 
leisure/school/work activities and like everybody else, they choose their targets from within 
their activity and awareness space. 
"Since burglars are, in a time-budget sense, primarily non-burglars, 
their activity spaces, or places they usually spend time, are most likely 
similar to the activity spaces of non-burglars from similar backgrounds 
and living in similar areas" (Brantinghaxn and Brantingham, 1984 p. 80). 
Several research studies support the theory that crimes are likely to cluster around offenders' 
activity and awareness spaces. Wiles and Costello (2000) found that offenders generally select a 
burglary target because they are passing it, or have passed it on an earlier occasion. 63% of their 
sample stated that they selected a burglary target through 'chance'. A further 31% stated their 
reason for target selection as 'passing and it looked easy (poor security)', 26% stated that they 
were 'passing and it looked easy (unoccupied)' and 26% stated that they were 'passing and it 
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looked easy (isolated/quiet)'. The key to these findings being that the vast majority of offenders 
were selecting targets that they had passed as part of their everyday activities. 
"Offenders do not inhabit a world in which offending and non-offending 
routines are straightforwardly dichotomised. Offending, therefore, fits in 
with other routines as opportunities, needs or temptations present themselves 
and routines themselves can include both deviant and non-deviant behaviour" 
(Wiles and Costello, 2000 p. 40). 
Taylor and Gottfredson (1987) suggest that an offender's selection of an area is based upon 
cognitive images of particular neighbourhoods that they build up over time (much like any 
normal individual building up an image of aieas which they are familiar with). They suggest that 
these images are based upon five classes of factors. These are 1) physical/environmental 
features, 2) policing patterns, 3) offenders' collective social knowledge of the locale, 4) 
resident socio-demographic characteristics and behaviour patterns, and S) the knowledge and 
disposition of the particular offender. Other studies which support Pattern Theory include 
Greenberg and Rohe (1984) and Rengert and Wasilchick (2000). Rengert and Wasilchick 
(2000) conducted interviews with incarcerated burglars and analysed burglary data as a means 
of establishing a) how burglars select from the properties available and b) what makes 
victimised properties different from those which have not been burgled? The results revealed 
that "for criminal activity individuals tend to extend familiar habitual paths, rather than travel in 
an unfamiliar directioe (p. 72). The majority of burglars selected properties which were within 
their travel path to work or leisure activities. Rengert and Wasilchick (2000) suggest that the 
position of both workplace and recreational places (although slightly less so than workplace) are 
important in influencing the location of target selection. 
"It seems that both work and recreation travel tend to orient the 
direction of the burglar's search behaviour. However, the direction 
of the workplace seems more important than the direction of the 
recreation place" (Rengert and Wasilchick, 2000 p. 79). 
If, as is suggested by the new opportunity theories discussed above, individuals commit crime as 
a response to opportunities that arise and that these opportunities are shaped by their views of 
the environment surrounding them, it follows that crime can be reduced through the 
manipulation of the environment. Crime prevention interventions which aim to achieve this 
include SCP and CPTED. 
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The Role of the Environment in Crime Reduction: 
According to Clarke (1992) SCP comprises opportunity reducing measures that are directed at 
highly specific forms of crime and involve the management, design or manipulation of the 
immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible, so as to increase the 
effort and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as perceived by offenders. 
The mechanisms through which SCP reduces crime are: 
1) Increasing perceived effort. This may include target hardening measures such 
as improving door and window locks; 
2) Reducing anticipated rewards. This may include property marldng or 
measures to disable stolen mobile phones; 
3) Increasing perceived risks. This may include the installation of CCTV or 
burglar alarms, increasing the likelihood that an offender will be seen and 
potentiaUy apprehended; 
4) Removing excuses. This may include the use of signs which state that shoplifters 
will be prosecuted removing an offender's excuse that they were not aware that 
they were doing anydiing wrong. 
SCP interventions work on the premise that offenders make calculated decisions (of limited 
rationality in formal decision theory terms) about the most suitable targets to select. Therefore, 
altering the target (installing a burglar alarm or CCTV), or portraying the message that you may 
have altered the target (installing a dummy burglar alarm or installing CCTV in some shops but 
not others) should render that target less suitable, as perceived by the potential offender. 
As noted earlier, SCP increased in popularity in the late 1970s and 1980s following a period in 
which criminology was predominantly focused upon the Criminal Justice System and the 
offender. The Home Office established its Crime Prevention Unit at this juncture, headed first 
by Kevin Heal and latterly by Gloria Laycock. Garland (2000) suggests that its re-emergence, 
alongside other similar theories of criminology, can be explained by: 
1) SCP's use of economic language such as rewards, risks, demand and supply fitted well 
with the Conservative goverrument of that time. 
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2) SCP interventions were typically short-term and relatively inexpensive compared to social 
programmes which aimed to alter criminal behaviour. 
3) SCP provided practical solutions, rather than simply postulating as to why crime is 
committed. This was attractive to practitioners who had to implement such theories on 
the ground. 
The appeal of this type of intervention over long term, resource intensive offender based 
interventions is highlighted by Smith (2000). For practitioners who are tasked with achieving 
crime reduction targets within a short timescale with very little additional resources, many 
crime reduction theories (and accompanying interventions) are unfeasible. 
"It is easy to see that happy families tend not to produce criminals. 
It is hard to see how public policy can decree that family relationships 
be constructive and positive" (Smith, 2000 p. 149). 
Similar to SCP in that it attempts to reduce crime through the manipulation of the 
enviromment, CPTED focuses solely upon designing (or altering post design) the features of the 
environment (be it a housing estate, park, shopping centre or caf6) in an attempt to: 
a) Physically increase the difficulty in committing a crime. This may include the 
installation of gates, locks or grills; 
b) Create an enviromnent in which an offender or potential offender perceives the 
risks associated with committing a crime within this location to be high. This can 
be achieved through informal, unobtrusive measures such as symbolic barriers (a 
change in road colour or texture) at the entrance to an estate which portray a 
message that this area is private even through there is no actual barrier. 
According to Poyner (198 3) CPTED generally covers four areas. These are: 
a) Surveillance - To increase the likelihood that an offender will be observed through 
measures such as enhanced lighting, the removal of blind-spots, the introduction of 
formal (security guards) or informal (neighbourbood watch) social control; 
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b) Movement Control - To limit the movement throUgh an area by minimising the 
number of access and egress points, the use of real or symbolic barriers at the entrance 
to a site as well as security measures such as lodcs; 
c) Activity Support - Increasing the likelihood that people will make use of public area 
and therefore act as additional surveillance; 
d) Motivational Reinforcement - Increasing residents' desire to engage in their own crime 
prevention activity. 
The principles through which SBD aims to reduce crime draws upon the new opportunity 
theories and brings together elements of both SCP and CPTED into a recognisable, saleable 
padcage. 
Designing out crime - An Age Old Phenomenon: 
The concept of manipulating the environment as a means of preventing crime (or attack) is not 
new. Mediaeval castles were designed to be impenetrable - sited on high ground with towers 
from which troops stood watch. These castles were surrounded by moats, spiked barriers, 
portcullis and machicolations. The towers had thickened walls and were rounded in shape with 
slightly flared bases to deflect canon shot. Barriers have also been used as a means of defence 
against attack for thousands of years. For example, the city of Jericho was protected by a wall 
21 feet high encompassing an area of 10 acres, with an outer moat IS feet wide and 9 feet deep. 
The walled city was built around 7000 BC and designed to protect the goods reaped from the 
agricultural revolution. Other examples of the early use of environmental design as a means of 
protection include the Great Wall of China (built in the 3d century BC), which was designed to 
protect China's Northern frontiers against Nomads; Hadrian's Wall (Britain); the Walls of 
Anthernius (Constantinople) and the Maginot Line (France). 
In his 1751 Treatise, Henry Fielding also gave an account of the causes and means of preventing 
crime which bear remarkable similarities to the New Opportunity Theories. Fielding (1988) 
suggests that luxury, and the temptations which it offers, goes some way towards explaining the 
crimes committed amongst the 'lower orders of society' who whilst enjoying this luxury to the 
same extent as 'upper part of life', have no way of gratifying it without resorting to crime and 
delinquency. According to Fielding (1988), as with Felson (1998) and other Opportunity 
Theorists, the most effective means of reducing crime is to remove the temptation (or 
opportunity) to offend. Fielding (1988) highlights the limitations of reactive measures which 
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simply act to 'patch-up the disease' without addressing its causes. In a similar vein to the New 
Opportunity Theorists discussed throughout this chapter, Fielding advocates prevention as a 
more effective strategy. 
"The gentlest Method which I know, and at the same Time perhaps one 
of the most effectual, of stopping the Progress of Vice, is by removing 
the Temptation. Now the two great Motives to Luxury, in the Mind of 
Man, are Vanity and Voluptuousness. The former of these operates but 
little in. this Regard with the lower Order of People. I do not mean that 
they have less of this Passion than their Betters; but the apparent Impossibility 
of gratifying it this Way deters them, and diverts at least this Passion into 
another charmer (Fielding, 1988 p. 78-79). 
Fielding's (1988) suggestions for reducing crime bear many similarities to the principles of SCP 
as well as CPTED. On the issues of punishment for receivers of stolen goods, Fielding (as has 
Clarke, 1992) stresses the role which reward has in encouraging individuals to offend. Without 
the opportunity to dispose of stolen goods, the risks of offending would be more hkely to 
outweigh the potential rewards. On discussing the laws relating to vagabonds, Fielding (1988) 
suggests that one explanation for the increase in robbery lies with the probability of escaping 
punishment due to the layout of many neighbourhoods throughout London. 
"First then, The Robber hath great Hopes of being undiscovered: And 
this is one Reason, why Robberies are more frequent in this Town... 
Whoever indeed considers the Cities of London and Westminster, with the 
late vast Addition of their Suburbs; the great Irregularity of their Buildings, 
the immense Number of Lanes, Alleys, Courts and Bye-Places; must think, 
that, had they been intended for the very purpose of Concealment, they 
could scarce have been better contrived" (Fielding, 1988 p. 13 1). 
The recognition that the environment can influence behaviour dates back thousands of years, 
but the formal study of the geography or pattern of socio-economic variables (and the social 
problems associated with these) began largely with the University of Chicago School of 
Sociology in the 1920s and 1930s (Burgess, 1916, Park et a], 192S). Although the geography of 
social problems such as unemployment, delinquency and deprivation had been researched long 
before, specific reference to the potential to reduce crime through the design or manipulation 
of the environment began in the 1960s and 70s with research conducted by authors such as 
Jacobs (196 1), Jeffery (197 1) and Newman (1973). 
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Jacobs' work raised many issues which are still debated decades later. These can be summaxised 
into four points. First, design should not be paternalistic and planners must not assume that 
they know what residents want. Second, that there should be a clear demarcation between 
public and private space. Third, that buildings should be oriented towards the street to increase 
the level of 'eyes on the street' which can act as natural surveillance. Finally, that streets should 
be used as continuously as possible thus bringing more people (eyes on the street) to the area 
and creating a vibrant atmosphere which encourages people living and working within the area 
to watch the street from their building (Jacobs states that people do not watch empty streets). 
The debates surrounding the issues of natural surveillance and mixed land use win be discussed 
in more detail throughout this chapter, however, it is worth raising several key points at this 
stage. Firstly, the crux of Jacobs theory relates to the trust between those using the street (be 
they shopkeepers, residents or passers by) to intervene should a crime take place. However, 
research suggests firstly that people do not always notice crimes taking place (Gelfand et a], 
1973; Mayhew et a], 1979) and if they notice them, they do not always intervene (Rosenthal, 
1964; Latane and Darley, 1970). The second point, which is raised by Jacobs herself 
throughout her work, but which is often excluded from debates surrounding the issues of 
designing out crime, is that Jacobs' theories relate to cities and were never intended to be 
translated to towns or suburbs. 
I hope no reader wiH try to transfer my observations into guides as 
to what goes on in towns, or little cities, or in suburbs which stiR 
are suburban. Towns, suburbs, and even little cities are totaHy 
different organisms from great cities ... To try to understand towns 
in terms of big cities wiU only compound confusion" (Jacobs, 1961 p. 26) 
Much of the research conducted into designing out crime (including that upon which this thesis 
is based) is conducted within residential neighbourhoods within suburban areas. As Jacobs 
(1961) points out, many people choose to live in cities for the very reasons which make them 
different from towns or suburban areas i. e. dexibility, mobility and relative anonymity. For 
these reasons, the dynamics of those living and worldng within a city will not translate to 
suburban areas. Finally, Jacobs' theories are often simplificd to something along the lines of 
busy, well used streets are safer than quiet culs de sac. Not only does this fail to point out that 
her research does not apply to the type of suburban area in which culs de sac might be located, it 
also fails to admowlcdge the similarities between her theories and those used in interventions 
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such as SBD. For example, there is a need to make a clear distinction between public and 
private spaces and that reducing crime through the built environment is about more than bricks 
and mortar alone, it is about the social dynamic that the environment facilitates. 
"When we try to justify good shelter instead on the pretentious 
grounds that it will work social or family miracles we fool ourselves. 
Reinhold Niebuhr has called this particular self-deception, 'The doctrine 
of salvation by bricks" (Jacobs, 1961 p. 123). 
Jeffery coined the phrase Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in his 1971 book of 
the same title. Jeffery was disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system 
and was searching for a new theory of crime prevention based upon the relationship between 
humans and their environment. Jeffery drew upon a 'biosocial theory of learning' and argued 
that crime prevention must take into account both the effects of the environment upon human 
behaviour as well as the genetic predisposition towards criminal activity. As Clarke (1992) 
states, "Jeffery's general theory of criminal behaviour has enjoyed less support than his concept 
of CPTED" (p. 6) and the term CPTED (pronounced Septed) has influenced both theory and 
intervention over the last three decades. 
Oscar Newman's work (1973) played a large part in the development of designing out crime. 
Although written from the perspective of an architect, the principles introduced by Newman 
can be seen in many modem crime reduction theories and interventions. Although Newman's 
work has been criticised for its methodological weaknesses and the emphasis placed upon 
natural surveillance (Bottoms, 1974; Mawby, 1977; Wilson, 1978; Mayhew, 1979; Merry, 
1981) its appeal lies in its promise of practical benefits in terms of crime reduction. Perhaps 
because of Newman's architectural background, his work goes beyond that of vague or elusive 
theory to offer practical solutions relating to development design. Newman's work was based 
upon a multi-unit public housing project in America (Pruitt-Igoe). 
-rhe project was designed by one of the country's most eminent 
architects and was hailed as an example of the new enlightenment... 
Residents were raised into the air in elevenstorey buildings so as to 
keep the grounds and the first floor free for communal activity. The 
buildings were given communal corridors on every third floor to 
house laundry, storage, garbage and communal rooms" (Newman, 199S p. 150). 
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As Newman (I 99S) states, "the design proved a disaster" (p. ISO) with high levels of crime and 
disorder and low levels of occupancy. In contrast to Pruitt-Igoe, Newman became aware of a 
smaller, row-house complex (Carr Village Square) which was occupied by a similar population, 
yet experienced low levels of crime and disorder and high levels of occupancy. Newman found 
that areas where a smaller number of families shared a corridor were well tended, whereas 
corridors shared by larger numbers of families had higher levels of disorder and lower levels of 
maintenance. He concluded that areas shared by more people (i. e. public space) do not "evoke 
feelings of identity or contror leaving it "impossible for residents to develop an accord on what 
was acceptable behaviour" (Newman, 199S p. ISO). 
Newman's theory of defensible space (1973) argues that the physical design of a neighbourhood 
can either release or inhibit people's latent sense of control over the spaces in which they live. 
This is achieved through four elements: 
0 Territoriality - Newman categorised space into public (i. e. the road in front of a 
property), semi-public (the front garden), semi-private (the back yard) and private 
(inside the property itself). He argued that all space should have a dearly defined 
ownership, purpose and role (increasing the level of private and semi-private space by 
designating public areas to individual families) thus allowing residents to develop 
proprietary feelings towards the space within, and more crucially, surrounding their 
property. 
0 Natural surveillance - The positioning of housing to allow maximum surveillance from 
neighbouring properties. 
9 Image - Designing buildings to avoid the stigma of public housing. 
* Wieu - Locating residential properties near to areas of the city considered to be safe. 
Newman has since applied his theory to three residential housing projects within Ohio and New 
York (1995) to reveal lower levels of crime and fear of crime and higher levels of occupancy, 
property sales and property values. 
Early research into the influence of the environment upon human behaviour were wTitten 
largely from a planning perspective and although the theories could transcend both fields of 
architecture and criminology, the transition from planning based research to practical solutions 
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applicable to crime reduction practitioners, criminologists and architects alike, began in the 
1980s and 1990s with (amongst others) work conducted by Brantingham and Brantingham. 
(1981), Poyner (1983) and Poyner and Webb (1991). The work of these authors wiH be 
discussed in more detail in Part Four of this chapter. 
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Chapter Two - Part Two 
Negative Implications of Designing out 
Crime 
The previous part of this chapter looked at the principles of CPTED and highlighted how the 
environment has been used as a means of protection for centuries. It was noted that the specific 
use of design as a crime reduction measure, however, has emerged more recently with 
initiatives such as SBD drawing upon the principles of rational choice, routine activity and 
pattern theory and from crime prevention techniques such as SCP. Although many CPTED 
initiatives such as SBD aim to design out crime using subtle techniques such as changes in the 
road colour or texture at the entrance to an estate to portray the impression to potential 
intruders that they are entering a private area, there still remains the view from some critics 
that such initiatives promote a fortress mentality. One of the explanations for this is the 
tendency for CPTED interventions to be grouped together, when in reality their means of 
reducing crime are very different. For example, gated communities, which are rising in 
popularity throughout the world, particularly in America where Ellin (1997) estimates that 
approximately eight million residents reside. These utilise physical barriers, security guards and 
other means of formal surveillance to keep non-residents out. On the other hand, initiatives 
such as SBD aim to design out crime without physically preventing non-residents from entering 
the estate. This is achieved through discreet measures which leave intruders feeling conspicuous 
as opposed to physically blocking their entry. 
Before focusing upon the specific details of the SBD initiative, this chapter will explore some of 
the criticism levelled at CPTED interventions. These can be categorised into four main areas. 
First, do CPTED interventions provide a lower risk of victimisation for the privileged at the 
expense of the most vulnerable sectors of society? Do CPTED measures burden potential 
victims with the responsibility to prevent their own victimisation? Are CPTED measures short- 
sighted? And finally, do CPTED measures over emphasise the physical environment at the 
expense of social factors? 
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Them and Us: 
One of the main criticisms of interventions such as gated communities, or the privatisation of 
crime control, is that it creates a them and us society whereby those who can afford are offered 
protection against crime at the expense of the most vulnerable sectors of society. Ellin (1997) 
likens the restrictive nature of modem gated communities to the social control gained through 
the use of restrictive covenants in residential housing. Restrictive covenants were used in the 
Industrial Revolution as a means of ensuring that tenants were not able to convert certain areas 
of agricultural land into factories. However, their use began to expand with the growth of large 
developments to include restrictions upon race and class. This was viewed as a means of 
ensuring that property values were maintained within these residential developments. Examples 
of the modem use of these restrictions are highlighted by Ellin (1997): 
0 In Monroe, New Jersey, a homeowner association took a married couple to court because 
the wife, at age 4S, was 3 years younger than the association's minimum for residency. 
In Boca Raton, Florida, an association cited a homeowner and took her to court because her 
dog weighed more than 30 pounds, a violation of association rules. 
The creation of areas of land, be they housing estates or shopping malls, which restrict certain 
sectors of the community, raises several ethical concerns. First, the enhanced security offered 
by these housing estates usually equates to higher house prices. If this is the case, such initiatives 
are effectively offering a reduced risk of victimisation to those who can afford, at the expense of 
those who cannot. Is crime therefore being displaced from the rich to the poor? 
The second concern is that introducing formal security to physically keep non-residents from an 
area removes the trust that needs to exist in civilised societies, whereby individuals police or 
control their own behaviour based upon the social norms of that society. This self discipline is 
discussed by Foucault (199 1) in relation to Bentham's Panoptican. In the Panoptican, prison 
cells were arranged around a central watch tower from which a supervisor could constantly 
survey their behaviour. Prisoners could never be sure whether they were actually being 
watched and as such gradually began to police their own behaviour. 
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"Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and 
unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his 
eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied 
upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is 
being looked at at any moment, but he must be sure that he 
may always be so" (Foucault, 1991 p. 20 1). 
When applying this point to modem residential housing, the question remains as to whether the 
physical removal or barring of certain individuals from an area will actually address criminal 
intent in the long term. An initiative which restricts an individual's entry into a housing estate 
does not address the rationale behind their decision to offend. Is it therefore simply delaying or 
displacing that offence? The final concern is whether the exclusion of individuals from certain 
areas based upon their class or race, removes their liberty and freedom to enter public areas? 
Although the subject of displacement warrants a thesis in itself, the above points have raised this 
as an issue which must at least be briefly addressed. Displacement argues that in introducing a 
crime prevention measure, opportunities for crime will be blocked and therefore offenders 
(intent upon committing crime) will decide to commit the same crime elsewhere, at a different 
time, or make a decision to commit a different crime altogether. Displacement can be: 
9 Temporal - when faced with factors preventing the committal of a crime, the offender 
makes a decision to commit the same crime type, in the same location, but at a 
different time; 
0 Geographical - when faced with a crime prevention measure, the offender makes a 
decision to commit the same crime type elsewhere; 
e Crime Switch - when faced with a crime prevention measure, the offender makes a 
decision to conunit a different offence within the same location at the same time. 
The displacement of crime has been a constant criticism of SCP measures such as SBD and one 
which has been described by Barr & Pease (1992) as "an albatross around the neck of purposive 
crime prevention" (p. 197) and by Brantingharn and Brantingham. (2000) as "the spectre that 
haunts environmental criminology and situational crime prevention" (p. 5). Barr and Pease 
(1992) suggest that this pessimism is in part due to the ability to prove displacement, but the 
inability to disprove it. "The fact remains that no-one can demonstrate that 
displacement/deflection is less than total" (p. 199). The case for displacement, however, is not 
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always clear cut and it is by no means inevitable that the restriction of an offence will always 
result in its displacement. Research suggests firstly that many offenders have a limited sphere of 
influence in which they will consider offending (Decker, 1972; Forrester et a], 1988; Wiles and 
Costello, 2000) and that if displacement does occur, the results need not always be considered 
negative. Barr and Pease (1990) suggest that the deflected or displaced crime may cause less 
harm than the original offence. 
Crime often occurs in a particular place and at a particular time due to a window of 
opportunity. If that opportunity to commit crime at a particular time is blocked, offenders will 
not always try again at an alternative time. Bennett & Wright (1984) found that burglars will 
not always return at a later time, reasons for this being planning, fate or timing. Offenders may 
also be reluctant, when faced with a blocked opportunity, to travel elsewhere. Many research 
findings support the theory of distance decay - that an offender will not automatically travel to 
find a target which is not protected by such crime prevention measures. This is highlighted by 
the following studies: 
0 Wiles and Costello (2000) found that the average distance travelled to offend was 1.93 
miles. Domestic burglary was 1.88 miles, Theft from vehicle (1.97 miles), TWOC (2.36 
miles), Non-Domestic Burglary (1 . 83 miles) and 
ABH (1.49 miles). 
a Decker (1972) suggests that the introduction of slug-rejecter devices in parking meters did 
not lead to people parking their cars in the nearest town without these devices. 
Table 1: Distance to Offend 
Auto Theft 
Study Miles to Offend Location 
White (1932) 3.43 miles Indianapolis 
Phillips (1980) 1.15 miles Lex ing. ton -Fayette, Kentucky 
Gabor and Gottheil (1984) 1.24 miles Ottawa 
Adapted from Wiles and Costello (2000) 
Burglary 
Study Miles to Offend Location 
White (19 3 2) 1.76 miles Indianapolis 
Phillips (1980) 1.05 miles Lex i ngton -Fayette, Kentucky 
Gabor and Gottheil (1984) 0.35 miles Ottawa 
Reppetto (1974) 0.5 miles Boston and a nearby small city 
Pyle (1974) - residential 2.48 miles Akron, Ohio 
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Pyle (1974) --- non-residential 2.34 miles Akron, Ohio 
Rhodes and Conly (198 1) 1 1.62 miles Washington D. C 
Adapted from Wiles and Costello (2000) 
The concept of action being based upon opportunity and hence not necessarily displaced is 
summed up by Clarke & Mayhew (1988) who showed that the change from toxic to natural gas 
in the 1970s reduced the number of suicides using domestic gas without a displacement to other 
methods of suicide. The premise of this theory being that gas as a means of suicide was 
available, painless and lethal. Those who may have chosen to commit suicide using this method, 
had it been available, will not necessarily take the time or effort to select a more difficult 
method of suicide. Displacement in this case is not total. Examples of research studies which 
have shown some evidence of displacement include: 
* Brown's (1995) study of Birmingham and Tilley's study of car crime (1993) showed 
evidence of displacement following the introduction of CCTV systems; 
0 Barr and Pease (1990) found evidence of spatial displacement of about one quarter of the 
burglaries prevented; 
Chaiken et a] (1974) found that a reduction in robberies achieved by 'exact fare' systems on 
New York buses was accompanied by an increase of robberies in the subway; 
0 Allatt (1984) found that the decrease in burglaries on a housing estate following extensive 
target hardening measures was almost matched by the increase in burglaries on a nearby 
estate. 
Contrary to these, there are suggestions that crime prevention initiatives can succeed without 
displacement and may even benefit surrounding areas (diffusion of benefits). 
0 Poyner and Webb (1987) found that measures to reduce thefts from shopping bags in some 
city areas seemed to reduce thefts in other city centre areas. 
Poyner (1988 & 1992) found that CCTV in both car parks and on buses appeared to 
produce a diffusion of benerits to areas without CCTV in place. 
Scherdin (1986) found that the introduction of an electronic security system in a library 
reduced thefts of items which were not tagged as well as those which were. 
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The Burden of Responsibility. - 
Duff and Marshall (2000) raise the concern that crime prevention measures such as CPTED 
which offer advice and information relating to the potential threat of victimisation and the 
associated measures which can be taken to reduce this risk, place an unnecessary burden upon 
victims or potential victims. Does the availability of information which could prevent 
vicfm-tisation place the onus upon the wrong party - the victim as opposed to the offender? 
Clarke (2000) suggests that offering advice and information relating to crime prevention is both 
valuable and welcome and does not have to result in blame being placed upon individuals who 
go on to become victims. He suggests that the only place for blame, within the field of crime 
prevention, is in shaming manufacturers who produce criminogenic products, for example the 
publication of league tables relating to the make of stolen cars. 
"It is indefensible to blame rape on short skirts and other 'sexually 
provocative conduct'. Nonetheless, there is a place for giving people 
information about behaviours that put them at risk of crime" (Clarke, 2000 p. 106) 
Architectural Determinism: 
One of the criticisms levelled at CPTED, in particular Newman's earlier claims (1973), are that 
they over-emphasise the physical enviromnent at the expense of social factors such as resident 
income and child density or population (Wilson, 1978; Mayhew, 1979; Poyner, 1983 and 
Moughtin and Gardner, 1990). Wilson's (1978) study of vandalism on 38 housing estates 
within an inner London borough revealed that although there was evidence to suggest that in 
blocks with low child density (between 0 and 2 children per 10 dwellings) defensible space 
features such as the extent of public versus private space, territoriality and through-routes did 
influence levels of vandalism, the single most important factor in explaining variations in levels 
of vandalism was child density. Features such as design classification, height of block, size of 
block, privacy, real/symbolic barriers, entrance type, access, age of block, landscaping and 
child population/density were measured and compared against both recorded (local authority 
repairs) and observed levels of vandalism. As was suggested above, the study did give some 
limited support to Newman's (1973) contentions, with blocks with low child densities 
experiencing higher levels of vandalism where space was classed as impersonal, public or semi. 
public, where blocks were high rise and where entrances were used as through routes to other 
blocks. However, the findings did not support Newman's (1973) early suggestions that physical 
design features are more influential than social factors. Although these criticisms raise caution 
over architectural determinism, it would be misleading to claim that CPTED holds only 
36 
defensible space principles as its basis and that Newman's early suggestions remained unrefined. 
In relation to the latter point, Newman's later work (I 97S, 1976) recognised the importance of 
social factors, with the percentage of one parent families and population of teenage children 
revealed as the factors most likely to influence levels of crime in his 197S study of 100,000 
units of public housing in New York. 
A study by Bottoms et a] (1992) also suggests that although the physical design of residential 
housing can have some influence upon crime levels, the alteration of the environment cannot 
act alone to inhibit or encourage crime. In their study of two housing estates within Sheffield. 
Bottoms et al (1992) found that the direct and indirect influences of the housing market were 
vital in understanding the offender and offence rates of these communities. 
"in order to understand and explain offending behaviour by residents of 
particular areas, it is vital to consider who lives in these areas; how they 
came to live there in the first place; what Und of social life the residents 
have created; how outsiders (including official agencies) react to them; 
and why they remain in the areas and have not moved" (Bottoms et a], 
1992 p. 122). 
Bottoms et a] (1992) suggest that the housing market - that is the process whicli enables or 
restricts people from moving into a property, or restricts people from leaving a residence 
should they desire, affects the crime levels experienced within a given area through direct and 
indirect influences. The obvious influence being the allocation by housing providers of different 
groups of individuals to different housing estates based upon socio-demograpbic factors such as 
age or marital status, with these socio-demographic factors in turn influencing an individuals 
propensity to offend. For example, a policy which houses young, single males on a given 
housing estate may increase the likelihood that the offence/offender rate will rise. In contrast, a 
decision to locate pensioners within that housing estate may have the opposite effect upon the 
local offence/offender rate. Bottoms et a] (1992) demonstrate how the housing allocation 
policy within Sheffield, which utilises a date-order system whereby individuals are placed in one 
of four categories - A, B, C and D (A being urgent and D being the general waiting and general 
transfer list) perpetuates (and even exacerbates) the crime problems within certain areas by 
encouraging those who are desperate to be housed to accept low demand housing estates, 
leaving the only residents who are confident to select high demand housing (with a waiting list 
of over ten years) being those already housed within another area. As Bottoms et a] (1992) 
suggest, the proportion of transfers to general waiting list applicants for a housing estate is a 
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good indicator of the perceived desirability of that estate. Those who are in a position to choose 
will, those who are not will accept the low demand, high crime areas. just as Bottoms et a] 
(1992) caution against relying upon the influence of design in determining the extent to which a 
residential housing estate will or will not experience crime, they are also dear in stating that 
the influence of the housing market "does not operate alone in the creation of offender-based 
residential community crime careers" (p. 123). Rather, they suggest "it interacts with a range of 
other aspects of social life to create the relevant social effects" (p. 123) these being the social 
networks of the area, socialisation processes affecting the children within that area, the work of 
social control agencies, the development of reputations or labels of a given area, the economic 
development within the area, as well as the physical design of the built environment. 
Criminals Adapt: 
The final point to be discussed within this diapter is the criticism that the reliance upon physical 
barriers alone fails to admowledge that criminals are able to adapt their methods to overcome 
the barriers which face them. In the case of the Constantinople, the walls which had acted as 
protection were weak from above (bombardment) and below (mining) once attackers had 
adapted to the restraints that faced them. 
-The first transforming event was the fall (or liberation, for Muslims) 
of Constantinople in 1453 when the Ottoman Turks were able 
- assisted by gunpowder ... and cannon ... to lob 800 pound cannon 
balls against the city's walls, breaching them over the course of fifty days. 
These were the same walls that had withstood the onslaught of Islam 
for 700 years" (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002 p. 77). 
For this reason, crime reduction practitioners must avoid complacency by continuing to 
research the effectiveness of any crime reduction measure which they are implementing. A 
measure which has worked to reduce crime in the past will not automatically continue to do so 
once criminals adapt their methods. 
To avoid this criticism, CPTED interventions must continue to evolve by carrying out research 
with an improvement orientation. It is not sufficient to accept that a crime reduction measure 
works per se, the focus must be placed upon ensuring that standards continue to evolve faster 
than criminals' abilities to overcome them. 
"Reacting once crime harvests happen is the least desirable state of 
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affairs. Scanning for new threats and reacting quicIdy to spread the 
alert is better than waiting for the future to take us entirely 
unawares. And anticipation - seeing the wave coming and taldng 
avoiding action - is best of all" (Ekblorn 2002 p. 38) 
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Chapter Two - Part Three 
Secured by Design 
SBD is a UK based initiative, managed by ACPO Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd. (ACPO CPI 
Ltd. ), which aims to encourage the building industry to design out crime. SBD was devised in 
1989 by police forces based within the South East of England, with the aim of countering the 
rise in household burglary (Pascoe and Topping, 1997). Very little has been published on the 
origins of the scheme and the theories upon which it was based, however, papers by both 
Cozens et al (2001) and Pascoe and Topping (1997) suggest that the initiative was based, in 
some part, upon Newman's theory of defensible space (1973). In an attempt to establish how 
far the SBD scheme was theoretically and empirically supported at the time of its inception, 
Pascoe and Topping (1997) conducted a review of the available documentation as wen as 
interviews with IS police officers. They suggest that the scheme was influenced by both 
environmental criminology (including SCP and defensible space) as well as theories which 
focused upon offenders as decision makers (including rational choice theory). Although it is 
estimated that in the seven ensuing years, 3S, 000 SBD homes were built on nearly 3,700 estates 
these figures are no longer updated by the Crime Prevention College and unlike the Secured 
Car Park scheme, there is no national database which monitors the number of houses or estates 
built to the SBD standard. There have, however, been several legislative and policy 
developments since this figure was published which anecdotal evidence suggests have 
contributed to a rise in the use and popularity of SBD. These include the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998, Housing Corporation incentives such as enhanced 
funding for meeting additional security requirements, Best Value Performance Indicators 
relating to crime reduction and multi-agency working as well as the Home Office Circular 
S/94. 
SBD includes both the Developers' Award and licensed Products. Ile Developers' Award is a 
certificate given to building developments which are built to the SBD standard. That is, 
following consultation with the police Architectural liaison Officer (ALO) or Crime 
Prevention Design Advisor (CPDA) the development is deemed to conform to the appropriate 
ACPO guidelines. SED guides exist for a vaiiety of buildings and spaces including new homes, 
refurbishments, sheltered accommodation, multi-storey dwellings, car parks, railway stations, 
caravan parks and play areas. It is the Developers' Award element of SBD - that which deems a 
property/area to be SBD or not, upon which this thesis is focused. 
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The second element of SBD, which has been more recently developed, is Licensed Products. 
ACPO CPI Ltd. may award SBD licensed Company status to companies which produce doors 
and windows which pass the standards and tests required to achieve the SBD status. The 
minimum standards for SBD are prepared through consultation with the ACPO Project and 
Design Technical Committee, as well as other relevant agencies, and are subject to regular 
review. The specific standards for SBD developments are included at appendix 1 and can also be 
accessed via the SBD website (Standards and Testing, 2004). 
The SBD scheme was developed in consultation with the Department of Transport and the 
Local Regions as well as trade, industry and standards organisations. It also has the backing of 
the Home Office. Although the SBD scheme requires the input of a variety of agencies such as 
local authority planning departments, registered social landlords (RSIs) and architects, it is 
managed and promoted primarily by the police. Each police force has a number of ALOs or 
CPDAs who work in consultation with these different agencies to ensure that as many 
developments as possible are designed and built (or refurbished) to the SBD standard. It is the 
responsibility of ALOs and CPDAs to assess planning applications from a security perspective 
and to work with developers to attempt to address any design weaknesses which emerge. The 
process from the submission of a planning application to the ALO/CPDA awarding SBD status 
may vary considerably depending upon the police force as well as the client involved. Where a 
client is required to build all new homes to SBD standard (this is the case for several RSI-s) and 
is familiar with their appointed ALO/CPDA and the process of applying for the SBD award, 
applications are likely to be submitted at the concept stage with plans which already meet (or 
almost meet) the required standards. In this instance, the work of the ALO/CPDA would differ 
greatly from a case whereby plans were submitted at the post-planning stage with designs which 
would require major alterations to ensure that the development complied with the scheme. A 
more common scenario is likely to be somewhere between these examples, with ALO/CPDA 
and client negotiation taking place at the planning stage. Again depending upon the police 
force/local authority area, this negotiation process is likely to rely heavily upon both national 
and local policy such as the Unitary Development Plan and any Supplementary Planning 
Guidance, which should emphasise the importance of security considerations. 
Although it is the responsibility of individual ALO/CPDAs to deterniine whether a 
development receives the SBD award, there is an appeal process should developers disagree 
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with the decision made by the ALO/CPDA. Although a developer has never appealed against a 
decision made within the West Yorkshire region and only four appeals have been made 
nationally in the first eight months of 2004, ACPO outline the appeals procedure as follows: 
0 ALO/CPDA refuses to offer SBD certification; 
0 Developer contacts the Chair of ACPO Crime Prevention Design Group (CPDG); 
A nominated representative is allocated to the appeal. This representative will not be 
from the same region as the ALO / CPDA in question; 
The representative submits their findings to the Chair of ACPO CPDG for 
consideration by the committee; 
0 Assuming that there are no difficulties arising from the representative's interpretation 
of SBD or any other facts involved in the case, the decision will be made at committee 
level; 
0 If there is still a problem, then the appeal will be heard by the ACPO, Officer 
responsible for the ACPO CPDG. This will take the form of a hearing 
As was mentioned within the opening paragraph, the principles of SBD draw largely upon the 
New Opportunity Theories of crime and upon crime prevention measures such as SCP and 
CPTED which assume that crime is a response to opportunity, therefore removing the 
opportunity can reduce crime. These theories also place an emphasis upon the role of the 
environment in creating or impeding these opportunities. The principles of SBD fall largely into 
the Mowing categories: 
Physical Security: SBD sets standards of physical security for each property and its 
boundaries. These include BS: PAS 23-1: 1999 (general perfonnance), BS: EN 1303: 
1998 Oock cylinders for multi-point locldng), BS 3621: 1998 (locks), BS: PAS 24-1: 
1999 (security performance), LPS 117S: Issue 4,1998 (specification for testing) for 
doors and BS: 79SO (security performance), BS 7412: 1991 (plastic windows), BS 644- 
1: 1989 (wood windows), BWF: TWAS (timber windows), BS 6510: 1984 (steel 
windows), LPS I 17S: Issue 4,1998 (specification for testing) for windows. 
o Surveillance: SBD estates are designed to adiieve maximum natural surveillance 
without compromising the need for privacy. 
* Access/Egress: SBD estates are designed to include a minimum number of 
access/egress points in an attempt to avoid unnecessary entry onto the estate by non- 
residents and potential offenders. 
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Aid 
0 Territoriality: In an attempt to achieve maximum informal social control, SBD draws 
upon Newman's principles of Defensible Space (1973). If space has a clearly defined 
ownership, purpose and role, it is evident to residents within the neighbourhood who 
should, and more importantly who should not be in a given area. 
Management and Maintenance: SBD estates should have a programmed management 
system in place to maintain the area. This includes the removal of litter and graffiti. 
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Chapter Two - Part Four 
Principles of SBD 
As was discussed within part two of this chapter, the main premise upon which initiatives such 
as SBD are developed is that crime is a response to opportunity and that opportunities are 
largely influenced by the environment in which offenders or potential offenders operate. This 
section of the chapter will focus upon previous research carried out into the influence of the 
environment upon offender decision making. This will be broken down into the main principles 
of SBD - these being physical security, surveillance, access and egress, territoriality and finally 
management and maintenance. 
Physical Security - Can I get in? 
Although SBD does not rely solely upon physical security, the standards set to which doors, 
windows, fences etc. must adhere to, suggest that physical security is viewed as a crucial factor. 
Previous research into this subject is mixed, with several studies suggesting that the actual home 
break-in requires little in the way of technical sophistication and is a low priority for burglars 
when searching for targets (Reppetto, 1974; Maguire and Bennett, 1982). However, the 
majority of studies appear to suggest that with all other factors being equal, burglars would 
prefer to offend against properties with lower levels of physical security. Cromwell et a] (199 1) 
used staged activity analysis (interviews and ride-alongs) with a sample of 30 active burglars as a 
means of establishing which (if any) environmental cues influenced target selection. Although 
the majority of participants initially stated that they were not deterred by locks or alarm 
systems, during burglary reconstructions it was discovered that given two potential sites, all 
other factors being equal, they would prefer to offend against properties with lower levels of 
physical security. Over 90% of the sample stated that they would not choose a target with an 
alarm system and 7S% of the sample stated that they would be deterred by a sign or a window 
sticker that stated that the house was protected by an alarm system. 
Brown and Altman (198 3) studied the environmental features of 306 burgled houses on burgled 
blocks, non-burgled houses on burgled blocks and non-burgled houses on non-burgled blocks 
and found that when compared with non-burgled houses, those which had been burgled had 
fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories and more indicators of public 
territories (i. e. stop signs). These properties also had fewer actual barriers such as fences and 
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locked gates protecting private territory from public access. Brown and Bentley (1993) studied 
a group of 72 incarcerated burglars who were each shown 10 pictures of homes - half burgled, 
half non-burgled. They were asked to rate the properties on a number of risk factors as well as 
judge their burglary status. Across all 10 homes, houses judged as difficult to enter were 
perceived as being non-burgled. 
Surveillance - Is Anybody There? 
As was discussed within the previous section, SBD estates are designed to achieve maximum 
natural surveillance without compromising the need for privacy. This is achieved through a 
variety of methods. Houses are positioned so that entrances face the street, foliage, walls and 
fences must not obstruct sightlines and wherever possible, estates include a mix of dwelling 
types suited to a variety of residents such as families, elderly and young couples, thus 
maximising the likelihood that at least one neighbour will be at home throughout the day and 
night. Research suggests that the issue of surveillance is crucial in offender decision maldng, 
with occupancy or signs of occupancy, the location of neighbouring properties and the level to 
whf ch they can remain anonymous influencing a burglar's target choice. 
Offenders prefer to avoid confrontation with residents (Rengert and Wasilchick, 2000) and 
where possible, select targets which are unoccupied (Reppetto, 1974, Cromwell et a] 1991). 
Reppetto (1974) found that the most common reason given by 97 convicted burglars for 
avoiding a particular target was that there were 'too many people around' - over a third of the 
sample gave this as a reason for avoiding a particular target. Cromwell et al (199 1) found that 
over 90% of participants (n--230 active burglars) stated that they would never enter a residence 
that they knew to be occupied. Brown and Bentley (1993) asked 72 incarcerated burglars to 
assess from photographs whether or not properties had been burgled. Across all ten homes, the 
houses judged to be occupied were perceived as being non-burgled. 
in determining whether or not a property is occupied, offenders look for dues or traces of 
occupancy. Brown and Altman (1983) studied 306 burgled and non-burgled properties and 
found that burgled houses showed fewer indications of the probable presence of residents than 
non-burgled properties. These signs or traces included toys strewn across the yard or sprinUers 
operating in the garden. 
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As well as occupancy, the likelihood that offenders will be noticed by neighbours also appears 
to be crucial in the decision making process. Reppetto (1974) found that over a fifth of the 
sample of 97 convicted burglars stated that the possibility of neighbours watching them 
deterred them from selecting a property. This research also suggests that burglars select 
locations where they feel less conspicuous - race being a particularly important factor in this 
decision making process. In support of Reppetto's findings, Brown and Altinan (198 3) found 
that burgled properties had less visual access to immediately neighbouring properties than non- 
burgled properties. 
Territoriality - Does Anybody Care? 
The principles of SBD incorporate much of Oscar Newman's theory of Defensible Space 
(1973). Newman categorised space into public (i. e. the road in front of a property), semi- 
public (the front garden), semi-private (the back garden) and private (inside the property 
itself). He argued that all space should have a clearly defmed ownership, purpose and role 
(increasing the level of private and semi-private space by designating public areas to individual 
families) thus allowing residents to develop proprietary feelings towards the space within, and 
more crucially, surrounding their property. Newman argued that the physical design of a 
neighbourhood can either release or inhibit people's latent sense of control over the spaces in 
which they live. SBD aims to encourage what Newman refers to as territoriality through 
ensuring that private and semi-private space is maximised and public space is kept to a 
minimum. Front gardens are bounded by fencing - not to physically prevent entry, but rather 
to convey a message that 'this area is private'. Entrances to estates are also narrowed with a 
change in road colour and texture to portray the impression to outsiders that they are entering a 
private area. Research relating to territoriality is mixed. YVUlst Newman (1973,1995) found 
that housing estates designed with higher levels of communal space and a lack of dear 
demarcation between private and public space experienced higher levels of crime and disorder, 
others question the influence which architectural design can have upon resident's willingness to 
actually intervene if a crime were to take place. The extent to which architectural design alone 
can influence resident behaviour is questioned by Merry (1981) who supports the suggestion 
that housing estates in which residents show increased levels of social cohesion, social 
Organisation and interaction experience lower levels of crime and disorder, but questions the 
direct relationship between the architectural design and the residents' behaviour. 
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Merry (1981) examined the link between social organisation and crime and disorder in an 
American housing development which had been built to encompass many of the design features 
of defensible space. Within the housing project which Merry examined, 78% of the first floor 
residents had installed expensive iron bars over their windows. In the 4 years 1972-1976, police 
recorded statistics suggested that the project had suffered 117 robberies and purse snatches and 
40 burglaries. Merry's own victimisation survey suggested that there had been 89 burglaries, 50 
robberies and purse snatches and 10 assaults within the project area. Over half of these 
robberies reported in the victimisation survey took place in areas which were architecturally 
defensible. Merry suggests that the benefits of designing housing estates to maximise 
territoriality and surveillance fail to account for the behaviour of many residents who a) are not 
always present to look out of their window - which has been designed to overlook the 
neighbouring properties, b) may not be able to distinguish neighbours from strangers, c) may 
not be able to distinguish a 'domestic' from a 'brawl' - due to different social and cultural 
backgrounds and d) may be afraid to intervene due to fear of retribution. 
"Architectural design is necessary to create spaces which can be defended, 
but in this setting, actual intervention seems to depend on a sense of 
responsibility and control over territory, access to effective modes of 
intervention, commitment and involvement in the neighbourhood, and as 
a result of these factors, relatively little fear" (Merry, 1981 p. 412). 
Several research papers support the premise that neighbourhoods in which residents display 
signs of territorial behaviour actually experience (or are judged by offenders to be likely to 
experience) less crime (Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 1993). However, the 
direct ability to link that territorial behaviour to the architectural design of the property (and 
the neighbouring estate) is limited. Evidence supporting the premise that properties are less 
likely to be burgled if their residents show evidence of territorial behaviour i. e. well tended 
garden, signs on the gate or fences bounding the front garden, cannot be used as support for the 
theory that the design of the house or the layout of the estate created that territorial behaviour. 
just as evidence to support the direct link between architecture and resident behaviour is 
limited, those who raise doubts about defensible Space tend to question the architectural 
determinism, rather than raising evidence to suggest contrary findings i. e. that arc]-ýItectural 
design can increase as opposed to reduce crime. Unfortunately, the abundance of research which 
has studied the factors which predict territoriality through behaviour such as membership of 
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Neighbourhood Watch or other forms of crime prevention scheme, has focused largely upon 
personal factors such as gender, age, ethnicity and prior victimisation and does not include the 
design and layout of the housing estate in which they live. As was highlighted by Merry (198 1), 
the territoriality created by defensible space may not always be adequate to overcome the crime 
and disorder problems within a neighbourhood. and other factors such as fear of retribution, 
confusion and simply being unaware must be taken into account. Residents/shoppers/passers 
by do not always notice a crime taking place (Gelfand et a] 1973; Mawby 1977; Mayhew et al 
1979) and even if they notice the crime, they do not always take action to prevent it 
(Rosenthal, 1964; Latane and Darley, 1970). 
Access/Egress - Encounter versus Enclosure: 
One of the major current debates surrounding designing out crime within residential housing is 
that of permeability (through-movement). The debate centres upon the benefits of facilitating 
movement within an area weighed against the risks of potentially criminogenic design. Those 
who argue in favour of permeable housing believe that residential areas should encourage 
movement and thus allow passersby to create an informal surveillance or act as guardians for 
that area. Much support for the issue of permeable housing estates emerged following the Rio 
Earth Summit of 1992 (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992) 
and its product document Agenda 21 which encourages sustainability - getting people out of 
their cars and onto their feet and bicycles. In contrast, the principles of SBD draw upon 
research which suggests that encouraging movement through a housing estate allows offenders 
to attach that area to their awareness space as well as giving them a legitimate reason to be 
where they should not be. For example, if a housing estate is permeable with an abundance of 
footpaths, this gives an offender the opportunity to notice a vulnerable property en-route to 
school, work or leisure activities and to familiarise themselves with the daily routines of those 
living within the target property. As well as increasing the likelihood that an offender will 
notice the property, permeable estates give offenders an excuse to be within a given area. A 
resident living within a property which has a footpath running at the rear of the back garden 
may notice a stranger acting suspiciously, yet apprehension of that individual would likely be 
ineffective due to the possible legitimate nature of that individual's journey. Put simply, a 
resident has no right to apprehend an individual whom they feel may be considering their 
property as a potential target for burglary because that individual could simply reply that they 
are on their way to the shops or to visit a friend. 
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For those whose job it is to make decisions about planning applications regarding the design and 
layout of residential housing, there remains a conflict in advice. Whilst a large proportion of 
criminological research warns of the dangers involved in increasing access and permeability, 
several research studies, as well as design guidance (Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions, 1998; Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999) 
have suggested that through movement and permeability is preferable to limited access when 
attempting to reduce crime (Rudlin and Falk, 199S; HiMer and Chi-Feng Shu, 1998; Chi-Feng 
Shu, 2000). 
"It seems that burglars avoid dwellings on linear constituted through 
carriageways and also on the first line into the cul-de-sacs off integrated 
streets, and instead look for those in the deeper, more segregated parts 
of the tree like cul-de-sac complex, especially those with unconstituted 
back access" (Chi-Feng Shu, 2000 p. 187). 
As well as the design guidance and research discussed, there also exists a design movement 
termed New Urbanism (also known as Neo-Traditional Town Planning and Traditional 
Neighbourhood Development) which argues that vibrant streets and walkable neighbourhoods 
will reduce opportunities for crime. Schneider and Kitchen (2002) highlight how although the 
ultimate aim of New Urbanism is the same as SBD (that being to regenerate neighbourhoods 
and reduce crime and disorder as well as the fear of crime and disorder); the means by which 
they aim to achieve this are, in many instances, very different. New Urbanism encourages 
walkable neighbourhoods, mixed land use, using rear access alleys, hiding garages and 
eliminating culs de sac in favour of permeable street networks - measures which would not be 
acceptable within SBD housing. In contrast, there exists an abundance of criminological 
research which suggests that crime is higher along major vehicular or pedestrian pathways as 
opposed to within dosed estates such as culs-de-sac which limit through movement 
(Brantingharn and Brantingham, 197S, 1993,2000; Bevis and Nutter, 1977; Brantingharn et a], 
1977; Brown and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and Rohe, 1984; Cromwell et a], 
1991; Mirlees-Black et a], 1998; Rengert and Wasilchick, 2000). The rationale behind these 
findings falls largely into the following categories: 
a) Permeable neighbourhoods offer ease of entry and escape; 
b) Offenders are more likely to be aware of potential targets that they pass on a day to day 
basis. Therefore, crime will be higher along travel paths, both pedestrian and vehicular; 
c) Permeable neighbourhoods offer increased anonymity for potential offenders. 
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Research supporting the first rationale - that offenders prefer permeable neighbourhoods due 
to the ease they offer in terms of entry, through movement and escape, includes Taylor and 
Gottfredson (1987) and Poyner and Webb (1991). The second explanation for higher crime 
within permeable neighbourhoods, suggests that offenders have to be aware of a property's 
existence before they can select it as a target for crime. As offenders spend much of their time 
travelling between home, work, school or leisure activities, the properties that they become 
aware of are likely to be along the travel paths that they frequent. 
"Since burglars are, in a time-budget sense, primarily non-burglars, 
their activity spaces, or places they usually spend time, are most 
likely similar to the activity spaces of non-burglars from similar 
backgrounds and living in similar areas" (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1984 p. 80). 
Research which supports this perspective includes that of Wiles and Costello (2000) who used 
interviews with offenders, police recorded crime data and forensic science data from the police 
DNA database as a means of investigating the distance which offenders will travel to offend. 
Their findings suggest that burglars are largely opportunistic, with the selection of a particular 
target taldng place as they pass properties and notice their suitability. 
"Offenders do not inhabit a world in which offending and non-offending 
routines are straightforwardly dichotomised. Offending, therefore, 
fits in with other routines as opportunities, needs or temptations 
present themselves and routines themselves can include both deviant 
and non-deviant behaviour" (Wiles and Costello, 2000 p. 40). 
Additional research findings which support the premise that offenders select properties as they 
take part in day to day activities include Letkemann (1973) who found that burglars interviewed 
in British Columbia stated that they generally kept their eyes open for targets all of the time. 
Rengert and Wasilchick (2000) found that convicted Philadelphia area burglars usually picked 
their targets within a limited distance of their normal travel paths, primarily along the axis of 
their usual home-to-work travel path. Feeney (1986) and Gabor et a] (1987) found that 
individual choice of robbery locations was oriented or directed towards personally wen known 
locations. Beavon (1984) analysed police recorded crimes and found that for all types of crime 
(with the exception of bicycle theft) crime decreased the fin-ther the target was located away 
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from highly accessible roads. Taylor and Nee (198 8) found that burglars express a consistent 
preference for comer houses. 
The rationale behind this preference may relate to awareness of the property as well as the 
increased ease through which they can enter and escape from a comer home. And finally, 
Poyner and Webb (199 1) suggest that through routes allow offenders to search for potential 
targets. The final rationale, that offenders prefer targets located within areas of high pedestrian 
movement due to the anonymity which this movement provides, is supported by Angel (1968), 
Suttles (1968), Brantingham & Brantingham (1975), Taylor and Gottfredson (1987) and Poyner 
and Webb (199 1). 
"Avoid creating pedestrian routes through housing areas as this 
encourages search behaviour by prospective thieves. it gives 
them an opportunity to wander freely through any housing area 
without looldng out of place7 (Poyner and Webb, 1991 p. 9S). 
Those who offer the counter argument suggest that through movement encourages people to 
the area who can subsequently act as guardians and enhance informal social control. Jacobs 
(1961) is often quoted as a supporter of 'eyes on the street' as a means of reducing crime. 
However, as was discussed earlier within this chapter, Jacobs' theory that increased movement 
can act to reduce crime, was never meant to be applied to towns, villages or housing estates and 
should only be applied to cities. 
Management and Maintenance: 
in recognition of research which highlights that anti-social behaviour can act as a catalyst for 
increased crime and disorder, higher levels of fear of crime and a reluctance by residents to 
engage in informal crime prevention activities (Skogan, 1990), SBD places a large emphasis 
upon management and maintenance. Several studies have suggested that if low level disorder 
such as vandalism and litter are not addressed, they can act as a catalyst for more serious crimes. 
Skogan (1990) refers to this as the contagion theory, suggesting that the "presence of vandalism 
stimulates more vandalism" (p. 39). Wilson and Kelling (1982) refer to this contagious effect as 
the "broken windows theory" (p. 16). This suggests that an area with existing deterioration such 
as graffiti and vandalism conveys the impression that a) nobody cares so apprehension is less 
likely and b) the area is already untidy so one more act will go unnoticed. Because of existing 
deterioration, the area is not only an easy target, it is also viewed as fair game. This is supported 
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by Zimbardo (1970) and Finnie (1973) who found that anti-social behaviour such as vandalism, 
rubbish or criminal damage leads directly to more anti-social behaviour. Taylor and 
Gotttfredson (1987) also found that physical incivilities indirectly influence offenders' 
perception of risk in that they portray a resident's level of care or concern for the area in which 
they live, thus acting as an indicator for the likelihood that they will intervene if they detect an 
offence taldng place. 
"The incivilities thesis proposes a process that links residents making inferences 
about potential offenders and offenders making inferences about potential 
interventions by residents" (raylor and Gottfredson, 1987 p. 405). 
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Chapter Two - Part Five 
The Current Climate within the UK 
Since its inception in 1989, SBD has seen policy and legislative changes which have both 
encouraged its development as well as hindering its progress. The majority of policy 
developments have been favourable, with the increasing importance placed upon both 
community safety and multi-agency crime reduction. One of the most important legislative 
changes has been the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which has placed a statutory responsibility 
upon partners such as local authorities and the police, to work together to reduce crime and 
disorder. It seemed appropriate to the writer to include in the thesis the legislative and policy 
framework within which SBD has to be considered. 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998: 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) emerged as a result of the 1991 report -entitled Safer 
Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention Through the Partnership Approach 
(otherwise known as the Morgan Report) and was the work of an independent working group 
convened by the then Home Office Standing Conference on Crime Prevention, under the 
Chairmanship of Mr James Morgan. The report underlined the need for broadly based, multi- 
agency approaches to crime prevention and reduction, within which agencies could co-operate 
as well as deliver their own contribution. 
The Crime and Disorder Act introduced many changes to the field of community safety. 
However, the elements which impacted most prominently upon crime reduction schemes such 
as SBD, were Sections 5,6 and 17. Under sections 5 and 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
relevant partners were set the task of compiling Crime and Disorder Audits designed to 
ascertain the extent, level and locality of crime and disorder within their area. 7be audit 
document had to be presented to the public in a consultation exercise before a Crime and 
Disorder Strategy was compiled which set out dear aims and objectives for reducing crime and 
disorder. This placed a requirement upon the police and local authorities to work together to 
reduce crime in their area and led to the development of multi-agency partnership groups 
whose task it was to devise, implement and measure local and national crime reduction targets. 
71-jis climate of multi-agency worldng between departments who had previously been excluded 
&om. the crime reduction agenda, such as Development and Control and Housing and Planning 
departments has created a perfect arena within which SBD can flourish. Partnerships are 
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searching for interventions which allow, them to demonstrate their commitment to work 
together to reduce crime, the fact that SBD requires the input and expertise of so many of these 
agencies, renders it a ideal choice to demonstrate compliance. 
As was previously mentioned, the Crime and Disorder Act placed a requirement upon 
partnerships to produce crime and disorder strategies every three years. The first strategy had 
to be published by April 1999, often leaving newly formed partnerships very little time (Byme 
and Pease, 2003 suggest that partnerships had little more fl= six weeks) to compile an audit, 
consult with service users and service providers, set aims, objectives and targets for the 
reduction of crime within their area and publish a three year strategy containing these findings. 
As Sampson (2000) highlights, this left little time for partners to consider the remaining 
sections of the Act which were less urgent in terms of imposed deadlines. As a result, many 
partnerships failed to realise that the Crime and Disorder Act had far more depth and that these 
partners would be required to do more than provide data for the audit, or contribute to the 
development of local targets. Through Section 17 they would be required to demonstrate that 
they had considered the crime and disorder implications of every decision that they made. 
Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 states that "it shall be the duty of each authority 
to which this section applies to exercise its various fimctions with due regard to the likely effect 
of the exercise of those functions on ... crime and disorder in its aree (Great Britain, 1998a). 
This means that all relevant partners must be able to demonstrate that they have considered the 
crime and disorder implications of every decision that they have made and consequently, that 
they have done all that they reasonably can to reduce crime and disorder within the area. 
Examples of these decisions include the decision to grant planning permission for new housing 
estates, maintenance of open spaces, housing allocation policies, the levels of security in council 
owned car parks or the maintenance and level of street lighting. Moss and Pease (1999) refer to 
Section 17 as "the most radical part of the Act7 (p. 15), suggesting that "it is difficult to conceive 
of any decision which will remain untouched by s 17 considerations" (p. 16). 
Bullock et al. (2000) highlight the legal implications of non-compliance with Section 17. These 
broadly translate to a) Liability in private law for breach of statutory duty, and b) Liability to 
judicial review under the doctrine of ultra vires. Under the first option there exists three 
possibilities: 
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Careless exercise of statutory powers and duties: In this case it must be proven 
that the plaintiff suffered damage and that the public body owed the plaintiff a legal 
duty of care. In malcing judgements about potential breaches the courts must also look 
at two fiu-ther issues, these are i) reasonableness and ii) the intentions of Parliament and 
the public interest i. e. what was the thinking behind the Act? For example, Clunis was 
found ilty of the murder of John Zito following his release from a psychiatric 
hospital, he sued the local authority for negligence under Section 117 of the Mental 
Health Act 1983, stating that it was their duty to provide aftercare for the mentally 
disordered. The court's response was that they did not believe that parliament intended 
alleged failures of this duty to be actionable in damages and he therefore failed (Clunis v 
Camden and Islington Health Authority, 1997). 
Failure to exercise a statutory power: This could only occur in very limited cases 
where the plaintiff could prove that i) the failure was irrational, ii) that a finding of 
liability would not be contrary to the policy considerations of the Act. For a court to 
reach this finding, they must be able to identify the Act's requirement precisely. With 
the wording of Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 'all that it reasonably can', 
this would not be straightforward. 
Breach of statutory Duty: In this case the plaintiff must prove that the public body 
was under a statutory duty to take a particular course of action, that the duty was not 
fiMed and that this failure caused damages. 
7he second option involves a judicial Review. A judicial Review allows people with enough 
interest in a decision made by a public body to ask a judge to assess its lawfulness. It does not 
assess the merit of a decision, merely its lawfulness. Remedies include: Ji) Certiorari - quashing 
a decision, ii) Prohibition - preventing a public body from making an illegal, irrational or 
improper decision, iii) Mandamus - forcing a public body to reach a decision when it has failed 
to do so, but it does not determine outcome, iv) Declaration - declares the way in which the act 
should be interpreted in the future, v) Injunction - prevents an illegal act and enforces the 
performance of a public duty and vi) Damages - compensation payable to individuals against 
whom unlawful decisions have been made. There are several ways in which a local authority can 
be found to have made an unlawful decision, and these are known as 'grounds' or 'heads of 
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review'. These are i) Illegality (under which comes failure to fulfil a Statutory Duty) ii) 
Irrationality iii) Procedural Impropriety and iv) Incompatibility with European Law (this 
includes Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 -'Breach of a Convention Right). Moss and 
Pease (1999) highlight one of the many outcomes of non-compliance with Section 17 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act. 
"There are many circumstances in which an individual citizen, a business 
or a residents group could plausibly argue that a local authority had breached 
s. 17. To take one example: someone moves into new home. She is told by 
the police that her home is not built to SBD standards, despite the area's high 
rate of burglary. A Residents' Association meeting is convened and she finds 
that the experience is not unusual: burglars always gaining entry in the 
same way because of the clear design weaknesses. With the Association's 
support she successfully seeks a judicial review of the authority's actions, 
with the expectation of a decision of mandamus, whereby the security uprating 
of the homes to SBD is ordered" (Moss & Pease, 1999 p. 16). 
Although building homes to SBD standard is not a requirement of Section 17, or any other part 
of the Crime and Disorder Act, these legislative requirements have created an arena in which 
partners are seeking interventions which will not only reduce crime and disorder, but will 
explicitly demonstrate that they have worked together as a partnership. 
Human Rights Act 1998: 
The Human ýLights Act 1998 came into force on the 2d October 2000 and includes many 
elements which are relevant to SBD and crime reduction. Section 6 states that it is unlawful for 
a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right. Schedule I- 
Part I includes articles 5 and 8 which state (respectively) that individuals have the right to 
liberty and security of person and respect for private life, the family and the home. Article I of 
the First Protocol (Part 2) states that individuals have the right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions and the protection of property. The Human Rights Act spreads its net much wider 
than Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act and applies to A public bodies. 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000: 
Another legislative change which has eased the implementation of certain designing out crime 
measures (such as closing footpaths and alley-gating) is the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 
2000 which states that highways can be dosed or diverted on aime reduction grounds. 
Schedule 6, Part 1, Section 8 states that under Section II 8B, which is inserted after 11 8A of the 
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1980 Highways Act, highways can be 'stopped up' or diverted where their existence is 
facilitating the persistent commission of criminal offences, where premises adjoining or adjacent 
to the highway are affected by high levels of crime, or for highways that cross land occupied by 
school premises, where that diversion would prevent crime and disorder against school staff or 
pupils. This Act is highly relevant in terms of rectifying already existent design mistakes in 
residential areas where footpaths are facilitating the commission of crime either by aiding the 
entry/escape to properties or by giving an offender a reason to be in an area. Until this act, the 
closure of alleyways still considered by opponents to be public rights of way, was a complex 
and costly legal process resulting in many local authorities choosing to avoid this course of 
preventative action (Kodz and Pease, 2004). 
Planning Guidance: 
As Schneider and Kitchen (2002) highlight, although planning departments hold much of the 
decision making powers relating to housing design and layout, they traditionally have very little 
knowledge of crime prevention theory or best practice. However, the introduction of the 
Planning Circular 5/94 (Department of the Environment, 1994), as well as the many other 
legislative changes discussed within this chapter, has aided the partnership working between 
planners and police, ensuring that crime implications are at least considered (if not accepted) in 
all planning decisions. 
"Given the fundamental significance of crime impacts and costs 
to urban liveability in Britain and the United States, it is extraordinary 
how peripheral a role urban planners and designers have played in 
place-based crime prevention" (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002 p. 22). 
Circular S/94 placed the consultation between police ALO/CPDAs and Planning departments 
on a more formal footing as well as recognising the link between design and crime. Although 
the circular did not make consultation between police and planners mandatory, it encouraged it 
as best practice and urged planning authorities to consider crime prevention in their 
development plans. The Urban Policy VVUte Paper (Office of the Deputy Prime Ministers 
2000) proposed that circular S/94 should be reviewed and in 2004 Safer Places - The Planning 
System and Crime Prevention (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004) was published. 
Although this guide highlights the importance of crime reduction considerations in planning and 
design, its seven attributes of safer places have not addressed the confusion surrounding access 
and movement and the message conveyed still remains unclear. For example, the guide 
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highlights how safer places will have "well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for 
convenient movement without compromising security" (p. 16). Yet the following paragraph 
highlights how crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if "there are several 
ways into and out of an area - providing potential escape routes for criminal activity" (p. 16). 
The answer, according to this guide, is that "too few connections can undermine vitality, too 
many - and especially too many under-used or poorly thought out connections - can increase 
the opportunity to commit crime" (p. 16). Although this guide emphasises the importance of 
crime reduction in planning and design, and recognises that structure, surveillance, ownership, 
activity and management and maintenance are key factors when designing safer communities, it 
is unfortunate that its message has failed to clarify many of the issues relating to through 
movement and housing layout. 
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Chapter Two - Part Six 
Conflict, Confusion and Contradiction 
Recent legislative change has seen the responsibility for crime reduction extended to agencies 
for which this issue had held very little prior significance. Coupled with the increasing emphasis 
placed upon the identification and implementation of what works, the stage should be set for a 
harmonious, multi agency approach towards crime reduction - yet advice remains confusing and 
contradictory. The main area of conflict within the field of designing out crime has been the 
issue of permeability or through movement. This debate (which has rather simplistically been 
presented as one of culs-de-sac versus through roads) has dominated much of the discussion 
surrounding SBD over the last five years, with headlines such as "End of the Road for the Cul- 
de-Sae (Fairs, 1998, p. 1), "Culs-de-Sac Hit the Skids" (Stungo, 1998, p. 2) and "How 
Brookside Boom Helped the Burglar? (Surnmerskill, 2000, p. 16). Those in favour of limiting 
through-movement generally argue that a residential area which encourages movement (be it 
vehicular or pedestrian) gives offenders an opportunity to attach that area to their awareness 
space. If a property is located on a through road which is used as part of an individual's route to 
work, school or leisure facilities, that individual will become familiar with who lives where, 
what time they leave for work, what car they drive and win generally feel less conspicuous 
within that neighbourhood. Those in favour of permeable, walkable neighbourhoods argue that 
sustainability - meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs, is the most important issue in future design 
considerations. 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) consist of statutory and non-statutory 
agencies such as Police, Local Authorities, Primary Care Trusts, Fire Service, Probation 
service, Victim Support, local business and community representatives. Although some multi- 
agency partnerships existed pre-1998, primarily in Labour-controlled authorities which took 
note of the Labour opposition's intention to implement the Morgan recommendations on 
coming to power, the majority were developed as a response to the 1998 Crime and Disorder 
Act (Sections S and 6). Although these partnerships are guided by several policy and legislative 
requirements, it is the Crime and Disorder Act which fornis the basis of their work. As was 
discussed in part five of this chapter, Section 17 of this Act placed a responsibility upon these 
authorities to do all that they reasonably can to reduce crime and disorder within their area and 
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to consider the crime and disorder implications of every decision that they make. As the 
majority of partners work within a crime and disorder arena, the sources from which they draw 
most of their information are criminological in nature, with a large proportion of this research 
suggesting that unnecessary footpaths should be avoided, access and egress minimised and 
permeability limited (Brantingham. and Brantingham, 197S, 1993,2000; Bevis and Nutter, 
1977; Brantingham et a], 1977; Brown and Altrnan, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and 
Rohe, 1984; Beavon, 1984; Taylor and Gottfredson, 1987; Cromwell et a], 1991; Poyner and 
Webb, 1991; Rengert and Wasilchick, 2000; Wiles and Costello, 2000). As well as seeldng 
guidance from criminological research, CDRPs may also look for guidance from the police. 
Again, this advice would suggest limiting footpaths and through-movement. 
"It is recognised that too many footpaths and through roads in developments 
help to make crime easier to commit. They provide choice of alternative 
escape routes from the scene of the crime, rather than obliging the offender 
to return by the way he came. The opportunity to take a different route gives 
him the anonymity and safety he seeks, as opposed to the dangers of returning 
the same way, where he may have already been noticed. The more alternative 
routes there are, the more confident the wrongdoer feels, and the easier it is to 
commit crime" (Standards and Testing, 2004). 
In contrast, the sources of guidance for planning departments, whose task it is to make decisions 
regarding the design and layout of residential housing, offer very different advice regarding 
permeability and accessibility. Planners work for local authorities; local authorities have a 
statutory duty to reduce crime under Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. They are 
also bound by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, which states that it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right. Three convention rights 
(Schedule I- Part 1, Articles S and 8 and Article I of the First Protocol, Part 2) relate to 
security and safety: 
The conflict for those working in planning departments emerges when their sources of guidance 
are scrutinised. Places, Streets and Movement. A Companion guide to Design Bulletin 32 - 
Residential roads and footpaths (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
1998) states that "The principle of the walkable neighbourhood is the key to creating a sociable, 
sustainable community" (p. 39). Towards an Urban Renaissance (Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999) also makes contradictory suggestions relating 
to housing layout. 
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"A user friendly public realm should make walking and cycling easy, 
pleasant and convenient by keeping the size of urban blocks small, 
with frequent pedestrian cut-throughs to make a new development 
permeable and accessible to the existing neighbourhoods" (Department 
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999 p. 71). 
Many agencies are required under current legislation to do all that they reasonably can to 
prevent crime and disorder within their area. In the case of the design of residential housing this 
is not an easy task. That the current government places an emphasis upon evidence led practice 
is a positive step. The fact that this evidence is producing contradictory findings and guidance 
has led to confusion amongst many key agencies involved in the design, development and 
ultimately the granting of permission for residential housing. If it were as straight forward as 
Schneider and Kitchen (2002) suggest, the issue of designing out crime would be in that state of 
harmonious multi-agency working described within the opening paragraph. It is as a response to 
the current state of confusion that this thesis has been developed, one of the main aims being to 
clarify the position regarding permeability and crime and disorder. 
"Indeed, the notion of sustainability - defined as 'development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs' (UN Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987) is highly compatible with place-crime prevention 
planning. The latter is presumed to enhance community stability, by helping 
discourage among other things crime-generated urban out-migration 
and related economic and social disorder, while improving overall life 
quality for present and future residents" (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002 p. 16). 
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Chapter Two - Part Seven 
Predicting and Preventing 
To return briefly to Garland's (1996) quotation discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
the extent to which crime is viewed as "an accident to be avoided" or "a moral aberration which 
needs to be explained" (p. 4SO-45 1) largely influences the benefits that will be seen in 
intervening to prevent crime taldng place. If as the New Opportunity theories suggest, crime is 
a response to opportunity, then the future of effective crime reduction is in predicting and 
blocIdng future gaps or opportunities. 
Historically, those who design and manufacture products have largely ignored the crime and 
disorder implications of what they are producing. As Pease (1997) suggests, innovations go 
through three phases - First, design without consideration for the crime consequences; second, 
reaping the crime harvest, whereby criminals recognise and exploit vulnerabilities, and finally 
retro-fitting a solution (which is usually only partial). Modem examples of this include mobile 
phones, the intemet or the design of certain types of residential housing. This weakness, 
however, is not exclusive to modem technology. As Pease (1997) highlights, the Penny Black 
postage stamp was introduced in 1840 and withdrawn in 1841. The reason for this withdrawal 
was that the penny Black was franked with water soluble red ink, which resulted in people 
washing the ink off and re-using the stamp. The Penny Black had to be replaced with a Penny 
Red which was franked with an black ink, which could not be removed. A more desirable 
sequence of events would be that the crime consequences are considered at the design stage, 
with a regular flow of information between those concerned with crime reduction and those 
involved with the product's design and maufacture. Ekblorn (1997) highlights how designers 
need to be encouraged to shift their perspective from solely user to user and misuser. Ekblorn 
also highlights how for this to occur, crime reduction information must become more accessible 
for designers. 
"Much remains to be properly evaluated, and the working knowledge 
of prevention that exists is couched in a tangle of inconsistent and loosely 
defined terms and concepts which render it difficult for designers to access, 
to think about and to apply" (Ekblom, 1997 p. 249). 
The historical lack of communication between those whose task it is to reduce crime and those 
whose task it is to design products has led to the 
development of products, buildings, systems 
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and even urban spaces which are conducive to the committal of crime and disorder. In these 
instances, the prime objective has to be reactive i. e. minimising the impact of the crime harvest 
rather than a more favourable preventative approach. Unfortunately, these bolt-on solutions are 
often significantly more expensive and as the crime event has already occurred, the victim is left 
both traurnatised by their experience and more vulnerable to future crime and disorder events. 
There is however, recent evidence that Government, as well as academics and practitioners are 
recognising the weaknesses in this reactive response and attempting to anticipate the future 
impact of the introduction of products (Clarke, 1999; Clarke and Newman, 2002), scientific 
and technological innovations (Future Scanning Sub Group of the Police Science and 
Technology Group set up to deliver the Police Science and Technology Strategy), systems and 
processes (McKinnon and Tallam, 2002; Clarke and Newman, 2002), legislation and regulation 
(Leppa, 1999) as well as building design (Winchester and Jackson, 1982; Coleman, 198S; Groff 
and La Vigne, 2001). The Government's Technology Foresight Programme, which aims to 
identify the technological and business opportunities that will emerge over the next ten to 
twenty years included a thematic panel on crime reduction in its second round which 
commenced in 1999 (the findings from the first round failed to highlight crime as an issue of 
concern). Research is also currently being conducted by the Jill Dando Institute (in 
collaboration with European partners and funded by the European Comn-dssion) which will 
develop mechanisms for assessing the risk of crime due to legislation, regulation and products - 
the aim being to anticipate the unintended (criminological) consequences of the introduction of 
legislation as well as electronic products in order to proof them against this risk. 
Risk assessment in criminology is not new; however, the emphasis has largely focused upon the 
risk factors which increase the likelihood that individuals will become involved in crime, as 
opposed to the likelihood that products or buildings will become victimised, or legislation, 
regulation, products or systems will become conducive to the commitment of crime by 
individuals. Recent legislative requirements which have placed a responsibility upon the Chief 
Executives of Local Authorities to produce a local prevention strategy for children and young 
people by April 2003, have brought much of this research to the fore and publications by 
agencies such as the Youth justice Board (2001) and Nacro (Wong, 2003) have made some 
attempts to translate these findings into practical applications for practitioners working within 
crime and disorder related partnerships. Although there is an abundance of research into the 
factors which increase an individual's risk of becoming involved in criminality, the identification 
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of the risk factors whichincrease a property's vulnerability to crime remains in its infancy when 
compared to offender focused studies. However, several environmental risk indices have been 
published, and it is upon these that the methodology for Chapter Four is based. 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) created an Index of Risk using 14 variables. The presence of 
each variable meant the allocation of I point. A property with a score of 14 had all 
environmental factors, a property with 0 had none. Winchester and Jackson's Environmental 
Risk Factors were: 
I. Situation - Located in the country; 
2. Isolated; 
3. In a location with few (less than 5) other houses in sight; 
4. Road Type-Major Town Road or Village Lane; 
S. Set at a distance from the road in which the house stands; 
6. Located on the nearest major road; 
7. Housing plot not adjacent to gardens of other houses; 
8. Housing plot adjacent to private, open space; 
9. Access at both sides of the house from front and back of the plot; 
10. Not overlooked at the front by other houses; 
11. Not overlooked on either side by other houses; 
12. Majority of sides of the house not visible from a public area; 
13. Set at a distance from the nearest house; 
14. Frontage obscured from roadside view. 
Groff & La Vigne (2001) adopted the idea of designing a predictive tool to help identify 
desirable and undesirable locations of burglaries. The paper uses as its theoretical underpinning, 
the work of opportunity theorists who work upon the assumption that certain situational factors 
can help to translate offender motivation into the committal of an offence. Using Geographical 
information System (GIS) mapping, Groff and La Vigne created an opportunity surface which 
incorporated several grids each representing a different environmental characteristic. Each cell 
was given a score of I for present and 0 for absent based upon environmental variables which it 
possessed. The variables utifised within this study were: 
1. Land use -1 for residential, 0 for all others; 
2. Housing tenure -I for renter occupied, 0 for owner occupied; 
3. Vacant Unit -I for vacant unit, 0 for occupied; 
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4. Substandard Housing -I if it had a reported housing code violation, 0 if not; 
5. Nuisance Violations -I if it had a reported nuisance violation, 0 if not; 
6. Street Lighting -I for dark areas, 0 for illuminated areas; 
7. Comer Lots -I for a corner lot, 0 for a non-comer lot; 
8. Wooded areas - Areas adjacent to a wooded area or vacant lot are code(] as I, and all other 
areas are coded as 0; 
9. Proximity to a major thoroughfare - Areas within a 2-block radius (1,000 feet) ofmajor 
roads were coded as a 1, all others were 0; 
10. Proximity to likely offenders -- A doughnut-shaped buffer was created, coding units greater 
than 500 feet but less than 1,500 feet away from the residence of an arrested burglar as I 
and all others as 0. 
The final opportunity score for each cell represented the sum of the scores for each of the 
variables. The results revealed that the majority of burgled cells had either an average 
opportunity score or higher. All repeat victims had a higher than mean opportunity score. The 
vast majority of cells which had not been burgled had an absence of the predictive 
environmental variables. 
Coleman (1986) also established a list of factors which she believed contributed to the social 
and physical decay of housing estates, this was entitled the 'design disadvantage score'. The 
table below summarises Coleman's environmental factors. 
Table 2: Design Disadvantage Score 
Size Variables When Harmful 
Dwclhnýs per block 
I 
13+ 
Dwellings per entrance 7+ 
Number of'storeys 4+ 
Flats or Maisonettes Maisonettes 
Circulation Variables When Harmful 
Overhead walkways 1+ 
Connectin2 entrances 2+ 
'connecting lifts/stairs 2+ 
I)wellinjýys per corridor 5+ 
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I 
Entrance Variables When Harmful 
F, ntrance type Individual ground floor doors, no gardens 
Entrance position Facing inside estate, far back from road 
Doors or apertures 
E Open aperture 
stilts, garages or shops Characteristics of the grounds 
Blocks per site 2+ 
Access points or gaps 2+ 
Play areas I+ 
Spatial organisation Confused space 
Although risk-assessment measures can aid the prediction and prevention of crime, research 
conducted by Ellingworth et a] (1997) and Ashton et al (1998) highlight the dangers of relying 
upon risk-assessment mechanisms for predicting both single and repeat victimisation and 
suppest that environmental factors are more useful for assessing the risk of first victimisation as 
opposed to repeats. Ellingworth et al (1997) utilise British Crime Survey data to analyse the 
relationship between prior victimisation and the probability of suffering another event. One of' 
the interesting findings revealed within this paper is that different factors are important risk 
predictors for prior victims and for prior non-victims. The paper presents the log odds ratio of' 
being victimised for properties with certain environmental and lifestyle features. For example, 
for properties which have not experienced a prior victimisation, the likelihood of' being 
victimised increases as the number of cars at that household increases, until it reaches 4+ cars, 
whereby, the likelihood of being victimised reduces. 
*A property with 1 car has a log odds ratio of 1.137 times that ofa house with no cars of' 
being a victim of property crime; 
0 For a property with 2 cars, the log odds ratio increases to IASS times that ofa property 
with no cars; 
0 For a property with 3 cars, the log odds ratio increases to 1.590 times that of* a property 
with no cars, however; 
For a property with 4 or more cars, the log odds ratio reduces to 0.856 times that of' a 
property with no cars. 
However, when the data are analysed for prior victims, the pattern (liflCrs. As opposed to being 
less likely to experience property crime once the number of cars per houschold reaches 4, the 
likelihood of victimisation for these properties dramatically increases. 
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0A property AIth I car has a log odds ratio of 1.346 times that of a house with no cars of 
being a victim of property crime; 
For a property with 2 cars, the log odds ratio increases to 1.374 times that of a property 
with no cars; 
* For a property with 3 cars, the log odds ratio increases to 1.447 times that of a property 
with no cars, however; 
0 For a property with 4 or more cars, the log odds ratio increases to 10.683 times that of a 
property with no cars. 
The same pattern is shown for other environmental and lifestyle factors. For example: 
Table 3: Environmental Factors and the Likelihood of Victimisation 
Factor Likelihood of Non-Prior Likelihood of Prior Victim 
Victim being victimised being victimised 
Council House 1.400 1.551 
Housing 0.997 2.849 
Association 
Private Rented 0.993 1.538 
For properties which have not experienced a prior property crinie, a council house is 1.4 titncs 
more likely than an owner occupied house to become a victim ofproperty cTime. This being the 
tenure with the highest risk of victimisation. However, for properties which have experienced a 
prior victimisation, the most risky tenure becomes housing association owned homes, which are 
2.849 times more likely than owner occupied houses to experience property crime. I-or 
properties which had never experienced victimisation, the risk flor housing association homes 
was only 0.997 times than of owner occupied properties. 
"For prior non-victims an exp (B) of 0.987 implies that each year of age 
(of the head of household).. reduces the odds ratio by about 1.3%, but 
the protection per year effectively halves to about 0.6% for prior victims. 
Prior victimisation substantially nullifies the protection from crime which 
older people enjoy" (Ellingworth et a], 1997 p. 209). 
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The findings of this study support the event dependency view that a prior event changes the 
probability of suffering a subsequent victimisation, rather than the risk heterogeneity view 
which suggests that repeat victimisation is a result of pre-existing risk variables. 
These findings are supported by Ashton a a] (1998) who found that what offenders find when 
they enter a property is as important in influencing the possibility of a repeat offence as the 
external factors which influenced their initial perceptions. Examples include: "Because the first 
time was profitable and goods of value remained", "because once the lie of the land was known 
it became easy" and "because new goods would be available after replacement". These findings 
support the suggestion that although certain environmental factors influence an offender's 
choice of target for first victimisation, the decision to return to that property is based largely 
upon what the offender finds when they enter the property and not the factors which influenced 
their perception of risk in the first instance. 
The prediction of crime risk, although important to the future of criminology, remains 
meaningless unless those introducing and implementing legislation and regulation, or designing 
and manufacturing products have some incentive to consider the crime and disorder 
implications of their actions. At present, many of the design features which render products 
popular with users also make them attractive to misusers. For example, many mobile phone 
users prefer pay-as-you-go phones because they are flexible and do not bind the user into any 
contractual obligations. However, these same factors make the product attractive to criminals 
who can make phone calls with less risk of being traced. Other disincentives for manufacturers 
to design out crime include sales figures, which are likely to increase if their product is easy to 
steal. Products which are more likely to be stolen will need to be replaced more often, 
therefore inflating sales of this product. In order to improve the likelihood that designers will 
consider crime reduction, they need to be educated and encouraged. As Rogerson et al (2000) 
highlight, we need the manufacturers of products to know that designing out crime can have 
commercial benefits. This requires; 1) Fostering awareness that design can influence crime, for 
better or for worse; 2) The dissemination of knowledge of what the risks are and how to tackle 
them and 3) to motivate industry to tackle these risks. 
Although the SBD scheme includes a retrofit element which encourages the refurbishment of V. )-- 
buildings following development, these form only a small proportion of all SBD properties (at 
the commencement of this thesis, 6% of the SBD schemes within West Yorkshire were 
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refurbishments), with the vast majority of properties being newly built to the required 
standard. The SBD scheme exemplifies proactive, multi-agency crime prevention, with the 
crime implications of every development considered by crime reduction specialists (ALOs) 
before any building takes place. It is to the specifics of the scheme which this thesis now turns - 
has this ideal scenario actually resulted in reductions in crime and the fear of crime, are there 
any weaknesses within the current scheme and how can these be modified or improved? 
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Chapter Three 
Is Secured by Design an Effective Crime 
Reduction Measure? 
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Chapter Three - Part One 
Aims 
As was discussed within the introductory chapter, the aims of this thesis fall largely into the 
three categories of past, present and future - How did planning become encapsulated into 
crin-dnology? Does SBD reduce crime, disorder and the fear of crime, and what are the current 
weaknesses within the scheme? The initial aim of this thesis is to establish to what extent the 
SBD scheme actually works as a crime reduction measure. only when this question is addressed 
can an improvement-orientation be introduced. The analysis contained within this chapter is 
broken down into three areas, each with subsequent sub-categories: 
Do SBD estates experience less crime that their Non-SBD counterparts? 
a. Refurbished Estates - Two refurbishment schemes were randomly selected from the 
database of SBD schemes (provided by West Yorkshire Police). As these housing estates 
were upgraded from Non-SBD to SBD status, the analysis simply compares crime rates 
pre and post refurbishment. 
b. New Build: As the sample of SBD properties only included two refurbishments, the 
majority of housing estates included within this study were newly built to SBD status. 
As the estates did not exist prior to their SBD status, control estates had to be selected 
for comparison. 
Detailed Analysis -A sample of 2S SBD estates were matched as closely as possible 
with a control sample of 2S Non-SBD estates. Each matched pair were comparable 
in terms of age, location, housing tenure and external environmental factors. The 
crime rates (incidence, prevalence and concentration) for each matched pair were 
analysed. 
o Broad-Based Analysis -A sample of SO SBD estates were matched with a control 
sample of 50 Non-SBD estates. The control estates were selected based purely 
upon geography in that they were located directly adjacent to the SBD estate. The 
crime rates (incidence, prevalence and concentration) for each matched pair were 
analysed. 
c. Residents' Survey - As the previous two levels of analysis focused solely upon police 
recorded statistics, it was essential to include a self-reporting element to this study. 2SO 
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SBD residents and 250 Non-SBD residents were asked questions relating to their 
experiences of crime and disorder. Levels of prior vicdmisation were compared. 
Do residents living within SBD housing estates feel safer that those living 
within Non-SBD areas? 
a. 2SO SBD residents and 250 Non-SBD residents were asked questions relating to their 
fears, experiences and perceptions of crime and disorder within their area. Attitudes 
expressed by residents living within the two samples were compared. 
To what extent has the SBD scheme improved over the last decade? 
a. The specific standards of the SBD scheme have not remained constant since its 
inception in 1989. For example, the physical security standards of PAS 24-1 (doors) 
and BS79SO (windows) were only introduced in 1999. This section of the thesis aimed 
to establish whether the crime reduction performance of the SBD scheme have 
improved since 1989. 
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Chapter Three - Part Two 
Methodology 
Selection of Location: 
Although SBD is a national scheme, the analysis included within this thesis focuses solely upon 
schemes within the county of West Yorkshire. The explanations for this selection were 
twofold. Firstly, the author resides within this county and it was felt that due to the number of 
visits required to each estate, this would save both time and money. Below is an indication of 
the fieldwork required for Chapter three alone which should highlight the difficulties which 
would have been faced in conducting the analysis on a national basis. 
a. Each of the 2S SBD estates was visited to compile Winchester and Jackson's (1982) 
Environmental Risk Index. The survey took approximately 10 minutes per 
property, with some estates containing as many as 72 properties; 
b. Approximately 30 Non-SBD estates were visited in the process of selecting 2S 
estates as a control sample for the detailed analysis - again the Winchester and 
Jackson survey was carried out at each property within these estates; 
SO SBD estates were visited to select the closest Non-SBD estate for the broad- 
based analysis; 
d. 2SO residents from 25 SBD estates and 2SO residents from 2S Non-SBD estates 
were visited in the process of completing the residents' survey. 
In addition to the analysis discussed within this chapter, the analysis conducted for Subsequent 
chapters required extensive visits to 1058 properties to conduct in-depth surveys, as well as 
travel to and from the offices of RSLs, Architects and Quantity Surveyor's to conduct 
qualitative data collection. 
The second explanation for selecting the county of West Yorkshire relates to the police 
recorded data used for a large section of the analysis. Although the analysis used victimisation 
surveys to establish perceptions and personal experiences of crime (whether reported to the 
police or not), a large proportion of the analysis relies upon police statistics for which access to 
the Police Criminal Intelligence System (CIS) was essential. As West Yorkshire Police had 
agreed to act as a collaborating establishment 
for this thesis (which included providing access to 
CIS) the county of West Yorkshire was selected for the analysis conducted within this thesis. 
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Refurbishments: 
For estates which were refurbished to the SBD standard (there were only 2 of these within the 
analysis) crime rates (number of crimes divided by the number of properties within that 
scheme) were simply compared pre and post certification. The time periods between 
development and certification to SBD standard (pre) and between certification and 
commencement of the analysis (post) were not comparable. To ensure standardisation, analysis 
had to take into account the nurnber of months which the estate had existed as a Non-SBD 
building and the number of months which it had existed as a SBD property to produce an 
average monthly crime rate. 
New Build Properties - Detailed Analysis: 
All SBD estates within West Yorkshire were recorded on a database provided by West 
Yorkshire Police. As the detailed analysis was to involve extensive travel to and from sites, a 
decision was made to select just 2S estates for this level of analysis. The first stage of this 
selection process involved excluding all estates built post-April 1998. The rationale for this 
exclusion was to ensure that crime data were available for a full year following the estate's 
development. As the analysis of crime data for this section of the thesis began in April 1999, this 
meant excluding properties built after April 1998. 
The next stage of the selection process involved ensuring that the 2S estates were spread evenly 
throughout the West Yorkshire force area. The county of West Yorkshire includes towns and 
cities which vary dramatically in terms of socio-demographic variables such as crime rate and 
deprivation. For this reason, it was essential to ensure that the 2S estates were selected from 
each of the five postal districts of Bradford, Halifax, Huddersfield, Leeds and Wakefield. This 
involved stratification, using the five postal districts as separate strata. All properties built prior 
to April 1998 were grouped according to the postal district within which they were located and 
the number of properties within each area was divided by five to produce the sampling interval. 
For example, if there were 50 schemes in Huddersfield, the 10'h, 2&, 30'h, 4& and SO'h were 
selected. Unfortunately, the lack of SBD schemes within the Halifax area meant that once 
properties built post April 1998 were excluded, only five remained. Therefore, these five 
estates had to be selected. In order to avoid any bias in the selection process, the names of 
estates were excluded from the database to leave just the scheme number e. g. 306/97E. At this 
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early stage in the analysis, the name of the scheme could not be recognised simply by this 
number. 
Once the SBD estates had been selected, a control sample of Non-SBD properties had to be 
established. As was alluded to within the opening paragraphs of this chapter, the majority of 
SBD housing estates within West Yorkshire are new build. As these estates did not exist prior 
to their certification to the SBD standard, the analysis required the selection of a matched pair 
for each of the SBD estates. For the detailed level of analysis these matched pairs were carefully 
selected to ensure that they were comparable in terms of housing age, location, housing tenure 
and environmental/physical characteristics. The rationale was that in removing as many 
intervening variables as possible, any differences in the levels of crime and disorder between the 
samples could be attributed with more confidence to the implementation of SBD levels of 
standards. 
The 25 SBD estates selected for this analysis were built between 1988 and 1998. To ensure that 
extraneous variables relating to the age of the property were excluded from this analysis, all 
Non-SBD estates had to have been built within this ten year time frame. 
The 2S SBD estates selected for the analysis were owned by a variety of Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs). Research suggests that the housing tenure of a property can influence its 
subsequent victimisation, with social rented housing more than twice as vulnerable to burglary 
victimisation than owner occupied properties (Kershaw et a], 2000), therefore, all Non-SBD 
estates selected for this sample were owned by RSLs. 
In order to maximise the environmental/physical similarities of the SBD and Non-SBD 
properties within this level of analysis, control areas were selected which had the same physical 
and environmental features. This was achieved using Winchester and Jackson's Environmental 
Risk index (1982) which assigns a score between 0 and 14 to each property based upon features 
of its design and location. This score enables each property to be graded according to its 
vulnerability to burglary. As a means of determining the relationship between environmental 
risk and burglary victimisation, Winchester and Jackson produced an index based upon 14 
different variables of access and surveillance which were found to be particularly effective in 
discriminating between houses lived in by the victim sample and those lived in by the general 
household sample. The more factors possessed by a particular dwelling, the higher its chance of 
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having been burgled. Houses with a score of 0 on the risk index had aI in 1,84S chance of 
being burgled, those possessing 9 or more features had an average of 1 in 13 chance of being 
burgled. The median score on the Environmental Index of Risk for victims' houses was S, 
compared to a median score of 2 for houses lived in by the general household sample. Multiple 
victims (those who had been burgled on more than one occasion during the period that the 
present household had lived there) had a median score of 7 on the index. The difference 
between the single victim group and the non-victimised general household sample was 
statisticaHy sigriificant (p < OS). 
The index was established through the procedure of assigning a score of I for any surveillance 
or access risk factor present and adding these scores together for each property. The variables 
used to construct the Index of Environmental Risk were discussed in more detail within 
Chapter two, part seven. Within this thesis, factor 4- Road Type-Major Town Road or Village 
Lane was excluded due to the lack of clarity in the explanation regarding which road type is 
given a score of 1. It was not clear as to whether both village lane and major town road received 
a score of 1, or simply one of these road types. It was concluded that as long as the site surveys 
were consistent between SBD and Non-SBD, this would not affect the quality of the research. 
However, when the site surveys were carried out, the type of road was noted to ensure that 
future researchers attempting to expand or replicate this evaluation would be able to do so. 
Therefore, a maximum score in this study was 13, as opposed to Winchester and Jackson's 14. 
Litton (199 1) attempted to replicate the Winchester and Jackson study but on a much smaller 
scale. The study, which was carried out in Harrogate, North Yorkshire, found that at a 
significant level, the environmental risk index is predictive of burglary, although not every 
constituent of the index is equally important. This thesis utilises Litton's (1991) method of 
categorising houses into 3 risk levels, high (7 and above on the environmental risk index), 
medium (3 to 6) and low (0 to 2). 
Each of the 2S SBD estates within this thesis was awarded an average (mean) enviromnental risk 
score. This involved visiting each individual property within the sample of 2S estates to 
complete Winchester and Jackson's Environmental Risk Index. Each property was individually 
assessed; the scores for all properties were then totalled and divided by the number of 
properties on that estate to produce a mean Environmental Risk Index for each estate. Although 
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the sample of 25 estates were each based within the West Yorkshire region, they were spread 
evenly throughout towns and cities such as Bradford, Halifax, Huddersfield, Leeds and 
Wakefield and travel between the sites was time consuming. Once at each estate, it is estimated 
that the survey took approximately 10 minutes per property to conduct (it is worth reiterating 
that some estates contained as many as 72 properties), with additional time to input and analyse 
the data. Although the scores for each estate were slightly different, they were all categorised as 
low risk according to Litton's method of categorisation. Therefore, the Non-SBD matched pairs 
selected for this level of analysis each had to be categorised as low risk to ensure comparability. 
Selection of these Non-SBD matched pairs involved asking all RSLs to provide details of estates 
located within West Yorkshire and excluding those which were not built within the relevant 
time period. Although this was a paper-based exercise, it involved extensive correspondence 
with RSLs to collect details of each estate's age. Once information had been provided, the 
process of selecting the appropriate estates was again a time-consuming exercise. All properties 
built within the relevant time period were visited to conduct the Winchester and Jackson 
survey and to establish which were categorised as low risk in terms of their environmental 
features. Approximately 30 estates were visited at this stage of the data collection process and 
those which were categorised as medium or high risk were excluded from the possible sample. 
Again, the author would like to highlight the time-consuming task of identifying these sites, 
travelling between sites, conducting the survey and analysing the results. Although the results, 
of this exercise simply reveal 2S control estates, the process of selection was not a 
straightforward task. 
The final task, with all other factors comparable, was to select the best match in terms of 
location - to ensure that the pairs were located within as dose a proximity as possible. Due to 
the complexity of the selection process, there was no set boundary within which the control 
estate had to be located; instead the selection involved finding the estate which was as dose as 
possible to each SBD estate (taldng all other factors into account). In general, the majority of 
estates were located within the same village. 
Tables 4-8 below display each matched pair, alongside the number of properties within each 
estate, as well as the year in which each estate was built. 
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Table 4: Matched Pairs in Bradford 
Bradford 
Secured by No. of Year Non-Sccurcd by No. of Year 
Design propcrt Built Design Properties Built 
ies 
Fell Lane, Keighley 40 1994 Brierley Close, 10 1998 
Poplar Road, 
Shipley 
Beldon Road, Great 39 1995 Ilowater Court, off' 12 1995 
Horton) Kesteven Road 
(BD4) 
Kettlewell Drive, 16 1997 Ardsley Close (BD4) 8 199S 
Canterbury (BD5) 
Bicrley House Ave, 72 1995 Tawnv Close (BD4) 7 1997 
Bierley (BD4) 
Broadstone Way, 39 1995 Gilpin Street, off 10 1989 
Holmewood (BD4) Barkerend Road, 
Laisterdyke (BI. )4) 
Table 5: Matched Pairs in Halifax 
Halifax 
Secured by No. of Year Non-Sccured by No. of' Year 
Design propert Built Design Properties Built 
ics 
Wainman St, Pellon 9 1998 Reservoir Roa(i, 4 1998 
(fw) Pellon (HXI) 
Cherry Court, Pellon 48 1997 Thrum Hall Drive, 91 1994 
(IIXI) Shalimar Street 
(HXI) 
Lawler Close, JJ PýJ* w neatiey Lane, Ib 1991 
Ovenden (HX3) Ovenden (HX3) 
St. George's Road, 14 1997 Lincoln way, 14 1996 
Lee Mount (IIX3) Boothtown (IIX3) 
Lane (IIXI) 
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Table 6: Matched Pairs in Huddersfield 
Huddersfidd 
Secured by No. of Year Non-Secured by No. of Year 
Design propert Built Design Properties Built 
ies 
Littlewood Croft, 20 1997 White Hart Drive, 10 1997 
Newsome (IID4) Newsome (IID4) 
Park Drive, Gledholt 12 1995 Spire Court, Marsh 26 1997 
(HD 1) (HD 1)) 
Beaufort Ave, 28 1997 Fairfield Rise, 11 1994 
Shelley (I-ID8) Kirkburton (IIL)8) 
Wentworth Ave, 10 1997 Lydgate Close, 15 1994 
Emley (TIDS) New Mill (IID7) 
Trafalgar Close, 19 1996 Leonard Street, 21 1997 
Brackenhall (HD2) Fartown (HD2) 
Table 7: Matched Pairs in Leeds 
Leeds 
Secured by No. of Year Non-Secured by No. of Year 
Design propcrt Built Design Properties Built 
ics 
Haslewood Drive, 43 1994 West Grange Road 15 1996 
Gardens, (LSIO) 
Burmantofts 09) 
Simpson Grove, 28 1996 Pepper Gardens 12 1994 
Armley (LS12) (LS 13) 
Moynihan Close, 22 1996 Amberton Garth, 28 1993 
Gipton (LS8) Gipton (LSS) 
Beechwood Court, 30 1996 Mowbray Court 19 1994 
Boggart Hill Gardens (LS14) 
(1, S14) 
Ekota Place (LS8) 18 1995 Devonshire Ave, 59 1989 
Close & Sutherlands 
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Table 8: Matched Pairs in Wakefield 
Wakefidd 
Secured by No. of Year Non-Securcd by No. of Year 
Design propert Built Design Properties Built 
ics 
Buckingham Court, 14 1995 St. James Park, 13 1997 
Belle Vue, Wakefield Wakefield (WFI) 
(WFI) 
The Wickets, Batley 21 1997 Benny Parr Close, 26 1997 
(WF 17) Batley (WFI 7) 
Oaklands 55 1997 Browns Place, 11 1997 
Drive/Laithe Croft, Batley (WFI 7) 
Batley_(WFI 7) 
Victoria 16 1998 Crow Nest View, 20 1994 
Drive/Road, Dewsbury (WF13) 
Dewsbury (141'F-12) 
Quarry Court, 11 1998 Hunza Court, 25 1997 
Bames Road, Dewsbury (WF 13) 
Castleford (WFIO) 
Although the age of the two members of each matched pair was similar, they were not exactly 
the same. Because each matched pair were being compared in terms of cTime and disorder 
levels experienced, it was essential to ensure that the time period for which each estate had 
been exposed to victimisation was exactly the same. An estate built in January 1997 would have 
been exposed to an additional 12 months of potential victimisation than an estate built in 
January 1998. A simple analysis of all crimes experienced on each estate since they were built 
would have produced an inaccurate picture of crime risks of each estate and favoured estates 
built more recently. A decision was made that crimes which occurred on the Non-SBD estate 
before the SBD comparison had been built (and vice versa) were exclude(] from the analysis. 
For example, if the SBD estate in a matched pair was built in April 1996, but the Non-SBD pair 
was built in October 199S, only crimes dating from April 1996 to the commencement of' 
analysis were included. 
New Build Estates - Broad-Based Analysis: 
The broad-based level of analysis, as the account above hopefully makes c1car, included So Sill) 
new build estates. These included the 25 estates included within the detailed analysis, plus an 
additional 25 selected from the West Yorkshire Police database using the same method as that 
applied to the detailed analysis. However, unlike the detailed analysis, the method ofselection 
for the control sample simply involved visiting the SBD estate and identifying the Non-SBD 
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estate located closest to it. This method of selection did not take into account any intervening 
variables such as housing tenure or age. As with the detailed analysis, crime levels were 
calculated using police recorded crime data extracted from West Yorkshire Police's CIS. Again, 
as the age of each estate was not comparable, the period for analysis of crime data was selected 
using the same process as that described above. For example, crimes which occurred on the 
Non-SBD estate before the SBD comparison had been built (and vice versa) were excluded 
from the analysis. 
Residents'Survey: 
Alongside the broad-based and detailed analysis of crime and disorder levels on SBD and Non- 
SBD estates, a residents' survey was carried out at the 2S SBD and 25 Non-SBD estates selected 
for the detailed analysis. The objectives behind this survey were: 
a) To avoid comparisons based solely on police recorded statistics; 
b) To ascertain the residents' opinions and perceptions of crime and disorder in the area, as 
well as their actual experiences of crime. 
10 addresses from each of the estates were visited, giving a maximum total of 250 SBD and 2SO 
Non-SBD interviews. The 10 addresses were chosen by listing all house numbers on each 
estate, summing them, rounding the number down to the nearest divisible of 10 and dividing 
this figure by 10 to produce the sampling interval. For example, if there were 47 addresses on 
an estate, this was rounded down to 40 and the 4ý', 8"', 12", 16detc. addresses were selected. if 
estates had less than 10 addresses (for example 367/98E in Halifax which only has 9 addresses) 
an alternative estate within Halifax, for example OS6/94E, would receive I extra 
questionnaire. The questions contained within the interview/questionnaire were based upon 
the British Crime Survey to ensure that in addition to the comparison between SBD and Non- 
SBD estates, national comparisons could also be made. All questions were closed-ended, with 
either yes/no answers or multiple choice options from which the respondent could select (see 
appendix 2 for a copy of the questionnaire). 
Ile process of carrying out the survey involved visiting each property (following an 
introductory letter explaining the research, the issue of confidentiality and giving a contact 
name and number should they wish to verify the legitimacy of the project), and asking the 
questions face to face to the person who answered the door. If a child answered, they were 
asked if their mother or father was present. Children were not used as respondents. If the 
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residents were not at home, the questionnaire was posted through the letterbox, along with a 
stamped addressed envelope and a note explaining what the research was about, how sorry the 
researcher was that they had missed them and how their opinions were still valuable in this 
research project. As the questionnaire was designed with self-completion in mind (short and 
easy to comprehend with tick box answers to all questions) the less preferred option of posting 
the questionnaires was still considered to be acceptable. As a means of avoiding exclusion of 
residents who did not speak/read English, a representative from the relevant RSL was invited 
to attend all interviews to assist with translation. Unfortunately, this was not always feasible. If 
a RSL representative was available, the visits took place in the day. If there were no 
representatives available, a decision was made to conduct the surveys in the evening. It was felt 
by the RSTs that the majority of children would be willing and able to translate for their 
parents, therefore, waiting for them to return home from school would be preferable. By 
spreading the visits between evenings and daytime, the problem of over-representing those who 
were at home in the day (females/unemployed) was also minimised. 
The response rate for the residents' survey was 47% of which 4S% were SBD respondents and 
SS% Non-SBD respondents. It is suggested that the high level of responses is in some part due 
to the effort taken to write to respondents in advance, to visit the properties and conduct the 
questionnaires as interviews (where possible) and to ensure that RSLs were offered the 
opportunity to assist in the exercise (where they felt that language difficulties may be a 
problem). A postal survey would have saved a large amount of time visiting each of the SOO 
properties and conducting a survey which took approximately I S-20 minutes for each resident. 
However, it is suggested that a postal survey would have produced a far lower response rate 
than that acheived for this study. 
SBD as an Evolving Standard: 
in an attempt to establish whether the performance of SBD is improving as lessons are learned 
and new standards are introduced, the burglary rates of SBD estates built in 1994 through to 
1998 were expressed as a percentage of the burglary rates of their Non-SBD matched pair. If 
lessons are being learnt, the more recently developed sites should experience lower levels of 
crime than those built in the early stages of SBD. 
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Chapter Three - Part Three 
Results 
Murbishments: 
Estates which had been refurbished to SBD standard were analysed on a before and after basis as 
opposed to selecting a Non-SBD matched pair. There were two refurbished estates included 
within this analysis; these were Cherry Court/Crossley Gardens in Halifax and Appleton 
Court/Saville Green in Leeds. As was discussed within the methodology section, crime levels 
were measured using police recorded data extracted from West Yorkshire Police's CIS. 36 
crime categories were included within the analysis. With the exception of several offences 
considered to be irrelevant to this study (for example, sex offences) this included all crime 
types experienced by the properties selected for this study. The process of data collection from 
the police system was conducted according to West Yorkshire Police's data protection 
protocols. The author was required to take part in a short training exercise, to sign a data 
protection declaration and to conduct all data extraction and analysis within the police station. 
Cherry Court (previously known as Crossley Gardens) was refurbished to SBD standard in 
January 1998. The first full year for which crime data were available pre-SBD status was 1991, 
therefore a decision was made to use crime data for the period January 1991 to April 1999 
(when analysis commenced). The graph (figure 1) below displays the yearly crime rates at 
Cherry Court for the period January 1991 to April 1999. These figures represent the total 
crime within each year divided by the number of properties on that estate (48), and represent 
the incidence as opposed to prevalence rates. 
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Figure 1: Crime Rate at Cherry Court between 1991 and 1999 
Crime Rate - Cherry Court Uanuary 1991-April 1999) 
.9 
The crime rate in 1991 was 0.17, in 1992 it was 0.23, in 1993 it was 0.21, in 1994 it was 0.21, 
in 1995 it was 0.27, in 1996 it was 0.21 and in 1997 it was 0.19. Following refurbishment to 
SBD in January 1998, the crime rate dropped to 0.13 and 0 for the first four months of' 1999. 
When comparing the two periods pre and post SBD, the results reveal that following 
certification to SBD, total crime fell by 55% relative to the pre-SBD period (see figure 2 
below). This figure is calculated by adding the crimes experienced within the pre-SBD period 
and dividing this figure by 84 (the number of months between January 1991 and January 1998). 
Adding the crimes experienced post-SBD and dividing this figure by 16 (the total number of' 
months post certification) to create the two figures 0.85 (average monthly crime levels) and 
0.3 8 (average monthly crime levels). 
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Figure 2: Cherry Court Pre and Post SBD 
Average Monthly Crime - Cherry Court (Pre and Post SBD) 
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The second refurbished estate was Appleton Gardens/Saville Court in Leeds. This estate was 
refurbished to SBD standard in October 1993. As with Cherry Court, the crime data were 
analysed for the period January 1991 to April 1999. As this estate was refurbished mid- 1993, it 
was easier to compare the periods pre and post SBD using a monthly as opposed to yearly crime 
rate. Therefore, the total crime for each year was divided by the number of properties on the 
estate -- this figure was then divided by the number of months within that period of analysis. For 
example, for 1992, the total crimes (4-4) were divided by 120 (number of properties) to 
produce a crime rate. This figure was then divided by 12 to produce an average monthly crime 
rate. However, for 1993, the year in which the refurbishment took place, the crime rate was 
divided by either 9 (for the period pre-SBD) or 3 (for the period of October to December). 
The results (displayed in figure 3 below) reveal positive yet surprising findings. For the first 
three months following certification to SBD standard, the average monthly crime rate reduced 
dramatically. However, for the following year (1994) the rate rose to a level similar to that 
experienced in the pre-SBD period. In 199S the average monthly crime rate reduced and 
remained consistently low until the end of the sample time period. 
A possible explanation for the rise in 1994 could have been a high level of attempted burglaries, 
whereby offenders were still attempting to commit crimes against the previously vulnerable 
properties, having not yet realised that they had been upgraded. However, although there were 
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a higher number of attempted burglaries within this year, 7 as compared to 0 in 1990,0 in 
1991,4 in 1992,0 in 1993,0 in 1995,0 in 1996,0 in 1997,0 in 1998 and 0 in 1999, there was 
also an increase in successful burglaries (25 as compared to 4 in 1991,10 in 1992,23 in 1993, 
just 2 in 199S, 1996 and 1997 and 0 in 1998 and 1999). This rise in crime levels in the first year 
post- certification may be explained through a time delay in the effects of the measures 
introduced through the scheme. Although the physical security changes should provide 
immediate crime prevention benefits, other factors such as increased informal social control and 
social cohesion created through measures designed to increase surveillance and the sense of 
community, could take longer to produce the desired effect. However, one would expect any 
delay to be universal across all refurbished schemes, and this pattern was not evident in the 
analysis of Cherry Court. 
Figure 3: Crime Rate at Appleton Court between 1991 and 1999 
Crime Rate - Appleton Court/Saville Green Uanuarv 1991-April 1999) 
Y"r 
By comparing the average monthly crime levels pre-SBD with those experienced in the post- 
SBD sample period, the data reveal that crime levels fell by SS%, the same figure as that 
experienced by Cherry Court. As with Cherry Court, this figure was calculated by adding the 
total number of crimes within the pre-SBD period and dividing this by the number of'months 
within that sample period to create a pre-SBD average monthly crime level. The total number 
of crimes within the post-SBD period was then divided by the number of months within that 
given period to create an average monthly crime level for the post-SBD period. 
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Figure 4: Crime Rate at Appleton Court Pre and Post SBD 
Average Monthly Crime -Appleton Court/Saville Green (Pre and Post SBD) 
2 
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New Build Properties - Detailed Analysis: 
All newly built properties within the detailed analysis were assigned to a matched pair. The 
detailed analysis included 25 SBD estates (660 dwellings) and 2S Non-SBD estates (S22 
dwellings) which were matched according to their age, location, housing tenure and 
physical /environmental characteristics. To reiterate the methodology discussed earlier within 
the chapter, for each matched pair, the date which is taken as the start of the time period for 
analysis is always the date at which the newer member of the pair was built. For example, if the 
SBD estate was built in April 199S and the Non-SBD matched pair was built in Jan 1995, the 
time period for data analysis would be April 199S until the I" March 2000. The end date is 
always the V March 2000 - the date at which analysis for this section of the thesis began. The 
crime data utilised for this thesis includes 36 crime categories. These vary from property 
offences such as burglary dwelling and theft of and from vehicle, to violent crime such as GBH 
and ABH. 
The data were analysed to establish whether there was a normal distribution. As there were 
only 25 pairs within the sample, this was carried out using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The results 
revealed that the data differed significantly from a normal distribution (0-001). The histograms 
below display how the crime rates for both SBD and Non-SBD pairs differ from a normal 
distribution. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Crime Rates within the SBD sample 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Crime Rates within the Non-SBD Sample 
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As the crime rates within both SBD and Non-SBD samples differed from a normal distribution, 
a non-parametric test was selected for analysis of these data. The Wilcoxon Test is a non- 
parametric version of the Paired Comparison T-Test which was selected due to the nature of 
the data being studied. The sample includes one measurement i. e. the crime rate for a matched 
pair of subjects i. e. the SBD sample and the Non-SBD sample. The null hypothesis being tested 
was that there will be no difference between crime levels on SBD and Non-SBD estates. 
The results revealed that the mean crime rate (total crime levels divided by total number of 
properties) within the SBD sample was 0.70. This is compared to a Non-SBD rate of 0.94, 
suggesting that total crime was lower within the SBD sample. 
Table 9: Summary of'Total Crime Data 
Statistical analysis (Wilcoxon) revealed that the difference between the crime rate within the 
SBD sample and Non-SBD sample was not statistically significant at a probability of 0.05 (one- 
tailed test). 
When excluding all crimes other than burglary in a dwelling, the results revealed that the mean 
burglary rate was lower within the SBD sample. The mean burglary rate within the SBD sample 
was 0.17, this is compared to a rate of 0.29 within the Non-SBD sample. The Shapiro-Wilk test 
was again used to establish whether the data differed significantly from the norm in terms ofits 
distribution. The results revealed that once again the data were not evenly distributed, this can 
be seen in the histograms presented below. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Burglary Rates within the Non-SBD Sample 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Burglary Rates within the SBD Sample 
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As both samples differed significantly from the norm, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test was 
selected to analyse the difference between the means. The results revealed that the difference 
between the burglary rate on SBD and Non-SBD cstates was not significant at the level of'o. 05 
(one-tailed). 
90 
ý13 ý25 . 38 . 50 
. 19 . 31 . 44 . 56 
Burglary Rate 
Tablc 10: of tsurelarv 1-)ata 
Non-SBD 0.29 
Shapiro-Wilk (test for normality of 0.001 (SBD) & 0.000 (Non-SBD) 
distribution) 
Wilcoxon 0.16 
When comparing other crimes experienced within the SBD and Non-SBD samples, the results 
revealed that SBD estates also appear to offer crime reduction benefits in relation to crimes 
other than burglary. Vehicle crime was lower within the SBD sample, (see table II below) 
suggesting that although there are no specific vehicle crime reduction measures within SBD 
estates, the design and layout of SBD estates, with car parking within the curtilage of each 
dwelling and within the view of each owner's property, may act to deter potential offenders. 
offences which were higher within the SBD sample include violent crime such as ABH and 
GBH as well as damage related offences. One explanation for increased levels of' violence 
within higher security dwellings is that offenders - deter-mined to commit an offence, will use 
violence if restricted by increased security measures. However, the levels of these offences 
were very small and without further evidence, it would be difficult to make such assumptions. 
The higher levels of damage related offences may be explained by the fact that attempted 
burglaries are often categorised as damage offences, even though the motive is clearly an 
attempt to break in. The following examples are taken from the Modus Operandi field for two 
damage to a dwelling offences within this sample and clearly display this point. 
".. During hours of darkness person(s) unknown approach wooden rear door of 
premises and by believed kicking damage bottom panel of door which is actually 
kicked right through. Person(s) then make good escape. Possibly after being 
disturbed as no entry gained to premises". 
"Person(s) unknown approach garden fence at rear of semi-dctached 
house ... With spade or similar 
instrument dig up approximately 5 panels to 
fencing 4ft x 4ft. Lay them on ground and trample on them breaking panels". 
it is clear that the first example is an attempt to break into the property, whereas the motive 
behind the second lays more with damaging the property. 
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Table 11: Crime Rates within the Two SamDlcs 
Crime Category SBD Rate 
household) 
(per Non-SBD Rate (per 
household) 
Theft from Motor Vehicle 0.042 0.06S 
Theft of Motor Vehicle 0.027 0.036 
TWOC 0.026 0.054 
Damage to Property - 
Non Speci ic 
0.017 0.013 
Damage to Dwelling 0.142 0.121 
Damage to Building 
Other than Dwelling 
0.005 0.004 
ABH 0.047 0.040 
GBH 0.011 0.004 
The analysis has thus far focused upon the incidence of crime - the number of crime events per 
dwelling /population. The analysis will now turn to the prevalence of crime within the sample - 
the proportion of dwellings which were offended against at least once. The results reveal that as 
with incidence, the mean prevalence rate of total crime was lower within the SBD sample 
(0.37) as compared to the Non-SBD sample (0.4-4). This suggests that there are fewer crime 
victims within the SBD sample. Tests for normality of distribution (Shapiro-Wilk) revealed data 
which did not differ statistically from the mean, therefore the Paired Comparison T-Test was 
selected to test the statistical significance of these data. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of Crime Rates (Prevalence) within the Non SBD Sample 
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Figure 10: Distribution of Crime Rates (Prevalence) within the SBD Sample 
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Analysis revealed that the difference between the prevalence rate for total crime within the SBD 
and Non-SBD samples was not statistically significant at the level of 0.05 (one-tailed). 
However, at 0.06 it did verge on statistical significance. 
Table 12: Summarv of Total Crime Data (Prevalence 
When analysing burglary alone, the results revealed that the mean prevalence rate for burglary 
offences was 0.09 within the SBD sample and 0.16 within the Non-SBD sample, suggesting 
again that the SBD sample has a lower number of victims as well as crime events. Tests for 
normality of distribution (Shapiro-Wilk) revealed that the data differed significantly from the 
norm, therefore the non-parametric Wilcoxon test was selected for analysis. Analysis revealed 
that the difference between the burglary rate (prevalence) within the two samples was not 
statistically significant at the level of 0.05 (one-tailed). 
Table 13: Summary of Burglary Data (Prevalence 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Burglary Rates (Prevalence) within the Non SBD 
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Figure 12: Distribution of Burglary Rates (Prevalence) within the SBD Sample 
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Analysis of concentration rates of both burglary and total crime revealed mixed findings. 
Concentration is measured by dividing incidence by prevalence and measures the levels of 
repeat victimisation experienced by residents within the sample. Although the concentration 
rate for total crime was higher within the Non-SBD sample (2.14 as compared to 1.89 within 
the SBD sample), levels of repeat burglary were higher within the SBD sample (1.89 as 
compared to 1.8 1). This finding will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters as it 
highlights a weakness within the SBD scheme. Although residents appear to be protected against 
total crime and burglary, once they experience a burglary offence, they are more likely than 
their Non-SBD counterparts to experience a subsequent burglary offence. 
New Build Properties - Broad Based Analysis: 
The method utilised in the broad-based analysis was to compare each SBD scheme with a Non- 
SBD estate within as close a proximity as possible. Often this was the next street, cul de sac or 
estate, but in many cases it was possible to use part of the same street. The matching of SBD 
and Non-SBD estates in this broad-based analysis did not take account of any factors such as 
housing tenure, street type, environmental risk factor or age of property (as shown earlier in 
the detailed analysis). The analysis included 50 SBD estates (15S8 dwellings) and 50 Non-SBD 
estates (14S3 dwellings). 
The rationale for analysing these SO matched pairs on a less detailed level lay with constraints in 
resources. Selecting the matched pairs for the detailed analysis was time consuming and 
required many trips to visit the sample sites. Rather than exclude all other SBD estates, it was 
felt that there would be some use in conducting an additional level of analysis, but remaining 
aware that the methodology was not as valid as that discussed above. One of the criticisms of 
this method lays in the differences in housing tenure. Although this method allowed the 
selection of matched pairs which were often part of the same street (half of the street being SBD 
and the other Non-SBD), there were many cases in which the SBD section of the street was RSL 
owned whilst, the Non-SBD section of the street comprised owner occupied properties. 
Therefore, comparisons were being made between two different types of dwelling. This is by 
no means a criticism of RSL properties, or the residents residing within them, however, *rented 
accommodation and the fluidity of incoming/outgoing residents, the lack of social cohesion and 
awareness of who lives on the estate and who does not, cannot be compared like with like to 
owner occupied properties. The point of emphasising the less robust design of the broad-based 
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analysis is to anticipate that, in the event of divergent results, more weight should be placed on 
the detailed analysis. As with the detailed level of analysis, the period of time for which data 
were included varied between each pair. The start date was always the date at which the newest 
estate was built, the end date was always the 1" March 2000. The mean rate of total crime 
within the SBD sample was 0.76 compared to a rate of 0.70 within the Non-SBD sample, this 
suggests that total crime is slightly higher within the SBD sample. Tests for normality of 
distribution revealed that the data differed significantly from the normal (using the Shapiro- 
Wilk for the sample size of 50). Therefore, the Wilcoxon Test was used to analyse the data. 
The results revealed that the difference between the total crime rate experienced by the two 
samples was not statistically significant at the level of 0.05 (one-tailed). 
The results were very similar when the analysis included burglary alone. The mean rate of 
burglary within the SBD sample was 0.23, this is compared to a Non-SBD rate of 0.21. This 
suggests that burglary levels were slightly higher within the SBD sample. As the distribution of 
data differed significantly from the norm, the Wilcoxon test was used as the method of analysis. 
The results revealed that the difference between the burglary rate experienced by the sm) 
sample and that experienced by the Non-SBD sample was not statistically significant at the level 
of 0.05 (one-tailed). 
Table 14: Broad Based Analysis - Summary of Total Crime Data 
SBD Status Mean Total Crime Rate 
SBD 0.76 
NonSBD 0.70 
Shapiro-Wilk (test for normality of SBD (0.000) & Non-SBD 
distribution for sample size of 50) 
Wilcoxon Test 0.43 
Table 1 S: Broad Based Analysis - Summary of Burglary Data 
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distribution for sample size of 50) 
Wilcoxon Test 0.21 
When the prevalence rates for both total crime and burglary were analysed, the results revealed 
that estates within the SBD sample were experiencing slightly higher rates of victimisation. The 
prevalence rate of total crime within the SBD sample was 0.39, this is compared to 0.37 within 
the Non-SBD sample. The prevalence rate for burglary within the SBD sample was 0.19, this is 
compared to a rate of 0.16 within the Non-SBD sample. The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to 
measure the normality of distribution of the total crime and burglary data. The total crime data 
did not differ significantly from the norm, therefore, the Paired Comparison T-Test was used to 
analyse the data. The burglary data did differ significantly from the norm, therefore, the 
Wilcoxon test was used to analyse these data. Statistical analysis revealed that the difference 
between the prevalence rate of total crime and burglary experienced by the SBD sample did not 
differ siZ! 2ificgnLI)Lfrom that experienced by the Non-SBD sample at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). 
Table 16: Broad Based Analysis - 
Non SBD 
of I otal Unme Frevalcnce 
0.39 
0.37 
Shapiro-Wilk (test for norn 
distribution for sample size of 50) 
Wilcoxon Test 
SBD (0.005) & Non-SBD (0.003) 
0.12 
Analysis of the concentration rates within this broad-based sample again revealed mixed 
findings. Concentration rates of total crime were higher within the SIM sample 0-9S as 
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compared to 1.90). However, concentration rates of burglary offences were slightly higher 
within the Non-SBD sample (1.3 as compared to 1.2). 
Residents' Survey: 
The residents' survey was designed to ascertain residents' actual experiences of crime as well as 
their fears, perceptions and concerns regarding crime and disorder within their neighbourhood. 
The questions were based upon those utilised in the British Crime Survey to ensure that as well 
as comparisons between SBD and Non-SBD respondents, the findings could also be related to 
those of the general population. 250 SBD and 2SO Non-SBD addresses were visited as part of 
the residents' survey. The response rate was 47%, 45% of these were SBD residents and SS% 
were Non-SBD residents, giving a balanced representation. The residents' survey took place in 
1999, for this reason, the findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey (which measures 
experiences within 1999) were used as the national comparison. 
Burglary: 
The results revealed that 2.9% of SBD respondents had been burgled within the previous year, 
this is compared to 8.4% of Non-SBD respondents and 4.3% of BCS respondents. Statistical 
analysis revealed that the difference in levels of victimisation experienced by residents living 
within SBD and Non-SBD properties was not significant at the level of 0.05, but did verge on 
statistical significance - Pearson Chi-Square = 3.20S, df = 1, p=0.06 (one-tailed). Of those 
who had experienced a burglary within the previous year 1.9% of SBD respondents and 1.5% 
of Non-SBD respondents had been burgled more than once. This suggests that although 
burglary is lower within the SBD sample, residents are more vulnerable to repeat burglary. "11-lis 
finding supports those presented within the detailed analysis (above) which revealed that 
although burglary rates were lower within the SBD sample, levels of repeat burglary 
(concentration) were higher. 
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Figure 13: Percentage of Sample Experiencing Burglary 
Ri3k of Burglarv Victimisation 
Vehicle Offences: 
Findings from the residents' survey revealed that 4.8% of the SBD respondents and 6.1 % of the 
Non-SBD respondents had experienced a Theft of Vehicle offence within the previous year. 
Statistical analysis revealed that this difference was not statistically significant - Pearson Chi- 
Square 0.203, df =: 1, p=0.44 (one-tailed). 0% of the SBD respondents had experienced 
this offence on more than one occasion during the previous year compared to 1.6% of the Non- 
SBD sample. 
In direct contrast to this finding, 7.6% of SBD respondents and only 6.1% of Non-SBD 
respondents had experienced a Theft from Vehicle offence within the previous year. This 
difference was not statistically significant at the level of 0.05 - Pearson Chi- Square =: 0.2 11, df 
= 1, p=0.42 (one-tailed). 
A lower number of SBD respondents (5.7%) than Non-SBD residents (7.6%) reported having 
experienced damage to their vehicle during the previous year. Again, this difference was not 
statistically significant at the level of 0.05 - Pearson Chi-Square = 0.00s, df = 1, p=0.54 one- 
tailed) 
Theft of pedal cycles were higher among SBD respondents (9.5%) than Non-SBD respondents 
(6.9%), however, this difference was not statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = O. S54, 
df -= 1, p=0.31 (one-tailed). 
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Theft from outside dwelling: 
When asked whether they had experienced a theft of property from outside the dwelling (i. e. 
washing from the line, furniture or toys from the garden or tools from the shed/garage) 16.2% 
of the SBD respondents had experienced this offence during the previous year compared to 
24.4% of Non-SBD respondents. This offence showed the largest variance between SBD and 
Non-SBD responses, however, the difference was not statistically significant at the level of 0.0 - 
Pearson Chi-Square = 2.404, df = 1, p=0.08 (one-tailed). 
Safety: 
When asked how safe they felt when walking alone after dark, 11.4% of SBD respondents felt 
'very unsafe' compared to 19.1% of Non-SBD respondents and 11% of BCS respondents. This 
difference is statistically significant at the level of 0.05 - Pearson Chi-Square =: 6.111, df = 3, p 
= 0.05 (one-tailed). A further 43.8% of SBD respondents felt 'very unsafe or a bit unsafe' 
compared to 45.1 % of Non-SBD respondents and 3 3% of the BCS respondents. 
Figure 14: Percentage of Sample who Feet Very Unsafe Walking Alone After Dark 
Proportion of Respondents who Feel Very Unsafe Walking Alone After Dark 
i 
8. 
3.8% of SBD respondents felt very unsafe at home alone at night compared to 7.6% of Non- 
SBD respondents and 2% of BCS respondents. This difference was not statistically significant - 
Pearson Chi Square ::::: 3.307, df = 3, p=0.18 (one-tailed). 20% of the SBD respondents felt 
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very or a bit unsafe in their home at night compared to 29.7% of the Non-SBD respondents and 
only 9% of BCS respondents. 
Figure IS: Percentage of Sample who Feel Very Unsafe at Home Alone at Night. 
Proportion of Respondents who Feel Very Unufc At Home Alone At Night 
I 
> 
.2 
n. 
57.1 % of SBD respondents felt safer in their present home than the previous house in which 
they lived compared to only 49.6% of Non-SBD respondents. 
Worries and Concerns: 
24.8% of SBD respondents and 26.7% of Non-SBD respondents were 'very worried' about 
being a victim of burglary. This is compared to 19% of the BCS respondents. The difference 
between levels of worry felt by SBD and Non-SBD respondents was not statistically significant - 
Pearson Chi Square = 0.364, df = 3, p=0.47 (one-tailed). 25% of car owning SBD 
respondents were 'very worried' about being a victim of Theft of their vehicle compared to 
27% of car owning Non-SBD respondents and 21% of the BCS respondents. This difference 
verged on statistical significance - Pearson Chi Square - 6.163, df = 4, p=0.09 (one-tailed). 
2 3% of car owning SBD respondents were 'very worried' about being a victim of Theft From 
their vehicle compared to 26% of car owning Non-SBD respondents and only 16% of BCS 
respondents. This difference was statistically significant - Pearson Chi Square = 8.419, df = 4, 
p=0.04 (one-tailed). 20% of SBD respondents were 'very worried' about being a victim of 
mugging, this figure was higher than Non-SBD respondents of which only 17.6% were 'very 
worried'. (The BCS figure was 17%). This difference is not statistically significant - Pearson Chi 
102 
'A 
1, ., 1111' 1, I -AY S. MP6 
Square = 0.878, df z: -- 3, p=0.42 (one-tailed). Another concern which was greater amongst 
SBD residents was racially motivated incidents. 11.4% of SBD respondents were very worried 
compared to 9.2% of Non-SBD respondents. This difference was not statistically significant - 
Pearson Chi-Square = 4.374, df = 3, p=0.11 (one-tailed). 
Perceptions of Crime and Disorder: 
12.4% of SBD respondents felt that noisy neighbours were a 'very big problem' on their estate 
compared to 10.7% of Non-SBD respondents. Concerns relating to teenagers were again higher 
amongst the SBD respondents of which 23.8% felt that teenagers were a very big problem 
compared to only 17.6% of Non-SBD respondents. 18.1% of SBD respondents felt that 
vandalism was a very big problem on their estate compared to 19.8% of Non-SBD respondents. 
15.2% of SBD respondents felt that drug use and drug dealing were a very big problem on their 
estate compared to 22.1 % of the Non-SBD respondents. Statistical analysis, using Pearson's Chi 
Square revealed that perceptions of each of these crime and disorder issues were not statistically 
significant at the level of 0.05. Table 18 below summarises the findings from the residents' 
survey. 
Table 18: Summary of Survey Responses 
Crime/Disorder SBD Response Non-SBD Response 
Burglary* 2.9% 8.4% 
Thcft ofVchiclc 4.8% 6.1% 
The I fro ri Vehicle 7.6% 6.1% 
Damage to Motor Vehicle 5.7% 7.6% 
The i of Pcdal Cycle 9.5% 6.9% 
Theft from Outside 
Dwelling* 
16.2% 24.4% 
Very Unsafe Alone on 
Streets" 
11.4% 19.1% 
Very Unsafe at Home 
Alone 
3.8% 7.6% 
Very Worried about 
Burglary 
24.8% 26.7% 
Very Worried about 
Thcft of Vehicle* 
25% 27% 
Very Worried about 23% 26% 
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Theft from Vehicle" 
Verv Worried about 
1 
20% 17.6% 
Mugging 
Very Worried about 11.4% 9.2% 
Racially Motivated 
Attacks* 
Noisy Neighbours are a 12. Vý'o 10.7% 
Very Big Problem 
Teenagers are a Very Big 23.8% 17.6% 
Problem 
Vandalism is a Very Big 18.1% 19.8% 
Problem 
Drug Use is a Very Big 15.2% 22.1% 
Problem 
*d-, wi-I ., th, II ýft) I (--t. dd) 
denotes statistical signficance at the level ofO. 05 (one-tailed). 
Awareness of SBD: 
Finally, only 5% of the SBD respondents were aware that their neighbourhood had been given 
an award entitled the 'SBD' award because it had been designed and built to reduce 
opportunities f. or crime and disorder. This finding is extremely important and suggests that any 
feelings of enhanced security and safety are genuine emotions rather than the responses which 
respondents felt obliged to provide, given that they were residing in an estate designed to 
reduce crime. 
SBD as an Evolving Standard: 
In an attempt to establish whether the performance of SBD is improving as lessons arc learned 
and new standards are introduced, the burglary rates of SBD estates built in 1994 through to 
1998 were compared with their Non-SBD matched pair. The estates used as part of this analysis 
were the 25 matched pairs utilised for the detailed analysis discussed above. The burglary rate 
of each SBD pair was expressed as a percentage of its Non-SBD matched pair. These 
percentages were then aggregated according to the year in which the SBD estate was built, 
giving a mean percentage for each year - this being the percentage of burglary within the SBD 
as compared to the Non-SBD sample. 
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Figure 16: Burglary Rate on SBD Estates as a Proportion of Non-SBD Matched 
Pairs. 
SBD as an Evolving Standard 
The results revealed a year on year improvement in SBD's performance. The mean burglary 
rate for SBD estates built in 1994 was 171% of the burglary rate for Non-SBD estates built in 
1994 -a disappointing comparison and one which suggests that SBD estates were not achieving 
any crime reduction benefits. The mean burglary rate for SBD estates built in 1995 was 130% 
of the burglary rate for Non-SBD estates built in 1995. For estates built in 1996, the figure was 
97%, for 1997 the figure was 51% and for SBD estates built in 1998, the mean burglary rate 
was 4S% of the burglary rate for the Non-SBD matched pairs. These results suggest that until 
1996, the SBD estates were actually experiencing more burglary that their matched pairs - in 
the case of estates built in 1994, almost twice as much! Although one would expect an 
improvement in the performance of the SBD scheme, the extent to which its crime reduction 
potential has improved is extremely surprising. 
Many of the existing standards used in the SBD scheme such as the physical security standards 
for doors and windows (BS7950 and PAS - 24) were introduced in 1999. It is suggested that 
had the sample of estates utilised for this thesis been selected at a later date, thus excluding 
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1994 1995 1990 1997 1998 
Year Estate was Built 
some of the earlier estates and instead including estates built to a higher specification, the 
results would have shown a greater difference between crime experienced on SBD and Non- 
SBD estates. 
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Chapter Three - Part Four 
Discussion 
The results discussed within part three of this chapter are mixed, yet overall they reveal a 
positive picture for the SBD scheme. The analysis of police recorded statistics included three 
levels - estates which had been refurbished to SBD standard, newly built estates compared with 
matched pairs which were as similar as possible in terms of age, housing tenure, location and 
environmental features, and newly built estates which were simply compared with the nearest 
Non-SBD estate. 
The two estates which had been refurbished to SBD saw reductions in the total crime levels of 
55%. The crime pattern on the Cherry Court complex appeared straightforward, with 
immediate reductions in crime following certification to the SBD standard. However, this was 
not the case for Appleton Gardens/Saville Court. Although the crime rate on this estate fell at 
the same rate as Cherry Court, the drop in crime levels was not immediate. Crime rates fell in 
the period immediately following certification, however, they began to increase throughout the 
following year, before falling to a level much lower than that seen pre-certification, and 
remaining at this consistently low level for the next five years. Explanations for this pattern may 
lie with a delay in the crime reduction effects of certain measures introduced by the SBD 
scheme. Although the physical security improvements would reduce crime immediately, 
measures such as improved natural surveillance may require time for neighbours to become 
familiar with the community surrounding them. Others explanations for this pattern may be an 
increased police presence on the estate, thus an increase in the number of offences actually 
being detected; an increased willingness to report crime to the police due to rejuvenated levels 
of pride or increased feelings of confidence in the Criminal Justice System. Each of these 
suggestions would imply that the level of crimes =orted to the police rose following 
certification to SBD standard, rather than the actual number of crimes being committed. 
The refurbished estates involved a simple comparison of pre and post certification crime rates. 
However, this was not possible for the majority of SBD estates which were newly built to the 
SBD standard. The analysis of police recorded statistics on newly built SBD estates took place 
on two levels - detailed and broad based. The detailed level of analysis involved a detailed 
matching process of 2S SBD and Non-SBD pairs to ensure that as far as possible, the only 
difference between the pair was that one was SBD and the other was Non-SBD. 71-ds detailed 
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matching process was designed to ensure that any difference in the crime rates could be 
attributed to the SBD status, as opposed to any extraneous variables such as the age of the 
properties or the tenure of the residents. The results of this analysis revealed that the incidence 
rates (number of crime events divided by the number of properties) of both total crime and 
burglary alone were lower within the SBD sample. The total crime rate was 34% higher within 
the Non-SBD sample and the burglary rate was 71% higher within the Non-SBD sample. 
Although the differences between the rates within the two samples were not statistically 
significant at the level of 0.05, they did verge on statistical significance (0.1 for total crime and 
0.16 for burglary) and were virtually all in the same direction, and would thus have reached 
statistical reliability on a sign test. 
The findings were very similar when an analysis of incidence was replaced with prevalence (the 
proportion of dwellings which were offended against at least once). The results revealed that 
both total crime and burglary rates were higher within the Non-SBD sample. The total crime 
rate was 19% higher within the Non-SBD sainple, and the burglary rate was 78% higher within 
the Non-SBD sample. Although these results again did not reveal a statistically significant 
difference at the level of 0.05, the difference did verge upon statistical significance (0.06 for 
total crime and 0.12 for burglary). 
The analysis of levels of repeat victimisation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter four; 
however, initial analysis revealed that SBD did not perform as well at preventing repeat crimes 
once the first crime had been committed. Although repeat victimisation was higher within the 
Non-SBD sample, repeat burglary was higher within the SBD sample. This finding suggests that 
although SBD is more likely to prevent crime taking place, once the offender has found a 
weakness, either within the design of a property or the resident residing within that property, 
they are exploiting that weakness and committing repeat burglaries at a rate higher than that 
experienced by the Non-SBD matched pairs. 
in contrast to the detailed level of analysis, the broad-based level of analysis simply compared 
50 SBD estates with the nearest 50 Non-SBD estates irrespective of intervening variables such 
as housing tenure or age of property. The less robust design of the broad-based research means 
that it was recognised in advance that, in the event of divergence of results, more confidence 
would be invested in the detailed analyses. The results were much less positive for the SBD 
scheme and revealed very little difference between crime rates within the SBD and Non-SBD 
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sample. Incidence rates for total crime and burglary were very slightly higher within the SBD 
sample. However, these differences were not statistically significant (probabilities of 0.43 for 
total crime and 0.21 for burglary). Prevalence rates showed a very similar pattern, with both 
total crime and burglary rates slightly higher within the SBD sample. Again these differences did 
not show statistical significance (0.21 for total crime and 0.12 for burglary). The levels of 
repeat victimisation were higher within the SBD sample for total crime, but unlike the detailed 
level of analysis, the repeat victimisation rate for burglary was lower within the SBD sample. 
Although the results of the detailed analysis (the level of analysis with the most rigorous 
methodology) were positive, it was felt that the results were not as positive as might be 
expected. Further analysis of the burglary rates, paying particular attention to the year in which 
the SBD estates were built, revealed a year on year improvement in the performance of SBD as 
a crime reduction measure. The SBD estates built in 1994 and 199S were experiencing much 
higher levels of burglary than their Non-SBD matched pairs. Yet, the estates built in 1997 and 
1998 were experiencing less than half of the burglaries of the Non-SBD sample. As the 
standards of physical security required within SBD dwellings was upgraded in 1999, it is 
suggested that an analysis of estates built in more recent years would have revealed even more 
positive results, and such research is recommended. 
The analysis of refurbished and newly built estates had thus far focused only upon police 
recorded statistics. Kershaw et al (2000) estimated that only 41% of offences are actually 
reported to the police, and of those offences which are reported, only 57.2% are recorded as 
police statistics. For this reason, the analysis included a self-reporting questionnaire designed to 
ascertain experiences, fears and perceptions of crime and disorder within the sample of 2S SED 
and 25 Non-SBD estates which had been included in the detailed analysis. The results supported 
the findings of the detailed analysis and revealed that burglary, theft of vehicle, damage to 
motor vehicle and theft from outside the dwelling were higher within the Non-SBD sample. 
The only differences verging on statistical significance were burglary (0.06) and theft from 
outside the dwelling (0.08). The crime categories theft from vehicle and theft of pedal cycle 
were higher within the SBD sample, but these differences were not statistically significant. As 
well as measuring crimes experienced by residents, the survey asked questions relating to fears 
and concerns about crime and disorder issues. The results revealed that SBD residents feel safer 
than their Non-SBD counterparts whilst walldng alone on the streets as well as at home alone at 
night. The difference between levels of fear experienced by SBD and Non-SBD residents whilst 
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walldng alone on the streets at night was statistically significant (0.05), whilst the differences in 
levels of fear whilst home alone at night was not (0.18). 
SBD residents were less worried about becoming a victim of burglary or vehicle crime than 
their Non-SBD counterparts. However, they were more worried than their Non-SBD 
counterparts about becoming a victim of mugging or racially motivated attacks. SBD residents 
were more likely than Non-SBD residents to feel that both noisy neighbours and teenagers 
hanging around were a very big problem. However, SBD residents were less likely than their 
Non-SBD counterparts to feel that vandalism or drug use were very big problems on their 
estate. The findings from the residents' survey revealed that SBD residents experienced lower 
levels of burglary, theft of vehicle, damage to vehicle and theft from outside the dwelling - 
supporting the findings of the detailed analysis. However, SBD residents report experiencing 
higher levels of theft from vehicle and theft of pedal cycle than their Non-SBD counterparts. 
These two offences were lower within the analysis of police recorded statistics, suggesting 
either a level of under reporting to the police, or over reporting as part of the survey. As well 
as experiencing lower levels of crime, SBD residents appear to feel safer in their home and on 
the streets surrounding their home than Non-SBD residents. SBD residents also appear to 
worry less about becoming a victim of property crimes such as burglary and vehicle crime, yet 
more about personal crimes such as mugging and racially motivated attacks -a result which 
supports the police recorded statistics, which showed higher levels of violent crimes such as 
ABH and GBH within the SBD sample. 
A less positive finding from the residents' survey was that of perceptions relating to disorder 
and anti-social behaviour. A higher number of SBD respondents felt that noisy neighbours and 
teenagers hanging around were a 'very big problem' on their estate than Non-SBD respondents. 
However, lower numbers of SBD respondents felt that drug use/dealing and vandalism were a 
'very big problem' than Non-SBD respondents. One explanation for this finding may be related 
to a displacement of concerns or priorities among the SBD residents. A lower level of crime 
within these estates may have led to disorder issues becoming their main priority for concern 
(perhaps a positive result of the reduction in crime on SBD estates). Overall, the findings from 
the residents' survey are positive and support the recorded statistics in their presentation of 
SBD estates. 
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This aim of this chapter of the thesis was to establish whether SBD is an effective crime 
reduction measure. The results are positive, yet not straightforward. Overall, the findings 
suggest that SBD is probably and with qualifications an effective crime reduction measure when 
compared with houses which are similar in terms of tenure, age and environmental factors. 
Rates of burglary and total crime are lower, and residents appear to feel safer and less 
concerned about property crime. Although the findings suggest that SBD estates experience 
lower levels of crime than their similar Non-SBD counterparts, the results were far from 
positive when SBD estates were simply compared with the nearest estate irrespective of 
intervening variables. It is suggested that the variables age and housing tenure have more impact 
upon crime, albeit negatively, than the introduction of the SBD scheme. Although these factors 
have not been disentangled, it is suggested that housing tenure is likely to have the greatest 
impact upon these findings. The estates were not matched for age, yet the majority were of a 
similar age. However, within this level of analysis, all SBD dwellings were RSL owned and 
therefore rented to their tenants. In contrast, the majority of Non-SBD properties were owner 
occupied. Although the actual levels of social cohesion have not been measured for this study, it 
is suggested that the increased levels of resident turnover within the rented accommodation, 
would render those properties more vulnerable to crime. Neighbours are less likely to know 
who are residents and who are strangers, a factor which would increase the appeal of those 
properties to potential offenders (Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 1993). 
The reader will recaU at the outset that the present thesis is intended as in part future-oriented 
Thus the evaluation reported to this point will in due course form the basis for a prospectus of 
possible refinements of SBD, rather than a static statement of how good it is. In many ways, the 
easier route to a doctoral thesis would have been to analyse the data reported to this point in 
greater detail. Some of the analyses which could be done include the following: 
1. is the time and day of week proffle in SBD homes different from those of Non-SBD 
homes, i. e. are there different peak times and days? 
2. Is there a different gap between the first time an offence occurs and the last, comparing 
SBD and Non-SBD homes? The shortness of this gap can be used as a proxy for the 
shortness of the travel to crime distance of the perpetrator. 
Is there a different proportion of SBD and Non-SBD burglaries which involve garden 
sheds rather thm intra-mural burglary? 
Are there differences between goods taken in the burglary of SBD and Non-SBD 
homes? 
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These and many other interesting questions could have been addressed with the data to hand, 
and perhaps will be in the future. However the trade-off between evaluation and improvement 
was made in favour of the latter, which accounts for the direction taken in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Environmental Factors and the Prediction of 
Risk 
113 A 
Chapter Four - Part One 
Aims 
Chapter three focused upon the performance of SBD as a crime reduction measure, comparing 
crime and the fear of crime between samples of SBD and Non-SBD properties. The results were 
positive yet mixed. SBD residents appear to experience less crime and fear of crime than their 
Non-SBD counterparts, yet SBD properties remain vulnerable to repeat victimisation. The 
standard of SBD estates also appears to be improving year on year. Estates built prior to 1996 
were experiencing burglary rates almost twice as high as their Non-SBD counterparts, 
however, those built in 1998 experienced less than half of the burglary of the Non-SBD sample. 
The research findings discussed thus far warrant the claim that SBD is an effective crime 
reduction measure, but to sit back and enjoy this claim without pursuit of improvement would 
be both naive and complacent. Complacency is used to describe those who are contented or self 
satisfied to a fault. To become complacent about the merits of SBD, or any crime prevention 
measure, would be to ignore the evolving nature of crime and those who take part in it. To 
ensure that SBD continues to evolve faster than criminals' abilities to overcome it, research 
with an improvement orientation is essential. With this in mind, Chapters four and five aim to 
investigate the current weaknesses within the SBD scheme and to suggest ways in which its use 
as a crime reduction tool can be maximised. Chapter four focuses upon the specific 
environmental factors which increase a property's vulnerability to first and repeat victimisation. 
The rationale for this investigation is twofold - the first relates to clarification, the second to 
improvement. 
The first rationale for investigating which individual environmental factors increase a property's 
vulnerability to crime was to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the issue of permeability 
and through movement. Although the research presented within this thesis investigates an 
abundance of factors other than pedestrian and vehicular movement (including the presence of 
litter/vandalism, signs of desertion and traces of residence), the analysis of environmental 
factors such as the positioning of footpaths, road layout surrounding properties and pedestrian 
and vehicular through movement is designed to help clarify a position which has become 
confusing and contradictory for the practitioners tasked with the role of designing residential 
housing estates. The second rationale is improvement oriented. As was discussed in earlier 
paragraphs, initial investigations suggest that SBD is an effective crime reduction measure. 
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However, previous research suggests that many crime reduction initiatives foRow a finite life 
cycle (Berr-f and Carter, 1992) with the positive effects susceptible to fade unless managed 
closely. This pattern has been displayed within many CCTV initiatives, for example, Webb and 
Laycock (1992), Tilley (1993), Brown (1995) and Armitage et a] (1999). It is hoped that in 
investigating the influence of particular environmental factors upon crime risk, the SBD 
standards can be re-assessed and improved as necessary. 
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Chapter Four - Part Two 
Risk Factors as a means of Prediction 
The importance of predicting the risks associated with the introduction of new products, 
systems, processes, buildings and even legislation was discussed in Chapter two. 
Consideration of the unintended consequences of development and innovation are essential. 
In 1999 the UK government projected a need for some 4.1 million additional homes by 
2021. Consider the impact, which this development could have upon crime and disorder 
should planners and developers a) know which factors make a property vulnerable to crime 
and b) care enough to avoid these. Chapter two discussed work already carried out by 
authors such as Winchester and Jackson (1982), Coleman (1986) and Groff and LaVigne 
(2001) who produced risk assessment tools for residential housing. The Winchester and 
Jackson Environmental Risk Index provided a good, empirically based starting point and was 
used as a means of minimising intervening variables within the selection of samples for the 
analysis contained within Chapter three. However, with the original aims of this thesis in 
mind, it was felt that a much more comprehensive fist of factors was required. The rationale 
behind the perceived need for a wider range of factors was twofold. Firstly, further analysis 
of the Winchester and Jackson Environmental Index scores awarded to properties within the 
original'sample (see chapter Three) revealed that there was very little difference between 
the SBD and Non-SBD samples (even those rejected due to scores which were medium or 
high). For example, only 1% of the sample was located in the country, 0% were isolated, 
0% were set at a distance from the road on which they stood and 0% were in a position with 
5 or less houses in sight. This meant that analysis of whether these particular factors predict 
risk would in all likelihood prove impossible. The second and overriding rationale was to 
ensure that the findings from the analysis could be used to clarify many of the current 
debates surrounding SBD and designing out crime. This meant ensuring that data were 
collected on factors such as through movement, surveillance, maintenance and road layout 
because these were factors on which variation could reasonably be expected. "Me factors 
utilised for this section of the thesis are discussed in more detail within the methodology 
section below. 
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Chapter Four - Part Three 
Methodology 
Chapter four of the thesis focuses upon developing a comprehensive environmental risk index 
to aid the future development of the SBD scheme and to inform practitioners as to the factors 
which influence crime and disorder within residential housing. The sample included the 25 SBD 
and 25 Non-SBD housing estates which had been used in the detailed analysis (see Chapter 
three) and covered 1058 properties located throughout the West Yorkshire region. The scale of 
this task will hopefully become clear as the reader continues, however, in case this is not 
apparent, it is hoped that a brief review will not appear boastful. The collection of data for 
Chapter four involved conducting an assessment of each of these 1058 houses using the Other 
Environmental Risk Factors (OERF) checklist developed as part of this thesis (to be discussed 
below). The checklist is extremely comprehensive and covers factors which relate to the 
property itself as well as the layout of the surrounding area. Factors such as car parking, 
property boundary and orientation of the front door could be established relatively easily with a 
clear view of most properties. However, factors such as the positioning of footpaths were not as 
straightforward. In this instance the author had to measure the distance from the property to 
the footpath as well as investigating the destination of the footpath - did it lead to a maze of 
other paths, shops or another residential areas? Another example includes the factors relating to 
whether the property was likely to be within the awareness space of potential offenders. Factors 
included whether the property was in viewing distance of a road junction, the volume of traffic 
at that junction, whether the property was in viewing distance of traffic lights and what was the 
volume of traffic at those lights? It is estimated that the completion of one checklist took 
between 15 and 20 minutes. The sample included 1058 houses, spread throughout Bradford, 
Huddersfield, Halifax, Wakefield and Bradford. For this reason, the data collection for this 
section of the thesis alone covered a period of more than three months, and as the photos below 
highlight, more than one British season! 
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The OERF checklist was developed using previous indices of risk as well as the literature 
relating to enviromnental risk factors which has been discussed in detail in Chapter two. As was 
referred to within the previous paragraph, this checklist was entitled Other Enviromnental Risk 
Factors (OERF) checklist and was split into the seven categories road network, access, property 
within awareness space of others, surveillance, parking, social climate and traces. 
Road Network: Was the property located on a cul-de-sac without a linked pathway, a cul-de- 
sac with a linked pathway or a through road? Was the property situated on an estate which had a 
real or symbolic barrier at the entrance to the estate? Was there a change in the texture or 
colour of the road, a narrowing of the entrance or a physical roadblock? 
Access: This section of the table involved assessing how close the property was located to a 
footpath and where that footpath led. Did it lead to shops, a maze of other footpaths, another 
residential area or open land? There was also a need to establish whether the footpath ran at the 
rear of the property, whether there was a gate leading from the footpath into the garden and 
whether the house was visible from that footpath. The access section also looked at the 
boundary of the property. Was it bounded by a wall, solid fence, post and rail fence, thorny 
foliage, a fence/wall topped with trellis or nothing? 
Awareness space: This section of the table looked at whether or not the property was within 
the awareness space of potential offenders. Was it located within viewing distance of a stop sign 
and if so what was the volume of traffic at that stop sign? Was the property located within 
viewing distance of traffic lights and again if so what was the volume of traffic at these traffic 
lights? Was the property located within viewing distance of a road junction? If so, what was the 
volume of traffic at that junction? Information was also gathered relating to the average speed of 
traffic in front of the property as well as the volume of both vehicular and pedestrian traffic in 
front of the property. Finally, this section looked at whether or not there were people hanging 
around within the vicinity of the residence. 
Parking: Were the car parking facilities on the street, within a communal area, on the 
driveway or within a garage? 
Social Climate: Was there evidence of a neighbourhood watch scheme? Was there evidence 
of litter and graffiti? Were there signs of disrepair, or short/long term desertion? 
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Trams: The fmal section looked at traces. Was there evidence of a dog or a burglar alarm? Was 
there a window open or a door ajar? 
The checklist also asked the questions 'Were you observed by a resident? and 'Were you 
confronted by a resident? These were designed to measure the extent of informal social control 
on the estate where the property was located. 
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Table 19: Other Environmental Risk Factors Checklist 
Address: 
Day: 
Date: 
Time: 
Observed by Resident (i. e. twitching curtains etc. ): yes/no 
Questioned/ Confronted by Resident: yes/no 
Yes No Other 
Road Network 
1) Cul de sac without linked path,, %-aN- 
2) Cul de sac with linked pathway 
3) Through road 
4) Entrance to estate is marked by symbolic/real barrier i. e. change in road 
colour/texture, pillars, gate etc. 
-7Ve- -s -K -o - 6t- h -ei r 
Access 
footpath is any pedestrian thoroughfare that is NOT a pavement /sidewalk 
S) Number of'properties away from footpath* 
a) 0 (i. e. adjacent) 
b) I-5 (properties) 
C) 6- 10 (properties) 
6) Footpath leads to: 
a) Shops 
b) Open land 
C) Maze of other footpaths 
d) Other residential area 
7) Footpath runs at rear of house 
8) Gate leading from footpath into rear garden 
9) Property is visible from footpath 
10) Boundary of property is marked by 
a) Wall 
b) Solid Fence 
C) Post and Rail Fence i. e. see through 
d) Thorny foliage 
e) Fence/wall topped with trellis 
I f) 
Property within 'Awareness Space' of Others? 
11) Within viewing distance of 'Stop' sign 
12) Volume of Traffic at 'stop sign' 
a) Light (0-5 vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
b) Moderate (6- 10 vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
C) Heavy (10+ vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
13) Within viewing distance of traffic lights 
14) Volume of Traffic at traffic lights 
a) Light (0-5 vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
b) Moderate (6- 10 vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
C) Heavy 0 0+ vehicles stot) within 3 minutesi 
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16) Volume of traffic at road junction 
a) Light (0- S vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
b) Moderate (6- 10 vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
C) Heavy (10+ vehicles stop within 3 minutes) 
17) Average speed of traffic in front of residence 
18) Volume of traffic in front of'residence 
a) Light (0-5 vehicles pass in 3 minutes) 
b) Moderate (6- 10 vehicles pass in 3 minutes) 
C) Heavy (10+ vehicles pass in 3 minutes) 
19) Volume of pedestrian traffic in front of'residence 
a) Light (0-5 pedestrians pass in 3 minutes) 
b) Moderate (6- 10 pedestrians pass in 3 minutes) 
C) Heavv (10+ pedestrians pass in 3 minutes) 
20) People 'hatqpig arourid' wthin vicinity ofpropertý 
- 
Surveillance 
Ves --iýo dt-her 
21) Frontdoorf , aci[ILý Street 
Parking 
yVesi No ther 
22) Driveway 
23) Garage 
24) Communal Parking 
2S) Street parking 
Social Climate 
Yes No Other 
26) Evidence ofNeighbourhood Watch Scheme 
27) Evidence of' Litter/ Graff iti within vicinity of property 
a) None 
b) Some 
C) Heavy 
28) General upkeep of Property 
a) No signs of disrepair 
b) Some sign of disrepair 
C) Many signs of disrepair 
29) Signs of short term desertion: e. g. milk bottles left outside 
30) Signs of long term desertion e. g. untended garden, piles of letters/ newspapers, 
property boarded up 
Traces 
Yes No Other 
31 ) Evidence of dog 
32) Evidence of burglar alarm 
33) Window open /door ajar 
The final version of the OERF table was produced following several validation exercises to 
ensure that the statements /questions were not ambiguous or open to misinterpretation. The 
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criticism to which this methodology is most vulnerable concerns inter-rater reliability. Since it 
was not possible for the author to be unaware of an estate's SBD status, the rating had to be as 
objective as possible. Seeldng to ensure this involved a small pilot scheme at an estate not 
utilised within the final analysis. Two individuals scored the same properties without 
consultation. If there were discrepancies between their findings, these statements/questions 
were re-worded to improve clarity. The process was repeated until both individuals were 
reaching the same conclusions for each question/statement. The first fieldworker was the 
author, the second was a Researcher employed by the Applied Criminology Group at the 
University of Huddersfield. A second validation exercise involved consultation with several 
Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs) to ensure that the questions/statements covered all 
relevant debates surrounding the scheme - an issue of importance if the findings are to be 
utilised by practitioners. 
Data collection involved certain conventions which should be made explicit. The intention 
behind the collection of these data was to assess a property's vulnerability to crime as viewed by 
an outsider i. e. a potential offender. Therefore, when assessing whether there was evidence of 
factors such as a neighbourhood watch scheme, the objective was not to analyse the intensity of 
that scheme or even whether it actually existed, but purely to measure evidence of its existence 
as seen by an outsider. If there was a neighbourhood watch scheme in an area but no overt signs 
of the scheme it would be categorised as 'no'. On the other hand, if there was no 'working' 
scheme in an area, but signs of a scheme were present, it would be categorised as dyes'. On a 
similar note, evidence of a burglar alarm simply measured whether the fieldworker could see 
evidence of an alarm, not whether the alarm worked, whether the residents used it, or whether 
neighbours would respond to it. Following the collection of the OERF data, the fieldwork was 
concluded with another small pilot exercise whereby two individuals (discussed above) scored 
the original pilot sample to ensure that there was still consistency between findings. To this 
end, it is suggested that the scores for each property are as reliable as possible. As a means of 
supporting the evidence collected, important environmental features from each estate were 
photographed using a digital camera and filed according to the estate name/house number. 
Examples are displayed below. 
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FOOtPaths: 
Figure 17: Footpath 
running at rear of 
properties. This 
footpath led to shops 
and other residential 
areas. 
Figure 18: Footpath 
running at rear of' 
properties. This 
footpath led to open 
land. 
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Figure 19: Footpath at 
rear of properties. This 
footpath led to a maze of 
other footpaths and to 
openland. 
FFigure 
20: Vandalised 
i street sign. 
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Management 
Figure 21: Horses kept in 
front gardens -A 
management issue? 
Figure 22: Although this 
estate is well designed 
and tidy, the below 
photograph shows the 
image of its rear. 
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Figure 23: This 
photograph shows the 
rear of Figure 22. 
Figure 24: This estate is 
tidy, clean and almost 
crime-frec. 
The original sample (utilised within the detailed analvsis) included two schenies which 
had 
resident only entry systems and contained multiple households within one 
building. For these 
schemes, environmental factors were not collected for two reasons. First, entry was 
limited 
and would have required prior permission and second, many of the environmental 
factors did 
not apply to these schemes. Data relating to these 66 properties were therefore excluded 
from 
this section of the analysis. 
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Best Practice: 
The crime data which was used to establish risk was taken from West Yorkshire Police's CIS. It 
is Police recorded crime data and for that reason does not necessarily include all crime events 
which occurred at these properties. The analysis of these data, are presented in two distinct 
formats. The first section identifies which environmental factors are associated with risk of 
burglary, victimisation (all crime) and repeat burglary/ victimisation. Because this section of the 
thesis is concerned with the association between particular environmental factors which a 
property possesses and its vulnerability to crime, the analysis utiliscs Crosstabulation and Chi 
Square to test this association. it is worth re-iterating at this point that this method of analysis 
rneasures association between two variables rather than identifying a causal link. For example, 
the Crosstabulation table below presents the data relating to the environmental factor: "Does the 
Property show signs of litter or graffiti? " This analysis reveals that a higher proportion of properties 
showing sign, of 'heavy' litter/graffiti had been victimised than properties showing no signs of 
litter or graffiti. The statistical analysis reveals that there is an association (at the level of 0.05) 
between the presence of graffiti or litter and a property's (within this sample) vulnerability to 
'ictimisation. What this statistical test does not tell us is that the presence of litter or graffiti 
cause, ý clime. 
Table 20: Example of Data Presentation 
Evidence of Litter/ Graffiti 
Never Victimised victimised once or More Total 
None 
512 31S 827 
61.9% 38.1% 100% 
sot", 
MI 104 20S 
49.3% 50.7% 1 W/O 
Fleavy II ------- ---- is 26 
42.3% S 7.79/b I Ofte 
Total 
624 434 1058 
S90/0 41% 1 WO/O 
The second section of the analysis focuses upon the production ofa practitioners' scale 
for risk 
assessment -- the aim being to produce a simple, transparent and usable tool to enable crime 
reduction practitioners to direct resources within their local community, a tool whose 
construction is sufficiently simple for practitioners to revise themselves. Having identified the 
environmental factors which should feature in any prioritisation of crime reduction effort 
(because there -as a statistically significant association between that variable and the likelihood 
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that the property would have been victimised), the aim was to produce a practitioners' scale to 
be used to identify a property's vulnerability to crime. The method of analysis selected for this 
Process was the Burgess Method. This method is described in Simon (197 1) and an application 
in a rirlinological context is described in Nuttall et a] (1977), who commend it as robust and 
sirnple. It does not address the problems of multicollinearity as more sophisticated models do, 
but has the crucial advantage of transparency of rationale and construction. Essentially, a score 
is derived from the difference between the mean rate of crime suffered generally, and the rate 
of crime suffered by homes with a particular characteristic. The process of applying this method 
of analysis to this study involved the following steps: 
a) 71ie analysis detailed within the first section was utilised to identify the 
environmental factors which showed a statistically significant association with 
crime risk; 
b) For each of those factors, the average risk of burglary for the whole sample was 
subtracted from the percentage risk associated with that variable; 
C) A score was awarded to each environmental factor. This score was the figure 
derived from this calculation; 
d) Each property within the sample was awarded a total score 
based upon the 
envirownental factors which it possessed; 
All Properties within the sample were banded into risk deciles. The mean incidence 
and Prevalence of crime for each decile. was established to ensure that the 
lowest 
decile (that which had the lowest score) did experience the lowest 
level of crime, 
and that the highest decile (that with the highest environmental risk score) had the 
highest levels of crime. 
In the simplest case, if the r-ate of victimisation of homes in an area is 10%, the rate for homes 
"vith window locks is S% and for homes without window locks is 15%, then the 'window 
locks' factor is scored thus: +5 = no window locks, -5 = window locks fitted. The process 
described is repeated for all the attributes which attained statistical significance in the 
e"P"ratOry stage described above. Each home thus receives a total Burgess score. These scores 
are rneaningless until converted into the rate of crime suffered by groups of homes sharing a 
13urges' Score. To do this, as noted above, homes were divided into the 10% with highest 
Burgess scores, the 109/6 with next highest and so on down to the 10% with the lowest scores. 
The rate of crilne suffered by each such band was then calculated. These properties were then 
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banded into percentiles of 10. The mean incidence and prevalence of crime for each percentile 
was established to ensure that the lowest decile experienced the lowest level of crime, and the 
highest decile experienced the highest levels of crime. 
The scale which emerges is capable of immediate use by practitioners. However, one caveat 
must be entered. Any predictive scale is almost more powerful as a predictor of the sample on 
which it was constructed than of any other sample. This is known as shrinkage. This is one of 
the reasons why the use of this scale by practitioners would need to involve development over 
the long-term, taking account of local information, rather than simple application of the scale 
presented. This is not a weakness in the methodology, rather a selection of a method which is 
simple and transparent which is likely to be utilised by the practitioners it is designed to serve. 
Any necessity to collate further local information relating to the area in which the analysis was 
to be applied would require co-operation from a variety of partner agencies, therefore acting as 
an additional enabler for multi-agency crime reduction practices. 
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Chapter Four - Part Four 
Results 
Selecting the Environmental Factors which are associated with crime: 
As was detailed within the methodology section, the first stage of this analysis was to establish 
which environmental factors from the OERFs table, were associated with risk of victimisation. 
Once these factors had been identified, the second level of analysis - the production of a 
practitioners' checklist, could take place. 
Which Environmental Factors are Associated with Risk of Burglary? 
The analysis of the environmental factors which are associated with burglary prone homes was 
based upon data from 1058 properties, spread throughout the West Yorkshire area. These 
homes were selected from the detailed analysis sample which was described within Chapter 
three Of this thesis. As this section of the thesis aims to identify the environmental factors which 
predict risk of burglary of dwellings generally, the variable SBD/Non-SBD was excluded from 
the analysis. Chapter three focused upon the analysis of SBD against Non-SBD properties, this 
section of thesis simply looks at what makes a property vulnerable to crime, regardless of its 
S130 status. Therefore, the sample of 1058 homes includes both SBD and Non-SBD properties. 
'rhe first stage of the analysis involved identifying those environmental factors which were 
associated at a statistically significant level with the likelihood that a property had been burgled. 
Cross tabulation was used to compare 'Never Burgled' against 'Burgled Once or More' for each 
of the environmental factors on the OERF table. The environmental 
factors which were 
associated with burglary prone homes at or beyond a statistically significant criterion of 0.1 are 
detailed below. This criterion is more relaxed than the conventional level, but has the 
advantage of yielding enough criteria from which a checklist can emerge. 
Table 21: Buriziarv - Is the Propertv Adjacent to 
es 160 38 198 
80.8% 19.2% 100% 
No 728 132 860 
84.7% 15.3% 1000/0 
To 1 888 170 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
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19.2% of the properties which were located next to open land had been burgled at least once. 
Only 15.3% of those which were not located next to open land had been burgled at least once. 
These figures suggest that the association between being located next to open space and the 
likelihood 
of burglary victimisation is statistically significant - Pearson Chi Square = 1.489, df 
I, P=0.10 (one-tailed). 
Table 22: BurLIarv - What is the Road Network the 
Cul de-sa-cw-it hout - 481 
linked pathway 85.9% 
Cul de sac with 301 linked 
pathway 81.6% 
Through Road 106 
82.2% 
Total 888 
83.9% 
79 
14.1% 
18.4% 
23 
17.8% 
170 
16.1% 
560 
100% 
369 
100% 
129 
100% 
1058 
100% 
14.1 % of the properties which were situated on a cul-de-sac without a linked pathway had been 
burgled 
at least once. 18.4% of properties situated on a cul-de-sac with a linked pathway (leaky 
cul-de-sac) had been burgled at least once, and 17.8% of properties situated on a through road 
had been burgled at least once. This suggests that properties located on culs-de-sac are least 
likely to experience a burglary, those located on through roads are more vulnerable than true 
culs-de-sac, but less vulnerable than leaky culs-de-sac, and culs-de-sac which have a linked pathway 
(leaky) are the most vulnerable to burglary. The association between being located on a cul-de- 
sac with a linked pathway and the likelihood of burglary victimisation was statistically significant 
-- Pearson Chi-Square = 3.418, df z-- 2, p=0.09 (one-tailed). 
Table 23: Burglary - Is the Property Located on an 
Estate which has a Real/S zz:: ýymbolic Barrier? 
Yes 435 71 506 
8 Y( 6% 00 14% 100% 
o N -- 5 45 -3 99 552 :: 
82.10 0 0 8 2.1 %Oy( 17.9% 100% 
Total 
8 888 170 1058 
8 
. 
9. ) 8 3.9 %Y( 16.1% 100% 
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14% of the properties which were situated on an estate with a real or symbolic barrier had 
experienced at least one burglary. In contrast, 17.9% of properties which 'A, cre situated on an 
estate without a real or symbolic barrier had experienced at least one burglary. The association 
between being located on an estate without a real or symbolic barrier at the entrance to that 
estate and the likelihood of becoming a victim of burglary was statistically significant - Pearson 
Chi Square ýý= 2.982, df = 1, p=0.05 (one-tailed). 
Table 24: Burglary - Is the Property Located on an Estate which 
has a Footpath 
Linking it to Local ShoDs? 
Yes 42 is 57 
73.7% 26.3% 100% 
84.5% 15.5% 100% 
Total 888 170 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
26.3% of the properties which were located on estates with footpaths 
leading from the estate to 
local shops had experienced at least one burglary. However, only 15.5% of properties which 
were situated on estates without footpaths linking them to local shops 
had experienced at least 
one burglary. The association between being located on an estate which has a footpath leading 
from the estate to the local shops and the likelihood of becoming a victim of' 
burglary was 
statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 3.923, 
df = 1, p=0.02 (one-tailed). 
Table 25: Burglary - Is the Property Located on an 
Estate which has a Footpath 
Linkinf, the. ipct, ,, i%A, -- -irritk, F,., itnaths? 
Never Burgled Burgled at least Once Total 
jes 100 36 1 36 
73.5% 26.5% 
ý 
100% 
- - - 
788 134-- 9ý2 2 
- 
85.5% 14.5% 100% 
TOZI 
88ý- I 70 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
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26.5% of properties which were situated on estates with footpaths leading from the estate to a 
maze of other footpaths had experienced at least one burglary. In direct contrast, only 14.5% of 
houses situated on estates without footpaths linking them to a maze of other footpaths had 
experienced at least one burglary. The association between being located on an estate which has 
a footpath linking that estate to a maze of other footpaths and the likelihood of becoming a 
victim of burglary was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 11.653, df = 1, p 
0-0005 (one-tailed). 
Table 26: Burglary - Is the Property Located on an Estate which has a Footpath Linking the Estate to Another Residential Area? 
Never Burgled Burgled at least Once Total 
352 77 429 
82.1% 17.9% 100% 
ý 
S36 93 629 
85.2% 14.8% 100% 
-1 -70----TOS8 888 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
17.9% of properties which were situated on estates with footpaths leading from the estate to 
another residential area had experienced at least one burglary. In contrast, only 14.8% of' 
houses situated on estates without footpaths linking them to another residential area had 
experienced at least one burglary. The association between being located on an estate which has 
a footpath linking that estate to another residential area and the likelihood of becoming a victim 
of burglary was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square ý= 
1.665, (if = 1, p=0.10 (one- 
tailed). 
Table 27: BurLflarv - What is the Volume of Traffic at the Nearest 
Road junction? 
Never Burgled Burgled at least Once Total 
Light 343 3 48 391 
8=7 %Y( 12.3% 100% 
Moderate 102 31 133 
- 
76.7% 23.3% 100% 
Heavy --- -- -41--- - 12 
77.4% 22.6% 100% 
To 1 486 - 91 577 
L--, 
__ __84.2% ____ 
15.8% 
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12.3% of the properties situated on estates within viewing distance of a road junction with light 
traffic had experienced at least one burglary. In direct contrast, 23.3% of houses situated on 
estates within viewing distance of a road junction with 'moderate' traffic had experienced at 
least one burglary, and 22.6% of houses situated on estates within viewing distance of a road 
junction with heavy traffic had experienced at least one burglary. The association between being 
located 
on an estate which is in viewing distance of a road junction which has more than rive 
vehicle, passing within three minutes and the likelihood that you will be a victim of burglary 
was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square 11.166, 
df = 2, p =0.002 (one-tailed). 
Table 28: Burglary - How Heavy is the Volume of 
Pedestrian Traffic in Front of 
the Prnr, --#.. -) 
Ligh 1015 
84.3% 15.7% 100% 
32 11 43 
74.4% 25.6% 100% 
otal 888 170 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
15.7% 
If the properties which were situated on estates with 
light pedestrian traffic had 
"'Perienced at least one burglary. In contrast to this, 25.6% of properties which were situated 
on estates with 'moderate' pedestrian traffic had experienced at 
least one burglary. This finding 
suggests that the association between having more than five pedestrians passing in 
front of a 
property within a period of five minutes and the likelihood that the property will 
be burgled 
was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 
2.3 18, df= 2, p=0.04 (one-tailed). 
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Table 29: 13urglary Are there Signs that the Property is within a Neighbourhood Watch V. -L -- - 
II-I% of the properties which were located on estates which showed evidence of a 
neighbourhood watch scheme had been burgled at least once. In contrast, 17.1 % of properties 
which were located on estates which did not show any evidence of a neighbourhood watch 
scheme had experienced at least one burglary. These findings suggest that there is a statistically 
significant association between not being located within a Neighbourhood Watch area and the 
likelihood of burglary victimisation - Pearson Chi-Square = 3.521, df = 1, p=0.03 (one- 
tailed). 
i abje 30: Burelarv - Is there Evidence that the Property has a Burglar Alarm? 
Yes 311 
77.4% 
91 
22.6% 
402 
100% 
No 577 79 656 
88% 12% 100% 
- Total 888- 170 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
22.6% of properties which showed evidence of a burglar alarm had been burgled at least once. 
" contrast, 12% of those without a burglar alarm had been burgled at least once. This finding 
suggests that there is an association between having a burglar alarm and the likelihood that the 
property will be burgled - Pearson Chi-Square = 
19.966, df = 1, p= <0.0005 (one-tailed). 
However, 
caution should be taken regarding this (and other factors such as presence ofa (log) 
due to the retrospective nature of the crime data collected. Using the data available, it is not 
Possible to ascertain with any certainty whether the presence of a 
burglar alarm precelled the 
Offence, or whether the residents purchased the alarm as a result Of the burglary. 
Table 31: Burglary - Is there a Gate Leading from a 
Rear Path into the Property's 
Rear Gard. -n) 
Never Burgled A. -led at cast Once Total 
Yes 9 
E 
Yes 
5 14 
64.3% 35.7% 100% 
. No 879 165 1044 
8 4.2 0, 'o 15.8% 100% 
Total 888 170 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
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35.7% of the properties which had a gate leading from a rear path into the rear garden had been 
burgled at least once. This is compared to only 15.8% of houses without a gate leading into the 
rear garden. This finding suggests that there is a statistically significant association between 
having a gate leading from a rear footpath into a property's rear garden, and the likelihood that 
the property will be burgled - Pearson Chi Square =- 2.718, df = 1, p z-- 0.06 (one-tailed). 
Table 32: Burglary - Are there Signs that the Property has been Deserted on a Brief Bask? 
Never Burgled Burgled at least Once Total 
I es 7 5 12 
58.3% 41.7% 100% 
No 881 165 1046 
84.2% 15.8% 100% 
Total 888 170 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
41.7% of the properties which showed signs of brief desertion had been burgled at ]cast once. 
This is ý compared to only 15.8% of properties which (lid not show signs of brief desertion. This 
finding suggests that there is an association between a property showing signs of'bricf desertion 
and the likelihood that it will have been a victim of burglary. This association is statistically 
significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 4.134, df = 1, p=0.03 (one-tailed). 
Table 33: BurLirlarv - Are there SiLins that the Property 
has been Deserted on a 
LOing-Term Basis? 
yes 6 
54.5% 
5 
4S. 5% 
11 
100% 
882 1 6wS 
84.2% is. 8% 100% 
T ý- 888 l7 -0 1058 
83.9% 16.1% 100% 
45.5%, of the properties which showed signs of lengthy desertion had been burgled at least 
once. This is compared to a figure of just 15.8% for houses without signs of lengthy desertion. 
There is a statistically significant association between properties showing signs of' lengthy 
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desertion 
and burglary victimisation - Pearson Chi-Square = 
5.086, df = 1, p=0.02 (one- 
tailed). 
The table below presents, only for those variables which exhibited a statistically reliable 
association with burglary victimisation at the 0-1 
level, the odds-ratios of burglary or 
viCtimisation probability of the named attribute of a 
home relative to the absence of that 
attribute. Thus, for example, heavy traffic is associated with 
1.84 times the burglary risk of 
homes passed by only light traffic. 
Table 
-34! A,.,. nciated with 
Which Environmental Factors arc Associated with 
Risk of Victimisation from All 
Crime Categories? 
Having focused upon burglary alone, the next stage of 
the analysis looked at which 
environmental factors are associated with the risk of victimisation 
from all crime categories (as 
oPPO'cd to just burglary). This gives practitioners the choice of 
how to proceed in risk 
assessment. Clearly the mechanisms which drive crime will 
be more complex and more various 
the wider the category of crimes is set, and the interpretation of risk scores and what to 
do to 
lower them more contentious, but that is a choice which practitioners should 
discuss, trading 
case of interpretation off against generality of risk . 
The properties included within this analysis 
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The analysis of this sample of 1058 properties suggests that there 
is no statistically significant 
association between the remaining environmental 
factors (from the OERF table) and the 
likelihood that the property will be burgled. 
were the same as those included within the burglary analysis, as %%, ere the environmental 
factors. Rather than cross tabulating each factor with the property's experience of prior 
burglary victimisation, the analysis looked at any crimes experienced at that property. The 
environmental factors which were associated with crime risk at a statistically significant 
level of' 
0.1 are detailed below. 
Table 3S: All Crime - What is the Road Network Surrounding 
the Property? 
Ne e Victimýiised m ,v lcti7ý Victimised 02ncc oirýMorc 
Total 
w ý th 
Cul de sac i out lin d li ke pa way 
35ý 
62.9% 
2 08 
37.1% 
560 
100 x 
linked 
pathway S5.3% 4-4.7% 100% 
gh Iýoad 68 
52.7% 
61 
47.3% 
29 
100% 
624 434 lvýo 
59% 41% 100% 
'rhe analysis ofall crime categories revealed that true , 
A-de-, acs were the least vulnerable to 
"etimisation, followed by leaky culs-de-sac, with through roads 
being the most vulnerable to 
"'CUrnisation. 47.3% of properties located on through roads 
had been victimised compared to 
44.7% on culs-de-sac with linked pathways and only 
37.1% on culs-de-sac without linked 
Pathways. The association between being located on a through road and the 
likelihood that the 
property will be victimised was statistically significant - 
Pearson Chi Square = 7.656, dfz: -- 2, p 
:: __ (). 0I (one-tailed). 
Table U- A]] .. :- 4h- 
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The pattern for proximity to a footpath is not straightforward. Properties which were most 
vulnerable to victimisation were those located 6-10 houses away from a footpath (50.4% of 
these properties had been victimised). The next most vulnerable were properties which were 
located directly adjacent to a footpath (47.2% of properties located next to a footpath had been 
victimised). Properties which were least vulnerable to victimisation were those located furthest 
away from a footpath (10 or more properties away). The association between proximity to a 
footpath and risk of victimisation was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 8.598, df 
::: -- 3, P=0.02 (one-tailed). 
Table 37: All Crime - Is the Property Located on an 
Estate which has a Footpath 
Leading from the Estate to Local Shops? 
Yes 27 30 57 
47.4% 52.6% 100% 
FN ýO 
59 7- 40 -4 1001 
- 
59.6% 40.4% 
- 
100% 
- Tota l-- ---624 ---- ---- 43-4- 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
II, s with burglary, this analysis revealed that properties located on estates which had footpaths 
leading from the estate to local shops, were more vulnerable to victimisation. 52.6% of' 
Properties located on an estate with a footpath linking the estate to shops had been victimised. 
This is compared to 40.4% of properties on estates without footpaths linking them to shops. 
The association between being located on an estate with a footpath linking that estate to local 
shops and the likelihood that the property will be victimised was statistically significant 
Pearson Chi-Square = 2.869, df = 1, p=0.05 (one-tailed). 
Table 38: All Crime - Is the Property Located on an Estate with a 
Footpath Linking 
tnat Estate to a Maze of Other Footpaths? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
es 64 72 136 
47.1% 52.9% 100% 
0 560 362 922 
60.7% 39.3% 100% 
Total 624 434 1058 
100% 
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Again, the analysis suggests that properties located on estates which have a footpath linking that 
estate to a maze of other footpaths are more vulnerable to victimisation. 52.9% of properties 
located on estates with footpaths linking the estate to a maze of other footpaths had been 
victimised. This is compared to only 39.3% of properties on estates without footpaths linking 
them to a maze of other footpaths. The association between being located on an estate with a 
footpath linking the estate to a maze of other footpaths, and the likelihood that the property 
Will be victimised was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 8.609, df :: - 1, p=0.002 
(one tailed). 
Table 39: All Crime - Does the Property Have a Gate Leading 
from a Rear Path 
into the Rear Gnirdt-in) 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
es 1 13 14 
7.1% 92.9% 100% 
No 623 421 104-4 
- - 
59.7% 40.3% 
- 
100% 
- Total 624- 34 4 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
92.9% of the properties which had a gate leading from a rear footpath into the rear garden had 
been victimised. This is compared to only 4-0.3% of properties without gates leading from a 
rear footpath into the rear garden. The association between having a gate leading from a rear 
path into the rear garden and the likelihood that the property will be victimised is strongly 
stat"ticallv, "ignificant - Pearson Chi-Square : -- 13.661, 
df -- 1, p :: -- <0.0005 (one-tailed). 
I'able 40: All Crime - Is the Property Visible 
from a Nearby Foot path? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
es 78 70 148 
52.7% 47.3% 100% 
No 546 364 910 
60% 40% 100% 
Total 624 434 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
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Properties 
which are visible from a nearby footpath are more vulnerable to victimisation than 
those which are not. 47.3% of properties which were visible from a nearby footpath had been 
'ictimised. This is compared to 40% of properties which were not visible from a nearby 
footpath. The association between a property being visible from a nearby footpath and the 
likelihood that it will be victimised was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 2.508, 
off z:: 1, P=0.06 (one-tailed). 
Table 41: All Crime - How heavy is the Volume of Traffic at the Nearest Road Junction? 
Light Never Victimised Victimised 
Once or More Total 
247 144 391 
63.2% 36.8% 100% 
Moderate 
63 70 133 
47.4% 52.6% 100% 
Heavy 24 29 53 
Total 
45.3% 54.7% 100% 
334 243 S77 
57.9% 42.1% 100% 
Properties 
which are within sight of' busy road junctions are more vulnerable to victimisation 
than those which are not. Where traffic at the nearby road junction was heavy, 54.7% of the 
properties had been victimised, this is compared to only 36.8% of properties which were 
"'Ith"I light of a road junction with light traffic. The association between being within sight of a 
road junction which has more than ten vehicles passing within a period ofthree minutes, and 
'he likelihood that the property will be victimised was strongly statistically significant 
Pearson Chi-Square = 13.969, df z-- 2, p=0.0005 (one-tailed). 
Table 42: All Crime - How Heavy is the Volume of Pedestrian 
Traffic in Front of th 
0 91 L 
Pý=_Reveiýýi 
m sed 
ý___Victi7mis_ed_70nýceor Mýore ýT7ota: l::: 
4()7 7 
pertyl FL 
ght 15 
rop'"t 
ox 59.9% 40.1% 100% 
ý'4()(Jcrate 
16 27 43 
37.2% 62.8% 100% 
62ý 434 IOS8 
S9 0 s9 %Y( 41% 100% 
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62.8% of properties which were located on estates containing moderate levels of pedestrian 
traffic had been victimised. This is compared to only 40.1 % of properties on estates with 'light' 
levels 
of pedestrian traffic. The association between the presence of moderate pedestrian traffic 
(6-10 people passed within the period of three minutes) in front of a property and its 
vulnerability to victimisation was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 7.867, df = 1, 
P=0.003 (one-tailed). 
Table 43: All Crime - Does the Pr, 
Never Victimised 
None 512 
61.9% 
49.3% 
Hea VY 
42.3% 
Total 624 
59% 
have SiLyns of Litter/Graffiti? 
Victimised Once or More Total 
315 827 
38.1% 100% 
104 205 
50.7% 100% 
15 26 
57.7% 100% 
434 1058 
41% 100% 
The analysis revealed that properties showing signs of heavy litter or graffiti were more likely to 
have been victims of crime. 57.7% of properties showing evidence of heavy litter/graffiti had 
been victimised compared to only 38.1 % of properties which had no evidence of litter/gralliti. 
The association between levels of litter or graffiti and likelihood of victimisation was strongly 
statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square =: 13.915, df =-- 2, p=0.0005 (one-tailed). 
Table 44: All Crime Does the Pr, 
Never Victimised 
No 
signs of' 577 1)isrepair 
60.2% 
ty show Signs of Disrepair? 
Victimised Once or More Total 
, 382 
959 
39.8% 100% 
' gns or 
r Isr it 
Ei-epa 43 
so% ju /0 
4J 
50% 
00 
100% 
mallY 
of l ' 4 9 13 
s re pa 
! 
r 31 20/ 69.2% 100% 
z1 
6-24-- - 434 1058 
59% 41 '/o 100% 
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The analysis revealed that properties with many signs of disrepair were more vulnerable to 
crime than those with some or no signs of disrepair. 69.2% of properties with many signs of 
disrepair had been victimised. This is compared to only 39.8% of properties with no signs of 
disrepair. The association between levels of disrepair and likelihood of victimisation was 
statistically significant Pearson Chi-Square = 7.701, df = 2, p=0.01 (one-tailed). 
I able 45: All Crime - Were there Si gns that a Dog was Present at the 
Property? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Totad 
E 
Yes 5 
33.3% 
10 
66.7% 
15 
100% 
No 619 
59.3% 
424 
40.7% 
1043 
100% 
Total 624 
59% 
434 
41% 
058 
100% 
Properties which showed evidence of a dog were more likely to have 
been victimised than those 
Which did not. 66.7% of properties with evidence of a dog had 
been previously victimised 
Compared to only 40.7% of properties with no evidence of a (log. The association 
between 
evidence of a dog and the likelihood that a property has been a victim of crime was statistically 
significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 3.131, df = 1, p=0.04 
(one-tailed). Due to the 
retrospective nature of this analysis (i. e. looking at crimes which had occurred in the past) it 
Would be very difficult to ascertain whether the residents purchase(] a 
dog following the crime 
event, suggesting that the (log had not been present when the offence occurred, or whether the 
(7drne had taken place whilst the dog resided at the property suggesting that it was ineffective 
in deterring potential offenders. 
Table 46-- All 
- n. -. th, - Prnnertv 
have a BurLylar Alarm? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More - 
Total 
Y es 190 2] 
ý 402 
47.3% 52.7% 100% 
No 434 222 
- 
66.2% 33.8% 100% 
- Total -- --- 6-2-4 434 1058 
L--- 
59% 41% 100% 
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As with the presence of a dog, properties with burglar alarms appear to be more likely to have 
been victims of crime. 52.7% of properties with evidence of a burglar alarm had been 
victimised. This is compared to 33.8% of properties without a burglar alarm. The association 
between presence of a burglar alarm and prior victimisation was strongly statistically significant 
- Pearson Chi-Square = 36.005, df = 1, p= <0.0005 (one-tailed). As this study analyses 
crimes which have already occurred, it is difficult to show whether the burglar alarm was 
installed following the crime event, or whether the burglar alarm was ineffective in protecting 
that property against victimisation. 
Table 47: All Crime - Did the Property have a Window Open/Door 
Yes - 96 81 177 
54.2% 45.8% 100% 
No - 528 353 881 
59.9% 40.1% 100% 
Total 624 434 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
Properties which had a window open or a door ajar were more 
likely to have been victims of' 
clime. 45.8% of properties that had a window open or door ajar had 
been victimised compared 
to 4-0- 1% of those without a window open or door ajar. The association 
between a property 
having a window open or door ajar and its experience of prior victimisation was statistically 
significant - Pearson Chi-Squarc = 1.747, df'= 1, p=0.09 (one-tailed). 
'r-Li 
.----- ]kA--*- 11-23 
- at-lie 4? 5: All Crime - Is the Property Locatet] on me rwauvni 
yes 
- 
8 
40% 
12 
60% 
20 
100% 
No - -- 616 -4-22 1038 
- - - 
59.3% 40.7% 100% 
T "' , '-- ---6 2-4 --- ---4 34 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
60% of properties that were located on a main road had 
been victimised compared to 40.7% of 
those which were not. The association between being located a main road and the 
likelihood of 
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victimisation was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 2.288, df = 1, p=0.07 one- 
tailed). 
Table 49: All Crime - The House is Not Overlooked at Front? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Vict Total 
Yes 128 1112 240 
0 5 3.3 %Y( 
- 
46.7 %Y( 100% 
No 496 322 818 
60.6% 39.4% 100% 
1058 
59% 41% 100% 
Houses which were overlooked at the front were less vulnerable to crime. 46.7% of properties 
which were not overlooked at the front had been victimised compared to 39.4% of those which 
were overlooked at the front. The association between not being overlooked at the front and 
prior risk of victimisation was statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 3.794, (if = 1, p 
== 0.03 (one-tailed). 
Table SO: All Crime - Is the Property within Viewing 
Distance of Traffic Lights? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
8 
12.5% 87.5% 100% 
No 623 427 10so 
59.3% 40.7% 100% 
Total 624 434 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
Properties which were within viewing distance oftraffic 
lights were more vulnerable to crime 
than those which are not. 87.5% of properties which were located within viewing 
distance of' 
traffic lights had been victimised compared to only 40.7% of properties which were not. The 
association between being located within viewing distance of traffic lights and prior 
Victimisation was statistically significant -- Pearson Chi-Square ý: -- 
5.392, (if = 1, p=0.01 (one- 
tailed). 
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Table 51: All Crime - Does the Property show Signs of Brief Desertion? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
Yes 3 9 12 
25% 75% 100% 
1046 
59.4% 40.6% 100% 
1058 
59% 41% 100% 
Properties which show signs of brief desertion such as milk bottles on the doorstep, uncut grass 
or newspapers through the letterbox, were more vulnerable to crime than those which do not. 
75%, of properties with signs of brief desertion had been victimised, this is compared to 40.6% 
of properties without signs of brief desertion. The association between a property showing signs 
of desertion and the likelihood that it will have experienced prior victimisation was statistically 
significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 4.459, (if = 1, p=0.02 (one-tailed). 
Table 52: All Crime - Does the Property show Signs of 
Lengthy Desertion? 
Never Victimised Victimised Once or More Total 
es 2 9 11 
18.2% 81.8% 100% 
1047 
59.4% 40.6% 100% 
Total 624 434 1058 
59% 41% 100% 
Properties which showed signs oflengthy desertion (such as boarded up windows) were more 
likely to have experienced past victimisation. 81.8% of properties showing -signs of' lengthy 
desertion had been victimised compared to only 4-0.6% of properties without signs oflengthy 
desertion. The association between a property showing signs of' lengthy desertion and the 
likelihood that it will be victimised was statistically significant Pearson Chi-Square = 6.038, 
df `:: 1, P ý-- 0.007 (one-tailed). 
As with the burglary analysis, the table below presents, only for the variables which exhibited a 
statistically reliable association with victimisation at the level of 0.1, the odds-ratio of 
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victimisation risk. This presents each environmental factor and the risk which its presence 
produces. For example, being located on a through road is linked to a risk of victimisation 
1.2 
times that of living on a leaky cul-de-sac and 1.27 times that of 
living on a 'true' cul-de-sac. A 
property which shows signs of much disrepair is 1.74 times more 
likely to be victimised than a 
property which shows no signs of disrepair. 
Table 53: Environmental Factors Associated with All Crime Risks (n=1058) 
Environmental Factors Odds-Ratio 
Window open/ajar - 
1.14 
PropertN, visible from f'ootpath 1 
1.18 
Not overlooked at front 
1.19 
Through road (vs 'leaky' cul-de-sac) 
Adjacent to footpath (vs 10+ doors away) 
1.20 
1.24 
Some disrepair (vs none) 
1 . 26 
Through road (vs closed cul-de-sac) 
1.27 
Footpath to local shops 
Some graffiti (vs none) 
1.30 
1.33 
k)otpath to other footpaths 
1.35 
Moderate traffic (vs light) LLý ý 
1.43 
. Located on main road 
1.47 
Heavy traffic (vs li : - : _ý ght) 
1.49 
__ _ Heavy graffiti/ litter (vs none) 
1.51 
___Lývýiýdence of 
burglar alarm 
1.56 
Moderate pedestrian traffic (v 
Evidence of dog 
1.57 
1.64 
Much disrepair . (vs none) 
Signs of brief desertion 
). 74 
1.85 
S, 'lengthy desertion 
isible from. traffic- lights 
2.01 
2.15 
Gatc 1'rom rear path into garden 11_ý - __ ---, f_- " 
2,11 
The remaining environmental factors did not show a statistically significant association with 
Prior crime risk. 
Which Environmental Factors arc associated with the risk of 
Repeat Burglary? 
The next stage of the analysis included comparing 
houses which had been burgled once with 
houses which had been burgled twice or more. Do the same 
factors predict repeat burglaries as 
Predict an initial burglary? Environmental factors which showed a statistically significant 
association at the level of 0.1 are presented below. 
147 
`mUlC.! 14: Kcpeat Burglarv - What is the Road Network Surrounding the Property? 
Burgled Once Burgled Twice or More 
Total 
Cul dc sac without 47 32 79 
linked pathway 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
linked pathway 
jz 
75.5% 
10 
23.5% 100% 
Thro-ugh lZoaT- --19---- -4 -23 - 
.0 0 0 Total 118 52 170 
69.4% 30.6% 100% 
Unlike the analysis of first victimisation, the results reveal that properties located on true culs- 
de-sac are most vulnerable to repeat burglary, followed by properties on leaky culs-de-sac, with 
properties located on through roads experiencing the lowest levels of repeat burglary. The 
association between being located on a 'true' cul-de-sac and a property's risk of repeat burglary 
'4'as statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 7.143, df = 1, p=0.01 
(one-tafled). It is 
"'Orth reiterating that the direction of this relationship is very different to that presented in the 
analysis Of first burglary or first victimisation, whereby true culs-de-sac experienced the lowest 
levels Of crime. There is a plausible post-hoc interpretation of the finding, in that once having 
Crossed the threshold (literally and metaphorically) of a home on a true cul de sac, the quietness 
and lack Of incidental surveillance may invite repetition. 
'r .. 
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Again, the direction of the relationship appears to differ from that presented within the analysis 
OF first burglary. The analvsis of proximity to a footpath and experience of repeat burglary 
Suggests that properties located nearest to a footpath are the least likely to experience repeat 
victimisation, 
with those located furthest away from the footpath most vulnerable to repeat 
burglary. 25% of' houses situated 0 properties away from a footpath were repeat victims of 
burglary. 17.5% of houses situated 1 -5 properties away from a 
footpath were repeat victims of 
burglary. 30.4% of houses situated 6- 10 properties away from a footpath were repeat victims of 
burglary 
and 38.6% of houses situated more than 10 properties away from a footpath were 
'"epeat victins of burglary. The association between proximity to a footpath and repeat burglary 
was Statistically significant Pearson Chi-Square = 6.061, df = 3, p=0.05 (one-tailed). Again, 
it Should be highlighted that although this association is statistically significant, the pattern is 
very different from that revealed in the analysis of First burglary or first crime victimisation 
Vvhereby properties closest to the fDotpath were the most vulnerable to crime. The same post ho' explanation as was offered in relation to culs de sac is relevant here. 
lable S6* RCPeat Burglary - Is the Property Located on an 
Estate which has a F 
-ýýýking that Estate to Open Land? 
yes 
'33 
84.6% 
Burgled Twice or More Total 
6 39 
15.4% 100% 
85 
64.9% 
69.4% 
46 131 
3 S. 1 '/o 100% 
52 170 
30.6% 100% 
Again, the direction of the relationship between a property being 
located on an estate which 
contains a footpath linking the estate to open land is very different to that revealed in the 
'rst victimisation. 15.4% of houses situated on an estate with a 
footpath leading to alysi8 of r 'it" 
OPen land were repeat victims of burglary, compared to 3 S. I% of 
houses situated on estates 
v"'itho"t footpaths leading to open land. The association between 
being located on an estate 
"'ith( .. ta footpath linking that estate to open land, and the likelihood that the property will 
be a 
repeat 
0-02 
"'tirn of burglary was statistically significant -- Pearson Chi-Squarc = 
4.620, df =19P 
(0""ý-tailed). 
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Properties situated on estates with footpaths linking the estate to another residential area were 
less likely to be repeat victims of burglary than those which were not located on these leaky 
estates. 20.8% of houses situated on an estate with a footpath leading to another residential area 
were repeat victims of burglary, compared to 38.7% of houses situated on estates without 
footpaths leading to other residential areas. The association between being located on an estate 
which does not have a footpath linking it to another residential area was statistically significant 
Pearson Chi-Square = 5.562, (if = 1, p=0.009 (one-tailed). 
_Tahic 
58: Rend-at ni-l- - le there Fvidence of a 
NeiLlhbourhood Watch Scheme? 
Burgled Once Burgled Twice or More Total I 
es 17 3 20 
85% 15% 100% 
101 49 ISO 
67.3% 32.7% 100% 
tal T TOE otal 118 S2 170 
69.4% 30.6% 100% 
Properties 
within Neighbourhood Watch areas were less likely to be victims of'repeat burglary. 
0/ ' of Properties which had been repeatedly burgle(] were located within an area showing 
evidence of a Neighbourhoooi Watch scheme compared to 32.7% of'properties in areas without 
evidence of Neighbourhood Watch. The association between being located in an area which is 
not covered by a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme and the likelihood that a proper-ty will be the 
"ctin, of repeat burglary was statistically significant Pearson Chi-Square zz 1.829, df'= 1, p= 
0-09 (one-tailed). The presence of Neighbourhood Watch is the only statistically significant 
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Table S7: Repeat Burglary - is the Property Located on an Estate which has a Footpath Linking the Estate to Another Residential Area? 
factor which shows the same direction as the variables analysed within the first 
burglary/ victimisation section. 
Which Environmental Factors are associated with the risk of repeat victimisation? 
When analysing the association between environmental factors and a property's likelihood of' 
becoming a victim of repeat victimisation for all crime categories, the pattern is again complex. 
The environmental factors which are associated with risk at a statistically significant level of 0.1 
are presented below. 
Table 59: Repeat Victimisation - Is there Evidence of Littcr/Graffiti 
Surrounding 
tne irropertv? 
Victimised Once Victimised Twice or More Totai 
315 
58.1% 41.9% 100% 
Some 44 60 104 
42.3% 57.7% 100% 
Heavy 6 9 15 
40% 60% 100% 
tal 233- 201 
53,7% 46.3% 100% 
60% of' properties with evidence of heavy litter/grafliti had 
been repeatedly victimised 
compared to 41.9% of'properties with no evidence of I itter /graffiti. The association between 
the presence of heavy litter or graffiti and a property's vulnerability to repeat victimisation was 
statistically significant Pearson Chi-Square = 9.008, df' = 2, p=0.006 (one-tailed). This 
Pattern supports that revealed within the analysis of first viLtimisation. 
a ame 60: Re cat Victimisation - The Property is Not uverjooKeu at tnc t-ront., 
Victimised Once Victimised Twice or More Total 
Vs 73 -39 
112 
65.2% 34.8% 
- 
100% 
- No 160 162 322 
49.7% 50.3% 100% 
2 3T3- 720ý 434 
46,. ý3%_ jl 
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50.3% of properties which were overlooked at the front had been repeatedly victimised 
compared to 34.8% of properties which were not overlooked at the front. This relationship is 
the reverse of that displayed in the analysis of first victimisation, whereby properties which 
were overlooked at the front were less vulnerable to crime. The association between being 
Overlooked at the front and repeat victimisation was statistically significant Pearson Chi- 
Square = 7.407, df = 2, p=0.003 (one-tailed). 
Table 61: Repeat Victimisation - Is there Access at Both Sides of the Property? 
Victimised Once Victimised Twice or More Total 
10 
0% 100% 100% 
424 
55% 45% 100% 
Total 233 201 434 
53.7% 46.3% 100% 
100% of properties which had access at both sides had been repeatedly victimised compared to 
45% of properties which did not have access at both sides. The association 
between a property 
having access at both sides and the likelihood that it will be a victim of' repeat crime is 
highly 
statistically significant - Pearson Chi-Square = 9.758, (if = 
1, p= <O. OOOS (one-tailed). 
The odds-ratios for the relatively few variables which reliably distinguished onc-offand repeat 
burglaries 
are presented below. 
Tahle 62a: Odds-Ratios of Rct3eatcd Burglary Risk by Environmental 
Factor 
2.32 
)p(-n cul dc-sac (vs through road) 1.38 
M+ properties from footpath 1.54 
-No 
footpath to open Iand 
1.98 
No footpath to o residenLujal areas 1.86 
"h ""I "att c 
oo I- e5 t) No footpath reside 
()r r ood w ch 
1.86:: 86 =Noevi, 
_ ...... 
li ? 
Ic nce 
t(I 
hb (o) 
ýur h (f,, a 
et 
The findings from this analysis suggest that the factors which influence one-off victimisation are 
different to those which influence subsequent victimisation. For example, there is a statistically 
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significant relationship between a property being victimised and it NOT being overlooked at 
the front. When multiple victimisation is analysed, the results reveal that there is a statistically 
S'911ificant relationship between victimisation and BEING overlooked at the front. At first 
glance, this appears contradictory. What makes a property vulnerable to victimisation does not 
make it vulnerable to repeat victimisation. However, this makes both intuitive sense and has 
Practical implications. For example, distance from through routes is more likely to protect 
from burglary because such homes are less likely to be scanned en passant by burglary target 
seekers. However, once the first offence has safely been committed, the same factors cease to 
apply, and distance from scrutiny is converted into an advantage. Put simply, an offender 
chooses to offend against a property because it has easy access and escape via a footpath rurming 
at the rear of the property, which leads to open fields. Their decision is based upon perception 
Of the ease in which they can gain entry to that property as well as the ease in which they can 
escape unnoticed. Whether the offender chooses to re-offend against that property involves 
more factors than simply external perception. For example, they burgled the property because 
it 'as eas y to get into. Once inside the property they found that it contained an abundance of 
cash, a top of the range hi-fi system as well as a rare collection of valuable silver cutlery. The 
Offender, chose to burgle the property because it was easy to enter, they choose to return 
because of the lifestyle factors they found once they entered the property. The resident has a lot 
Of money, likes to listen to music on a top of the range stereo and owns valuable cutlery, all of 
'vhich are likely to be replaced when insurance money is awarded. 
Summary: 
The findings from the analysis Of environmental factors arc complex. Those environmental 
factors which are associated with likelihood 
'of burglary also appear to be associated with risk of 
all crime$- However, the relationship between these factors and a property's vulnerability to 
repeat victimisation is not straightforward. The factors which are associated with burglary, all 
crime and repeat victimisation are summarised below. The findings of this analysis suggest that 
burgled homes are more likely to: 
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1) Be located next to open land; 
. 
Figure 25: Be locatc77 
next to open land. 
Be located on a cul-de-sac with a linked pathway or a through road; 
Figure 26: Be located on 
a cul-de-sac with a 
linked pathway or a 
through road. 
3) Be located on an estate without a rcal/symbolic barrier; 
4) Be located on an estate containing a footpath which links it to shops; 
Be located on an estate containing a footpath which links it to a maze of other footpaths, 
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Figure 27: Be located on 
an estate which links it 
to a maze of other 
footpaths. 
6) Be located on an estate containing a footpath which links it to another residential area; 
Figure 28: Be located on' 
an estate which links it 
to another residential 
area. 
7) Be situated within viewing distance of a road junction which has moderate or heavy traffic; 
8) Be Located on an estate with a moderate flow ofpedestrian traffic; 
9) Be located on an estate without evidence of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme; 
10) Have evidence of a burglar alarm. 
11) Have a gate leading from a rear path into the rear garden; 
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12) Show signs of brief desertion; 
13) Show signs of lengthy desertion. 
The data suggest that repeatedly burgled homes (in this sample) are more likely to: 
1) Be located 6 or more properties away from a footpath; 
2) Not be located on an estate containing a footpath which links it open land; 
3) Not be located on an estate containing a footpath which links it to another residential area; 
4) Be located in an area without evidence of a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme; 
5) Be located on a cul-de-sac without a linked pathway. 
The data suggest that victimised (all crimes) homes are more likely to: 
1) Be located on a through road or a cul-de-sac with a linked pathway; 
2) Be located 0 or 6-10 properties away from footpath; 
3) Be located on an estate with a footpath linking the estate to shops; 
Figure 29: Be located on 
an estate with a footpath 
linking the estate to 
local shops. 
4) Be located on an estate with a footpath linking the estate to a maze of'other footpaths; 
S) Have a gate leading from a rear path into the rear garden; 
6) Be visible from a nearby footpath; 
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7) Be located within viewing distance of a road junction with heavy or moderate traf , fic flow; 
Figure 30: Be located 
within viewing distance 
of a road junction with 
'heavy' or 'mod crate' 
traffic flow. 
Be located on an estate with a moderate flow of pedestrian traffic; 
I Have many signs of disrepair; 
Have evidence of a dog, 
12) Have evidence of a burglar alarm; 
Figure 31: Show 
evidence of heavy 
litter/graffiti. 
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Show evidence of heavy litter /graffiti; 
13) Have a window open/door ajar-, 
14) Be located on the nearest main road; 
15) House is not overlooked at the front; 
16) Be located within viewing distance of traffic lights; 
18) Show signs of lengthy desertion. 
Figure 32: Be located' 
within viewing distance 
of traffic lights. 
Figure 33: Show signs of 
lengthy desertion. J. 
The data suggest that the following factors increase a property's vulnerability to repeat 
Victimisation: 
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17) Show signs of brief desertion; 
1) Showing signs of heavy litter or graffiti; 
Being overlooked at the front; 
3) Having access to the property at both sides. 
Designing a Practitioncrs'Chccklist - The Burgess Method: 
Having established the environmental variables which should 
feature in any prioritisation of 
clime reduction effort, the next step was to turn these into a simple, usable scale 
for risk 
assessment. The method to give effect to this was selected on the grounds of simplicity and 
robustness rather than statistical sophistication. This was so that the exercise could 
be repeated 
by local police or crime reduction partnerships to identify 
factors more precisely tailored to 
local circumstances. This seemed particularly important in that the 
Winchester and Jackson 
factors were found to be not well suited to the housing stock of 
West Yorkshire. With very few 
of the properties scoring any points on their scale, this made analysis using only the 
Winchester 
and Jackson method, almost impossible. 
The analysis was conducted for burglary as a separate crime type as well as all crime. 
The 
results displayed in the tables below show the scores for each environmental 
factor. For 
example, being located next to open land scores 3.1, being situated on a through road scores 
The higher the score, the greater the chance of being victimised. 
Table 62b: Burgled versus Not Burgled - Environmental 
Factors and Burgess Score 
Environn! mcental Factor BureessScore 
J( 
vocated next to open ]and , X1 3.1 
Not located next to open land -0.8 
tu t S Situated (on a cul-de-sac without a linked 
pathway 
-2 
Situated on a cul-de-sac with a linked pathw ty .3 Situated on a through road 1.7 
Situated on an estate with a real or symbolic barrier -2.1 
Situated on an estate without a real or symbolic 
barrier 
1.8 
Situated on an estate with a footpath leading from the estate to local shops 
10.2 
Situated on an estate without a footpath leading fron, the, estate to local shops 
-0.6 
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Situated on an estate without a footpath leading - 1.6 
from the estate to a maze of other footpaths 
[ Situate(i on an estate without a footpath leading 
from the estate to another residential area 
I No gate leading from a rear path into the rear -0.3 
3 Show- -, r 25.6 110winjz signs of Brief desertion 
N--(-)s-ig-gnýs ýoff Brichlesertion -o. 3 
Showin si 29.4 Shicýýwýinj s of Lengthy desertion 
ENo 
signs off Lengthy desertion -0.3 
It should be noted that although evidence of a burglar alarm was associated with the risk of' 
burglary at a statistically significant level, and would have scored 
6.5 for present and -4.1 fi)r 
not present, a decision was made to remove this factor 
from the checklist. As was highlighted 
following table 30, the fact that the cTime data were collected retrospectively leaves the author 
unable to ascertain with any certainty whether the presence ofthe 
burglar alarm preceded the 
burglary, or (a more likely scenario) whether it was installed as a result of the offence. 
I-or this 
reason, it was felt appropriate to remove this factor from the checklist. 
The graph below displays each Burgess decile against its mean incidence of* 
burglary. The results 
reveal that the relationship is close, with a coefficient determination of' +0.6418, such that 
moving up one decile is associated with a 69/b increase in victimisation. 
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Figure 34: Burgess Decile against Burglary Incidence 
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Figure 35: Burgess Decilc against Burglary Prevalence 
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The link between Burgess Score and crime prevalence (i. e. the proportion of homes victimised 
rather than the total number of victimisations) is even doser, with a coeflic-ient of' 
Iletermination of +0.7978, with an incTease of 3% in victimisation prevalence f6r every Burgess 
decile. 
161 A 
45f, 
Burgms Decile 
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Table 63: All Crimes - Victimised versus 
Not Victimised, Environmental Factors 
and Burgess Score 
No siQns of lengthv desertion -0.4 
As with the checklist for burglary, a decision was made to remove both prescnce/absencc of a 
burglar alarm and presence/ absence of a dog from the Burgess checklist for all crimes. Evidence 
of a dog would have added 28.2 to a property's score (absence of a dog subtracting 0.3). In a 
similar vein, presence of a burglar alarm would have added 11.7 to a property's Burgess score 
(absence subtracting 7.2). Due to the inability (using the present data alone) to ascertain 
whether these factors preceded or were installed as a result of the offence, it was felt that they 
should not be included in the checklist. 
Figure 36: Burgess Decile against Crime Incidence 
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The relationship between Burgess Score and crime incidence was a close one, with a coefficient 
determination 
of +0.7749, suggesting that an increase of one decile would be associated with a 
10% increase in victimisation. The relationship between Burgess Score and crime prevalence 
Was even stronger, with a coefficient determination ot'+0.862 1. 
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Figure 37: Burgess Decile against Crime Prevalence 
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The Burgess scores for repeat victimisation are displayed below. Because the link bet'Aeen 
Burgess Score and prevalence was closer than between that score and incidence, it seemed 
worthwhile to see how closely the Burgess Score was linked with concentration of victimisation 
(incidence /prevalence - the average number of' victimisations per victim). As might he 
expected, given the repeat victimisation results discussed in the exploratory phase of' this 
chapter (as well as the results discussed in Chapter three), there is only a meagre association 
between 
crime concentration and Burgess Score (+0.1504) and between burglary 
concentration and Burgess Score (+0.0208). 
Table 64: Burgled Once versus Twice or More - Environmental Factors an(l Burgess Score 
Environmental Factor Burgess Score 
Situated 
on a cul-de-sac without a linked 9.9 
pathway, 
Situated on a cul-de-sac with a linked pathway -7.1 Situated on a Through Road -1 1.2 Located 10 or more properties away from a8 foot ath 
1-0cated next to a footpath -5.6 Located 1 -5 properties away from a footpath -13.1 1 
-ocated 6- 10 properties away from a footpath -0.2 Situated on an estate without a footpath leading 4.5 to open land 
S't'1ý11-1 on all estate with a footi)ath Iradini-Y to I S.? 
104 
land 
on an estate without a footpath leadin2 8.1 
Situated on an estate with a footpath leading to -9.8 
another residential area 
I 
S 
NC hbo h at hh me 
ituate tat Nkizut evidence of aý 
ý21 si onooad e 
ur c Sc 
Leig hbourhood atch Scheme 
Table 65: Victimised Once versus Victimised Twice or More - Environmental 
]Factors and Burgess Score 
'with the risk of victimisation. These are the factors which, when present, 
increase a property's 
vulnerability to victimisation. The Burgess method ofanalysis involved converting these 
factors 
"'to scores, allowing each environmental factor to be awarded a number which represents its 
influence upon crime (the higher the number, the greater the risk of crime when that 
factor is 
present). Finally, this process was validated by awarding a total 
Burgess Score to each of' the 
1058 properties based upon the environmental factors which they possessed, and then testing 
the relationship between the Burgess Score and the crime incidence, prevalence and 
concentration experienced by properties to ensure that those with the 
highest scores 
experienced the highest levels of crime, and those with the 
lowest scores experienced the 
"'West levels of crime. The results were positive, suggesting that this method would 
be a valid 
tool for identifying risk amongst residential properties. 
The next question is how this scale, original or modified, is most profitably used. The logic is 
as Follows. Within an area (whether SBD or other) the identified environmental cues are 
associated with victimisation risk. Protection to houses within an area should be commensurate 
With that risk, therefore, a practitioner can identify the homes in need of' additional security 
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What does this analysis show us? The exploratory phase set out at the opening to this chapter 
identified the particular environmental factors (from the EORF table) which were associated 
measures or other special attention. As was discussed above, environmental factors are only 
one kind of risk factor, and the same enterprise is desirable on the basis of demographic factors, 
recent home removal, prior victimisation and the like. The advantage of environmental factors 
are that they tend to persist across the identity of the householder. Further, the information can 
be gathered easily and without the restrictions of data protection protocol. 
166 
Chapter Four - Part Five 
Discussion 
Chapter three of this thesis focused upon the effectiveness of SBD as a crime reduction 
measure, comparing the crime rates on SBD estates against Non-SBD estates. Chapter four has 
been improvement oriented with the aims of identiýýg which environmental factors are 
associated with crime prone homes and translating these findings into a risk-assessment tool for 
Practitioners to assess the vulnerability of residential housing. As was discussed within Chapter 
t"vO (as well as the introduction to Chapter four), several risk-assessment tools have already 
been Produced (Winchester and Jackson, 1982; Coleman, 1986 and Groff and LaVigne, 2001) 
which aim to identify which environmental factors are associated with crime risk amongst 
residential housing. In light of the existence of these tools, what justification is there for another 
r'sk-assessment measure? 
The first justification lies with the language of existing tools which is often unnecessarily 
c"rnPlex. Take for example Winchester and Jackson's environmental risk 
factors which are 
displayed 
as statements, with yes answers producing a score of 1, whilst no answers are 
awarded a score of 0. Several of these statements are confusing and unclear. 
Examples include: 
QHOusing Plot Not Adjacent to the Gardens of Other Houses". or "Not Overlooked at the Front 
by Other Houses". Other statements are open to misinterpretation amongst 
fieldworkers, for 
exarnple: "Isolated" - what is isolated? "Located 
in the Country" - What constitutes the 
co"ntrY? The second justification concerns the applicability of existing checklists to alternative 
samples. Groff and LaVigne's tool is produced using USA data, Winchester and Jackson's did 
'lot Prove useful in the West Yorkshire sample, with the majority of 
houses scoring 0, malcing 
useful distinctions between properties almost impossible. 
Ile third justification concerns the 
ease of usage. Groff and LaVigne's tool requires data relating to offender residence and 
levels of 
nuisance complaints. Although these data are useful, they simply add complication for 
Practitioners wishing to assess their built environment. Data protection 
issues often cause delays 
" the provision of data between agencies, and although CDRPs are 
designed to ensure that 
these complications are easily overcome, a simple and usable tool should avoid placing obstacles 
in the paths Of Practitioners. The final justification for the production of a new risk-assessment 
tool was the desire to include additional variables which had not been covered in existing 
checkhsts, namely those relating to through movement, permeability and being located within 
the awareness space of others. The resulting practitioners' checklist presented within this thesis 
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is thus clear, transparent and user friendly. It is designed to be used as a proactive crime 
reduction too], allowing practitioners to direct preventative resources towards vulnerable 
properties before they become victims of crime. 
Having re-iterated the justification for this too], the methods through which it was produced 
should also be summarised. Each of the 1058 properties which were selected for inclusion in 
the detailed analysis (Chapter three) were assessed using the OERF table. Crime data were 
collected for each of these properties, allowing the presence or absence of'each environmental 
factor to be cross-tabulated with crime risk. The results revealed that 13 environmental factors 
were associated with the risk of burglary (at the statistical significance level of 0.1 ). These are 
detailed below: 
jable 66: Environmental Factors Associated with 
ýactors Burglary Burglary Risk Significa 
L 
for sample of nce 
- 
I OS8 p operties 
ý - Is the Yes 's No= 15.3% - 
16.1% 0.10 
property Ox 19.2% 
adjacent to 
0c en s ace? 
Road Network True Cul- Leaky Cul- Through 16.1 (//o 0.09 
de-Sac de-Sac Road - 
14.1% 18.4% 17.8 ('/0 
Presence 
of Yes = 14% No = 17.9% - 16.1% O. OS Real/Symboli 
C Barrier 
- I)Oes Es-tate-- -Y`es--- No= 15.5% - 0- 16 - I, /", 0.02 have a 26.3% 
Footpath 
leading to 
local shops) 
')C)cs Estate Yes No= 14.5% - 16.1% O. OOOS have a 26.5% 
'v-d"Ing to a 
Maze of other 
100ýt aths? 
ýs st La te Y C's - No 16 1% 0.10 have a 17.9% 
fOOtpath 
leading to 
another 
residential 
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area? 
Volume of Light Moderate Heavy 16.1'/6 0.002 
Traffic at 12.3% 23.3% 22.6% 
Nearby Road 
junction 
Volume of Light Moderate - 16. 0.04 
Pedestrian 15.7% 25.6% 
Traffic in 
Front of 
3ro erty 
Signs of Yes No= 17.1% - 16.1% 
0.03 
1 Ncighbourhoo 11.1% 
d Watch 
Scheme? 
- 16.1% 
Property has a 22.6% 
Burglar 
Alarm'. ) 
Is there, a Gate Yes No=IS. 8% 16.19/6 0.06 
leading fýrom r, E 35.7% 
footpath into 
L 
( 
r ear arden? 
A__ A Are there Yes No 15.8% 16.1% 0.03 
signs of brief 41.7% 
desertion? 
_ - Are 45.5% 15 8% IF6 1% 
0.02 
signs of long- 
term 
desertion? 
17 environmental factors were associated with the risk of victimisation 
(all crime) at the 
statistical significance level of'O. 1. These arc detailed 
below: 
'Fahl- 
dr"7. With victinlisation - 1.2,1 IV II k1l I III U11ta II . 4Lt" I ýý 4 --, .. -- -- ý 
Environmen Percentage of Sample Victims of Crime 
Average Statistic 
tal iFactors Crime al 
Risk for Signific 
Sample of ance 
1058 
properties 
Road True Leaky Through 41% 
0.01 
Network Cul-de- Cul-de- Roa(i ý-- 
Sac = Sac = 47.3% 
37.1% 4-4.7% 
""W Close is 0 houses 1-5 -- 6-10:: -- 
More than 41 %) 0.02 
the Property away 39.3% 50.4% 10 = 
38.2% 
Located to a from 
LL022! PaLth footpath 
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= 47.2% 
Does Estate Yes = No 41% 0.05 
have a 52 6% 40.4% 
footpath . 
leading to 
local shops? 
Does Estate Yes No 41% 0.002 
have a 52.9% 39.3% 
footpath 
leading to a 
Irnaze of 
other 
footpaths? 
Is there a Yes No 
41% <0.0005 
Gate leading 92.9% 403% 
from 
footpath 
into rear 
_ 
garden? 
_ Is the Yes No 410/6 
0.06 
Property 47.3% 40% 
Visible from 
a Nearby 
Footpath? 
ow Heavy Light Moderate Heavy 
41% 0.0005 
is the 36.8% -- 52.6% 54.7% 
Volume of 
Trafiric at the 
Nearest 
Road 
Junction 
How Heavy Light Moderate 41 
0.003 
is the Flow 40.1% 62.8% 
of 
Pedestrian 
Traffic in 
Front of 
Property 
41% O. OOOS 
Property 38.1% 50.7% S7.7% 
have signs of 
Litter/Grafti 
ti? 
Does the No signs Sonic Manv 
41% 0.0 1 
Property 39.8% signs signs - 
show signs 50% 69.2% 
Of Disrepair? 
higns of I)og Yes No 
41% 0.04 
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Signs of a Yes = No = 
41% <O. OOOS 
Burglar 52.7% 33.8% 
Alarm 
41% 0.09 Does Yes No 
Property 45.8% 40.1% 
have a 
Window 
Open/Door 
Ajar? 
41% 0.07 Is Property Yes No 
located on 60% 40.7% 
the nearest 
Main Road 
41% 0.03 The tiouse is Yes No 
Not 46.7% 39.4% 
Overlooked 
at the Front 
411! o 0.02 Are there Yes No 
Signs of brief 75% 40.6% 
desertion? 
41% 0.007 Are there 81.8% 40.6% 
signs of 
long-term 
desertion? 
The findings relating to repeat victimisation were not straightforward. 
Factors which were 
associated with single victimisation were either absent when 
analysing repeat victimisation, or 
they were statistically significant yet the relationship was 
in a difl , crent direction. For example, 
there was a statistically significant relationship 
between a property being victimised and it NOT 
being overlooked at the front. When multiple victimisation 
was analysed, the results revealed 
that there was a statistically significant relationship 
between victimisation and BEING 
overlooked at the f'ront. 
Table 68: Environmental Factors Associat"I with Repeat 
Burglary 
.......... 
nvironmen ...... . .... f f Percentage am s of Repeat le Victims 
Average Statistic 
tal Factors Burglary 
Repeat 
Burglary 
al 
Signific 
Risk for ance 
sample of* 
1058 
properties 
Road True Lcaky Through 
30.6% 0.01 
Network Cul-de- Cul-de- Road = 
Sac = Sac ---: 17.4% 
40.5% 2 3.5% 
-"Ow 
Close is 0 houses 15 : -- 6-10 More than 30.6% 
0.05 
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the Property away 17.5% 30.4% 10 38.6% 
Located to a from 
Footpath footpath 
= 25% 
Does Estate Yes = No 30.6% 
0.02 
have a 15.4% 35.1% 
footpath 
leading to 
penland? 
_ Does Estate Y C. S No 
30.6% 0.009 
have a 20.8% 38.7% 
footpath 
leading to 
another 
residential 
area? 
Evidence of Yes No 
30.6% 0.09 
a IS% 32.7% 
Neighbourh 
ood Watch 
Scheme? 
Table 69: Environmenta l Factors Associated with Kepeat v icumisat-11 
Environmen Percentage of Sample Victims of Repeat 
Average Statistic 
tal Factors Victimisation 
Repeat al 
Victimisat Signific 
ion Risk ancc 
for sample 
of' I OS8 
properties 
I ividenk-ceof -None =- S( me 
46.3% 0. (X)6 
Litter/Grafli 41.9% 57.7% 60% 
ti 
e Yes - No 
46.3(ý/(. 0. (X) 3 
Property is 34.8% 50.3% 
Not 
Overlooked 
at the Front 
Isthere Yes No:: - 
46.3% <0. ()(X)S 
access at 100% 45% 
both sides of 
At first glance these findings appear contradictory; 
however, these findings are supported by 
other criminological research (F-Ilingworth et al, 
1997; Ashton et a], 1998). Offenders often 
select a target based upon external cues such as the proximity of the property 
to a nearby 
footpath 'how easily can I escape unnoticed from this target? 
' Whether the offender chooses 
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to re-offend against that property involves more factors than simply external perception, these 
are likely to relate to internal cues relating to the residents' lifestyle and wealth. The factors 
associated with repeat victimisation are different to those associated with single victimisation. 
An offender makes choices about initial victimisation based upon the cues available to them. 
Unless they know the resident, these have to be assumptions based upon what they perceive 
From the outside of the property. Once the offender has victimised the property, they can base 
their decision to re-offend on internal cues such as lifestyle and wealth. Tt is for this reason that 
the environmental factors relating to single victimisation are not present when multiple 
victimisation is analysed. 
Having established which environmental factors were associated with crime risk, the aim of this 
thesis was to translate this into a usable scale for risk -assessment. The method used to produce 
this scale was the Burgess Method whereby a score is produced for each environmental factor. 
This score represents the difference between the mean rate of crime suflered by the general 
sample and the mean rate of crime for properties possessing that feature. The two resulting 
checklists for burglary and all crime were validated to ensure that properties with the highest 
Burgess Scores actually experienced the highest incidence and prevalence of crime, and the 
properties with the lowest Burgess Scores experienced the lowest levels of crime. This 
validation proved successful, with positive correlations between Burgess Score and crime 
exPerienced. 
Table 70: Correlation between Burgess Score and Victimisation 
E Relationshi Correlation Coeflicient Bur ess Score and All Crime Incidence ý- +0.7749 l Isur Ye. ss s ore and All Crime Prevalence C 1 +0.8621 - Hurpess Score and Buri ur rice +0.6418 t 
e! B UrL s Score and Burglary Prevalence +0.7978 
I'art five of this Chapter opened with a discussion ofthe justification for developing this risk- 
assessment measure, these fell largely into the f'()Ilowing categories: 
a) Existing risk-assessment measures contained confusing language which is 
open to misinterpretation; 
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b) Existing risk-assessment measures were not applicable to housing within the 
West Yorkshire. It was assumed that this lack of transferability may be 
consistent across other geographical areas; 
c) Existing risk-assessment measures required the collection of data relating to 
offender residence and levels of noise nuisance complaints. There was a 
need to design a cheddist which could be completed without the need to 
collect additional data; 
d) Research relating to issues such as through-movement and permeability 
remains conflicting. There currently exists a debate surrounding these 
issues which has been unhelpful to the progression of designing out crime. 
It was hoped that the inclusion of these factors would help to clarify this 
debate. 
The first three justifications have been addressed in the production of the practitioners checklist 
Presented in this chapter. The final justification, relating to the current debate surrounding 
s4stainability and permeability should also have been clarified by the data presented within this 
thesis. These data are summarised below, alongside a brief return to the explanation for its 
inclusion. 
1ýerlneability. 
- 
7L' Permeability debate covers the three OERF table categories of road network, access and 
a"vareness space. Road network relates to the issue of cul-de-sac versus through road, a debate 
"'hiCh has dominated much of the discussion surrounding SBD over the last decade (Fairs, 1998; 
St`ngO, 1998; Summerskill, 2000). Ile issue of access is closely related to this and expands 
Upon the subject of footpaths, where they are positioned, where they lead to and whether there 
is access from that footpath directly into the boundary of the property. Awareness space relates 
to the Positioning of the property. within the surrounding neighbourhood - are potentjal 
offenders likely to notice the property en-route to school, work or leisure activities? Ile 
permeability debate centres around the benefits of facilitating movement within an area 
"reighed against the risks of potentially criminogenic design. Those who argue in favour of 
permeable housing (through roads or leaky culs-de-sac) believe that residential areas should 
encourage movement and thus aNow passers by to create an informal surveillance or act as 
guardians for that area. Previous research which supports the positioning of residential housing 
"thin permeable neighbourhoods includes Rudlin and Falk (199S); Department of the 
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Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998); Hiffier and Chi-Feng Shu (1998); Department 
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1999) and Chi-Feng Shu (2000). In contrast, 
there exists an abundance of criminological research which suggests that crime is higher along 
major vehicular or pedestrian pathways as opposed to within closed estates such as culs-de-sac 
which limit through movement (Brantingharn and Brantingham, 1975,1993,2000; Bevis and 
Nutter, 1977; Brantingham et a], 1977; Brown and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg 
and Rohe, 1984; Cromwell a a], 199 1; Nrlees-Black et a], 1998). 
The research findings presented within this thesis largely support the premise that properties 
Positioned within permeable estates are more vulnerable to victimisation. The environmental 
factors which emerge as associated with elevated crime (and burglary) levels suggest that higher 
levels of movement past the home are generally associated with higher levels of risk. Thus in 
the somewhat heated debate about the role of permeability in enabling crime, the general 
thrust of the data suggests that high permeability (as proxied by the property's proximity to a 
footpath, whether that footpath leads to shops/other residential areas/a maze of other 
footpaths and the level of pedestrian and vehicular movement through the estate) is indeed 
associated with higher levels of crime. in fact, 8 of the 13 environmental factors which were 
associated with risk of burglary at a statistically significant level of 0.1, and 10 of the 17 factors 
which were associated with total crime at a statistically significant level of 0.1 were related to 
Perrneabibty and access. 
Surveillance 
"revious research suggests that the likelihood that offenders will be noticed by neighbours is 
crucial in their decision maldng process. Reppetto (1974) found that over a fifth of his sample of 
97 convicted burglars stated that the possibility of neighbours watching them deterred them 
from selecting a property. Brown and Altman (198 3) also found that burgled properties had less 
visual access to immediately neighbouring properties than non-burgled properties. The research 
f'ndings presented within this thesis which relate to surveillance are mixed. 
* Houses wMch are not overlooked at the front are more vulnerable to total crime than 
those which are overlooked. The association between not being overlooked at the front 
and prior risk of victimisation. was statisticaUy significant (0.03); 
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Does the front door face the street? - When burglary alone is analysed, the findings do 
not support those revealed within existing research. Of the properties which had a 
front door facing the street, 16.1 % had been burgled. Of those which had a front door 
which did not face onto the street, 16.2% had been burgled. However, when all crime 
categories were analysed, the results were similar to those revealed by Reppetto (1974) 
and Brown and Altman (1983). Of the properties which had a front door facing the 
street, 40.6% had been victimised. Of those which had a front door which was not 
facing onto the street, 47.1 % had been victimised. This association, however, was not 
statistically significant (0.18). 
Social Climate 
The issue of management and maintenance was included in the OERFs table in recognition of 
Previous research which highlights that crime and anti-social behaviour can act as a catalyst for 
increased crime and disorder, higher levels of fear of crime and a reluctance by residents to 
engage in informal crime prevention activities (Zimbardo, 1970; Finnie, 1973; Wilson and 
Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990) as well as portraying the impression to offenders that residents 
living within the neighbourhood are less likely to apprehend them or report their actions to the 
Police (raylor and Gottfredson, 1987). Management and maintenance emerged as one of the 
most significant environmental factors, with properties showing signs of brief and lengthy 
desertion being more vulnerable to burglary and total crime at a statistically significant level 
than those which did not. Properties showing sips of heavy litter/graffiti were also more 
Vulnerable to total crime than those with no litter/graffiti as were those showing many signs of 
d'srePair (all were associated with total crime at a statistically significant level). 
Ile findings revealed within Chapter three of this thesis suggested that SBD properties 
experience less crime and fear of crime than their Non-SBD counterparts. Chapter four has 
built upon these findings, identifying the particular environmental factors which influence crime 
risk and translating these findings into a tool to allow practitioners to direct crime reduction 
resources. Continuing the improvement theme, Chapter five aims firstly to identify whether 
the environmental factors discussed within this chapter have a different impact upon SBD and 
Non-SBD properties. Is it the presence or absence of the environmental factors identified 
within Chapter four which affords SBD the crime reduction potential revealed within Chapter 
three? Finally, Chapter five presents the findings of an analysis of the modw operandl used by 
offenders when offending against SBD and Non-SBD properties. It is hoped that these findings 
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will allow the identification of particular weaknesses within the scheme (thus allowing these 
weaknesses to be addressed) as well as revealing something about the relationship between the 
offender and the built environment within both S13D and Non-SBD areas. 
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Chapter Five 
An Improvement Perspective 
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Chapter Five - Part One Elivironmental Factors and the SBD scheme 
"he findings from the previous chapter allow practitioners to identify which environmental 
factors are likely to increase a property's vulnerability to crime, thus allowing resources to be 
dillected towards those at risk of victimisation. As was discussed within Chapter two, the S13D 
scheme takes as its basis many of the principles of environmental criminology, CPTED and the 
Ne'4' OPPOrtunity Theories. With this in mind, one might presume that the environmental 
factors f"Ind to influence crime (such as permeability, vandalism and disrepair) are less likely 
to be Present within SBD schemes. The findings discussed within Chapter four revealed that 
V'ctilnised Properties have a higher Burgess Score than non-victimised properties. It did not 
address the question of whether SBD properties possess less of those environmental features 
a"soclat'd with crime victimisation (as one might expect) or whether the crime reduction 
benefits 
Of SBD are based upon alternative factors. This is an important consideration. Insofar as 
fact's associated with low risk are not more common in SBD areas, the scope of environmental 
irnproveme't by refining SBD is greater. Thus, paradoxically, it would be preferable for SBD 
status not to be statistically associated with risk scores. 
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Chapter Five - Part Two 
Methodology 
As was discussed within Chapter four, each property within the sample (n= 1058) was awarded 
a Burgess Score based upon the environmental factors which it possessed. These data were 
analysed using two way ANOVA with the Burgess Score representing the dependent variable, 
and whether the house was SBD or not and whether it had been victimised or not, representing 
the independent variables (0 represents a property which has not been victimised, I represents 
a property which has been victimised at least once). In this way, it was possible to see whether 
SBD was associated with environmental risk scores, either alone or in interaction with prior 
victimisation. This analysis was carried out separately for total crime and burglary alone. 
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Chapter Five - Part Three 
Results 
The findings from this analysis can be summarised as follows. The same pattern applies to both 
burglary alone and total crime. 
1. SBD homes have higher Burgess scores at both levels of victimisation (victimised and 
non-victimised). 
2. Non-victimised homes have lower levels of Burgess scores, for both SBD and Non-SBD 
homes. 
SBD properties which have not been burgled have a mean Burgess Score of + 1.6, SBD 
properties which have been burgled have a Burgess Score of +8.6. Non-SBD properties which 
have never been burgled have a mean Burgess Score of -6.1, Non-SBD properties which 
have 
been burgled have a mean Burgess Score of -1. The average 
Burgess Score for non-burgled 
properties was - 1.9, whilst the average Burgess Score 
for burgled properties was +4.3. 
Table 71: Mean Burgess Scores for Burgled versus Non-Burgled Properties 
Victimised properties (whether SBD or not) also have a higher Burgess Score than non- 
ViCtimised properties. SBD properties which had not been victimised 
had a Burgess Score of - 
1.8, SBD properties which had been victimised had a Burgess Score of 
+14.1. Non-SBD 
properties which had not been victimised had a mean Burgess Score of-8.8, whilst Non-Sill) 
properties which had been victimised had a mean Burgess Score of 
+2.1. The average Burgess 
Score for victimised properties (irrespective of SBI) status) was +8.7, the average Burgess 
Score for non-victimised properties was 
Table 72: Mean Burgess Scores for Victimiscd versus Non-Victimised Properties 
SBD Non-SBD Average Sample 
Risk 
Noln-Burgled 
-1.8 -8.8 -5.0 
8.7 
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Average Sample Risk 4.8 -4.4 
These findings validate those discussed in Chapter four, proper-ties with high Burgess Scores are 
more likelY to have been victimised than those with low Burgess Scores. 
As SBD properties experience lower levels of crime and are designed according to CPTLD 
principles, one would expect the SBD sample to have a lower mean Burgess Score than the 
Non-SBD sample. However, the results revealed that although the SIM properties within this 
sample experienced lower levels of crime and fear of crime, they were achieving this in spite of' 
the environmental factors which they possessed, not because of the environmental factors they 
possessed. The results of this analysis revealed that the SBD properties within the sample had a 
higher Burgess Score than the Non-SBD properties. For all crime categories, the mean Burgess 
Score for SBD properties was +4.8, for Non-SBD properties it was -4.4. The average Burgess 
Score for non-victimised properties was -S. Non-victimised SBD properties 
had a mean Burgess 
Score of -1.8, whilst non-victimised Non-SBD properties had a Burgess Score of -8.8. The 
average Burgess Score for victimised properties was +8.7. Non-Sill) victimiscd properties 
had 
a Burgess Score of +2.1, whilst SBD victimised properties had a Burgess Score of' + 14.1. When 
burglary alone was analysed, the results again revealed that the Sill) properties 
had a higher 
Burgess Score than the Non-SBD properties within this sample. The average Burgess 
Score for 
the SBD sample was +3.3, whilst the average Burgess Score for the Non-SBD sample was -4,9. 
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Chapter Five - Part Four 
How can these findings be used to improve 
SBD? 
The findings presented thus far suggest that although the SBD sample selected for this thesis rxý 
experienced lower levels of crime and fear of crime, this was achieved in spite of the indexed 
environmental features which those properties possessed, rather than because of those features. 
It is suggested that the value of SBD derives from other variables which were not measured by 
this checklist, these may include good quality security hardware. Ile environmental factors 
which were associated with crime victimisation were more likely to be present within the SBD 
'UIIPIC than the Non-SBD sample. This suggests that although the SBD scheme was designed 
with CPTED principles in mind, these have not been fully implemented within the chosen 
sample. 7le SBD sample has reduced crime in spite of its design characteristics, suggesting that 
addressing these design weaknesses could further improve the crime reduction potential of SBD 
housing estates. 
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Chapter Five - Part Five 
Does SBD Status affect Offender Modus 
Operandi? 
The foregoing suggests that a major refinement of SBD could come through having regard to 
the factors in the environmental risk index in SBD certification. There are others. One such 
supplementary method for immediately improving the existing SBD scheme would be to ensure 
that its principles are actually implemented at the design/build stage. Basing a crime reduction 
scheme upon principles which are proven to have crime reduction benefits is a sound 
judgement, failing to implement those principles in practice is short sighted. A second means of 
'rnPrOving the SBD scheme is to identify particular vulnerabilities within the existing standards 
through the analysis of offender Modus Operandi (MO). MO refers to the characteristic means 
throug'"vIlich an offender or offenders carry out an offence, for example, what is their point of 
entry? Do they use a tool? How do they penetrate the target enclosure? The importance of 
analys'ng MO in relation to this thesis is in identifying the specific design weaknesses of SBD as 
well as Non-SBD properties. Weaknesses may be specific to the property, for example patio 
windows or rear doors, or they may be within the wider environment such as houses located 
ne't to open fields. The aim is to draw out the finer details of burglaries being committed 
'""th'n SBD and Non-SBD estates and to offer these findings to practitioners faced with 
Managing the SBD scheme. 
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Chapter Five - Part Six 
Methodology 
As a means of identifying weaknesses within the SBD standards, as well as investigating the 
effectwhich SBD has upon the behaviour of offenders and potential offenders, MO information 
"'as collected for crimes committed against the 1058 properties within the detailed sample 
discussed throughout the thesis. Therefore, the sample utilised for this section of the thesis 
r"lains the same as that used within the detailed sample (Chapter three) as well as Chapter 
fo'- Data were collected for the three offences burglary dwelling, attempted burglary 
dwelling and darnage to a dwelling for the same time period as that utilised within the detailed 
4""Ysis. The MO data were extracted from the police CIS following the same data protection 
"rot"Ols discussed throughout the thesis. Although this section of the thesis is predominantly 
focused upon the burglaries committed against the SBD and Non-SBD properties, it was 
'n1portant to analyse failed burglaries (attempted burglary and dainage to a dwelling) as well as 
those which were completed. An attempted burglary is a failed burglary, be that 
failure due to 
a disturbance by a resident, or a failure to overcome security measures. Damage to a 
dwelling 
offences were included due to the large proportion of these offences which appeared to he 
attempted burglaries. Although there did appear to be, damage to a dwelling offences which 
were just that (see quote two below), a large number were clearly attempts to 
break into the 
Property (see quote one below). The examples detailed below (extracted 
from the police CIS 
for darnage to a dwelling offences) demonstrate the variance between what is considered to 
be 
" dan"ge to a dwelling offence. 
Quote one (taken from the MO field of a damage to a dwelling offence): 
"--During hours of darkness person(s) unknown approach wooden 
rear door of pren-iises and by believed ldcIdng damage bottom panel of 
door which is actuaUy kicked right through. Person(s) then make good 
escape. Possibly after being disturbed as no entry gained to premises". 
quIte'rwo (taken from the Afo field of a damage to a dwelling offence): 
"Person(s) unknown approach garden fence at rear of semi-detached house 
... With spade or similar instrument dig up approximately 
S panels 
to fencing 4ft x 4ft. Lay them on ground and trample on them breaking panels". 
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For the purpose of this analysis, the free text information contained within the MO field was 
categorised according to Ekblom's (2000) Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity, the main 
focus being the elements of the situation as opposed to the offender. Information was collated 
according to the following categories: 
1* Target enclosure (Premises). Was the property detached, mid-terrace, end-terrace? 
2. Target enclosure (Victims). Did the victim's status have relevance to the offence? For 
example was the victim an ex-partner using an old set of keys to break in? 
3. Target enclosure (Implement). Did the offender use a tool or a weapon? 
4. Target enclosure (Point of Entry). Where did the offender enter the property? 
S* Target enclosure (Point of escape). Where did the offender leave the property? 
6. Target enclosure (Method of Entry). How was the entry effccted? 
7. Target enclosure (Status). How did the offender present themselves? 
8. Crime Promoters: Promoters either carelessly or deliberately make crime more likely. 
These are active roles rather than features of the environment. For example, a property 
being located next to a main road or communal entrances within housing blocks - 
9. Crime preventcrs: Preventers are active roles making crimes less likely, the absence of 
prevcriters may facilitate crime. Examples of crime preventers include burglar alarms, 
double-gLuffig 
or bars/grills on ground floor windows. 
I Wider Environment: 'Me environment surrounding the crime or disorder scene can be 
logistically favourable to the offender and crime promoters and unfavourable for crime 
ý'r'venters, for example locating a housing estate next to a school playing field. 
Ide"t'fication 
of Offender. Was the victim able to identify the offender? 
1: or attempt burglary offences, the categories why did they fail? and 'did the offender 
penetrate- the target enclosure' were also introduced. For damage to a dwelling offences the 
categories 'did the offender penetrate the target enclosure? ' and 'did the offender gain entry to 
t4 property?, were also analysed. 
Ile- $141ity of MO information can vary depending on the officer responsible for the case, the 
tra"'ng and experience of that o lcor and the importance given to mo by the officer. Alt ough 
the arloYlis focused upon the above categories of information spedfic to the offence, in many 
C'a'es the re)evant information was not contained within the MO free text field. Because the Wonnation 
used to compare the mo of offences against SBD properties with those against 
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Non-SBD properties was extracted from the same CIS of the same police force it is suggested 
that any biases were minimised. 
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Chapter Five - Part Seven 
Results 
Burglary: 
Table 73 below displays the MO for burglary offences against SBD and Non-SBD properties. 
The results not only identify weak points within the SBD sample, but also reveal a great deal 
about the impact of the SBD scheme upon offender behaviour. The analysis of tool or 
irnplernent used in burglary offences showed very little difference between attacks on SBD and 
Non-SED properties. The most common implement used in this sample of burglaries was a 
bladed screwdriver type instrument. This was the most common tool for both SBD offences 
(3 1 %) as well as Non-SBD offences (3 10/6). The second most common tool for both SBD and 
Non-SIM offences was the body, either in the form of kicking or forcing the point of entry. 
The body was used in 12% of offences against both SBD and Non-SBD properties. Other tools 
which were used to break into SBD properties were: duplicate keys (SO/o), bricks (40/6), garden 
gnor" (1%), piping (1%) crowbar (1%) and electrical tool (1%). Other implements which 
were used to break into Non-SBD properties were: duplicate keys (40/6), bricks (20/6), hacksaw 
(1 %) and wire (i o/,, ). 
11' analysis of point of entry revealed very interesting contrasts between the two samples. 
Although the most common point of entry for both SBD and Non-SBD properties was a rear 
ground floor window (31% of offences), a much higher proportion of offences against SBD 
Properties involved entry via the rear of the property (rear ground floor window 31%, rear 
door 28%, rear upstairs window 1%). In direct contrast to this, a large proportion of points of 
'try against Non-SBD properties were committed via the front of the property (front door 
16%, front ground floor window 6%, front upstairs window 2%). The table below displays 
these findings. The most interesting finding is that 16% of offences against Non-SBD properties 
were committed via the front door, this is compared to only 9% of offences against SBD 
Properties. In contrast, 28% of offences against the SBD sample were committed via the rear 
door, compared to only 19% of the offences against the Non-SBD sample. 
188 
Table 73: Point of Entry 
This finding suggests that offenders may perceive social control to be higher amongst residents 
in SBD areas thus avoiding a conspicuous point of entry such as the front door. On the other 
hand, offenders choosing their point of entry in Non-SBD estates may feel that residents are 
unlikely to apprehend them even if they catch them in the act of breaking into a neighbouring 
property, therefore, they feel comfortable breaking in using the front of the property. 
As with the point of entry, the analysis of point of escape revealed very interesting Pindings. 
One Of the main differences between SBD and Non-SBD properties was that far more offenders 
escaped from the property via the front when offending against Non-SBD properties. In 17% of 
offences against Non-SBD properties the point of escape was the front door, this is compared to 
Only 9% of offences against SBD properties. These findings support the suggestion discussed 
within the previous paragraph, that offenders feel more comfortable exiting the property via 
the front door in Non-SBD areas. This may relate to the layout of these estates, in which there 
is less natural surveillance from neighbouring properties, or it may relate to the behaviour of 
Non-SBD residents who portray the impression that they are unlikely to intervene. 
The analysis of method of entry revealed some interesting findings relating to specific weak 
points within the SBD standard. For both samples, the most common method of entry was to 
jernimy the lock on the door. However, this was far more likely to occur within the Non-SBD 
sample (38% of offences compared to just 26%) suggesting that the standard of SBD locks is 
higher than those found on Non-SBD properties. The second most common method of entry 
for both SBD and Non-SBD properties was through an insecure door or window. In 23% of 
offences against SBD properties the offender entered through an insecure window or door. In 
20% of offences against Non-SBD properties the offender entered through an insecure door or 
window. The third most common method of entry for both SBD and Non-SBD properties was 
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to smash a window or a glass panel in the door. In 16% of offences against SBD properties the 
method of entry was to smash a window/panel of glass in the door. In 15% of offences against 
Non-SBD properties the method of entry was to smash a window/panel of glass in the door. 
Removing the Beading from around the windows was much more common in offences against 
SBD properties. 6% of offences against SBD properties involved removing the beading. Only 
1% of offences against Non-SBD properties involved this method of entry. Other common 
methods of entry used in offending against SBD properties were: Kicking open the door (7%), 
using duplicate keys (5%), bodily pressure to the door panel (4%), taking out a pane of glass 
(2%), fully removing the window and frame surround (I%) and pulling open the door using 
bodily force (1%). In only 1% of offences against SBD properties was threat of violence used. 
In 3% of offences against Non-SBD properties there was a threat of violence. There was no use 
Of violence in burglary offences against SBD properties. In 1% of offences against Non-SBD 
Properties there was some use of violence. The use of distraction was used in 1% of burglary 
offences against Non-SBD properties and 0% of SBD properties. The use of false pretences was 
used on I% of burglary offences against Non-SBD properties and 0% of SBD properties. 
Table 74: Modus Operandi for Burglary Offences against Sample of SBD and Non- 
SBD Properties (n=212) 
Category of Analysis Percentage of Offences 
(SBD) 
Implement 
Percentage of Offences 
(Non-SBD) 
Maded 
screwdriver type 
instrument 
entr usin, bod 
12 
1)" licate keys 4 
Bricks 4 2 
Garden nome I () I 
Pi in 1 0 
Crowb I 
Electrical tool 
Wire 
1 0 
I 
Hacksaw 0 1 
not spe, l;, d 
Point of Entry 
Rear round floor window 31 31 
Rear door 28 19 
Front door 9 16 
Front ound floor wiwd--ow 5 6 
I)atjo 3 3 
ýide door 
]E 
4 
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Attempted Burglary: 
e the The table below displays the MO for attempted burglary offenc s against 
two samples. The 
results revealed a similar pattern to those discussed within the 
burglary section. There was very 
little variation between the implement used to attempt to 
break into the properties. The most 
common implement used in attempt burglary offences was a 
'bladed screwdriver type 
implement'. 79% of' attempt burglary offences against 
SBD properties included this type of 
implement compared to 50% of attempt burglary offences against 
Non-Sill) properties. The 
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second most common implement was the body (either to ldck or force the point of entry). The 
body was used in 7% of offences against SBD properties and I I% of Non-SBD properties. 
The most common attempted points of entry for offences against SBD properties were either a 
rear ground floor window or the rear door (each accounting for 29% of the offences). The 
most common attempted point of entry for offences against Non-SBD properties was a rear 
ground floor window (39%). However, as with burglary offences, offenders were much more 
likely to attempt to break into Non-SBD properties via the front door. 22% of offences against 
Non-SBD properties involved an attempt to break in via the front door. Ms was compared to 
only 14% of offences against SBD properties. 
Ile most common attempted method of entry against SBD properties was to jerruny the lock 
(64% of offences). Far less Non-SBD properties experienced this attempted method of entry 
(33%). The most common methods of attempted entry against Non-SBD properties were 
removing the beading around the window (33%) and jemmying the lock (33%). Other 
attempted methods of entry used against SBD properties were: removing the beading (140/0), 
smashing the window/glass panel in the door (7%) and kidking open the door (7%). Other 
attempted methods of entry used against Non-SBD properties were: smashing the 
window/glass panel in the door (I I%), bodily pressure to the door panels (I 10/6), talcing out 
the pane of glass (6%) and drilling the lock (6%). 
In 71% of attempted burglaries against SBD properties the burglary failed due to the offender 
being unable to overcome security measures. This was compared to S6% of offences against 
Non-SBD properties. In 29% of offences against SBD properties, the offender failed due to a 
disturbance, this was the case in 39% of offences against Non-SBD properties. This finding is 
supported by the fact that offenders were much less likely to actually penetrate the target 
enclosure when offending against SBD properties. In 14% of attempted burglary offences 
against SBD properties the target enclosure was penetrated (even though the offence was still 
classed as an attempt). This was the case for a much higher percentage of Non-SBD properties 
(28%). These findings are extremely important and suggest that offenders attempting to burgle 
S13D properties are more likely to fail to enter the property -a positive finding for the SBD 
scheme. In addition, offenders attempting to burgle SBD properties arc more likely to be 
unsuccessful because of the security measures which they face, rather d= being disturbed in 
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the process. Again, this is an extremely positive finding and suggests that the scheme is 
succeeding in preventing offenders from successfully entering SBD properties. 
Damage to a Dwelling: 
The table below displays the findings from the analysis of damage to a 
dwelling offences 
committed against the sample of 1058 SBD and Non-SBD properties. 
The most common tool 
used in damage to a dwelling offences against SBD properties was the 
body (20%), followed by 
stone (17%) and then brick (6%). The most common tool used in 
damage to a dwelling 
offences against Non-SBD properties was stone (27%) followed 
by the body (13%) and then 
brick (10%). Unlike the two offences burglary and attempt burglary, this ofl'cnce was more 
likely to take place at the front of the property within the SBD sample. 
27% of the offences 
committed against the SBD sample took place against the front door-, this was compared to only 
19% of the offences against Non-SBD properties. In contrast, a 
higher proportion of offences 
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Table 75: Modus Operandi for Attempted Burglary Offences against Sample of SBD 
and Non-SBD Properties (n=32) 
against the Non-SBD sample took place against the rear door (13%) compared to the SBD 
sample (8%). 
The most common method of damage against SBD and Non-SBD properties was to smash the 
window or glass door panel (47% and 40% respectively). In 56% of damage to a dwelling 
offences against SBD properties the target enclosure was penetrated. This was compared to 
52% of offences against Non-SBD properties. The high levels of penetration of the target 
enclosures of both SBD and Non-SBD properties suggest that a proportion of these offences 
were attempted burglaries. As was discussed in the opening to this section, there is a vast 
difference between the offence categorised as damage to a dwelling, with some clearly an 
attempt to break in, whilst others are vandalism against the property or its surroundings. 
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Table 76: Modus Operandi for Damage to a Dwelling offences against Sample of 
SBD and Non-SBD Properties (n=142) 
Unlike the analysis of SBD versus Non-SBD, the comparison between offenders' MO in single 
burglary offences against repeat burglary offences showed very little variation. The most 
'Olnrnon implement used was a bladed screwdriver, which accounted for 31% of single and 
repeat burglary offences. The most common point of entry for both single and repeat offences 
was the rear ground floor window (31% of repeat offences and 30% of single offences). The 
only slight discrepancy between the two offence types was that only 19% of repeat offences 
took place via the rear door whilst 21% of single offences took place through this point of' 
entry. This finding was supported in the analysis of point of escape, whereby a higher 
proportion of single offences took place via the rear door (32%) than repeat offences (24%). 
Again, there was very little variation between the method of entry for single and repeat 
Offences. The most common method in both samples was to jemmy the lock (33% of'repeats 
and 31% of single offences). Bodily pressure to the door panels was used more often in repeat 
Offences, however the difference was only marginal (7% of repeat offences involved bodily 
pressure compared to 3% of single offences). 
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Do offenders'MO vary between single and repeatedly victimiscd properties? 
Table 77: NO for Repeat Burglary victims as Comparcd to Single Burglary Victims 
The analysis of attempted burglary offences revealed much greater discrepancies between single 
and repeat offences. Although the most common instrument used in this sample of'properties 
was a bladed screwdriver, a much higher proportion of single offences took place using this 
instrument. 64% of single attempt burglary offences involved the use of a screwdriver, in 
contrast only 50% of repeat offences utilised this tool. The use of bodily force was also more 
Common in single offences (I I%) than repeat offences (0%). 
The point of attempted entry also showed variations. 75% of repeat offences took place via a 
rear ground floor window, this is compared to only 29% of single offences. The front door was 
a much more common point ofentry for single offences (2 1 %) than repeat offences (0%). This 
Suggests that the selection of the front door as a point of entry may be related to one- 
off/chance offences whereby an offender notices the opportunity to enter via this point, but 
chooses not to re-offend through this risky method. The rear window may be more common in 
repeat offences due to its positioning away from the surveillance ofneighbouring properties. 
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The method of attempted entry also showed variations between single and repeat victims. 75% 
of repeat victimisations involved removing the window beading, this was compared to only 
18% of single victims. In contrast, 54% of single victims involved jemmying the lock, whilst 
0% of repeat victims involved this method of entry. 
Table 78: MO for Repeat Attempt Burglary Victims as Compared to Single 
Attempt Burglary Victims 
Category of Analysis* Percentage of Repeat 
Burglary offences 
Percentage of Single 
Burglary Offences 
Implement 
Bladed Screwdriver I ype 
Instrument 
so 64 
Bodily Force 0 11 
Hectrical tool 4 
, ý! o i-plement spec? lied1not known 50 
21 
Point of Attempted Entry 
Rear ound floor window 75 
29 
Rear door 2S 18 
21 
Front ground floor window 0 
7 
Patio 0 7 
Side window 0 7 
r specfied 0 11 
ttemptc(l Entry 
Re-ove beadin 75 18 
Srna. sh window/glass in door 2S 7 
Bodil ressure - door 0 
7 
Kick o en door 0 
4 
jern S4 
Drill Lock 4 
0 4 
Vol yeolicd1not known 
4 771 
't-tegorie, with I% or lem are excludeti from the -ble. 
Analysis of damage to a dwelling offences also revealed some interesting 
findings. Although 
there were very little differences between the instruments used to carry out this offence, the 
point of damage and the method ofdamage showed variations. 
Whilst the front door was the 
Most common point of damage for repeat and single victims, this point ofdamage was much 
more likely to be used in single damage offences (26% as compared to 
17%). This finding 
supports that revealed in the analysis of attempt burglary offences and suggests that the use of' 
the front door may relate to opportunistic or chance offences which 
do not result in a further 
offence. The rear door was also more commonly used in single offences 
(14%) than repeat 
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offences (4%). However, the front ground floor window was a much more common point of 
damage for repeat offences (12%) than single offences (5%). 
The most common method of damage for both single and repeat victims was to smash the glass 
in the window/door, this method accounted for 60% of repeat offences and 36% of single 
offences. 
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Table 79: MO for Repeat Damage to a Dwelling Victims as Compared to Single 
Damage to a Dwelling Victims 
Chapter Five - Part Eight 
Discussion 
Findings from the analysis of offenders' MO support the premise that SBD encourages informal 
social control amongst its residents. The front door was a far more common point of entry and 
escape for offences against Non-SBD properties, suggesting that offenders are less fearful of 
being noticed or apprehended. jemmying the lock was a far more common method of entry 
against Non-SBD properties, yet too many offenders are still using this method to break into 
SBD properties. There were a much higher proportion of attempt burglary offences which 
involved a failure to break-in due to the inability to overcome security measures within the 
SBD sample, suggesting an increased effort required to succeed in offending against SBD 
properties. 
Although 23% of the offences against SBD properties were committed through an insecure 
entrance, this proportion was only slightly higher than the Non-SBD sample and the majority of 
burglary offences took place by overcon-dng the security measures (as opposed to sneaking in). 
Overcoming the security measures within this sample did not appear to involve a high degree of 
sophistication or difficulty and in many cases the target enclosure was penetrated with tools 
which would be available on the roadside such as stones, garden gnomes and bricks. A worrying 
finding from this analysis is the ability of offenders to break into the sample properties (both 
SBD and Non-SBD) without the aid of a too], for example, kicking in the door, or applying 
prcssurc to the pancls. 
There are a number of features of this trawl which could alert practitioners to the points at 
which it may prove most profitable to refine SBD. First, and in general, the fact that most 
methods are roughly similar between SBD and non-SBD dwellings suggests that there is no 
'Obvious SBD weak point. The closest to such weak points concern the rear door and window 
beading, both of which were involved more in burglaries of SBD homes than of other homes. 
Whilst attention should be given to any identified weak points, it should be noted that many of 
the properties included within this analysis were built prior to the introduction of the current 
standards for windows (PAS 24) and doors (BS79SO), therefore, methods used against 
Properties built post 1999 may require more sophistication. A reassuring finding is that 
burglaries of SBD homes are not more often achieved by violence. Ile argument is often 
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advanced that improvements in security have as a cost their substitution by violence (as vehicle 
security begets caijacking). It is therefore important to note that violence is even rarer during 
the burglary of SBD homes than of other homes. Finally, it seems to be the case that SBD 
works more through target hardening than increased surveillance, given the distribution of 
reasons for non-completion of attempted burglaries. This being the case, consideration of 
surrogate signs of occupancy (e. g. by timers) might strengthen the whole package. 
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Chapter Six 
Improving and Selling the SBD Product 
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Chapter Six - Part One 
Aims 
"Me final chapter of this thesis focuses upon the future of SBD. The findings from the previous 
three chapters revealed that SBD is, with qualifications, a useful crime reduction measure and 
discussed the means by which the scheme can continue to improve. The incentive of reduced 
crime and fear of crime may be appealing for SBD residents, but bow do policy makers 
convince those who build and let these properties that the problem of crime, and the benefits of 
reduced crime, are theirs as well as their residents? 
'Me legislative requirements to consider the crime and disorder implications of decision making 
were discussed within Chapter two. These include Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
0 998) and the Human Rights Act (1998). However, the process of selling crime reduction to 
developers and purchasers must involve both carrot and stick techniques (particularly 
for those 
"thin the Private sector). For public bodies who own and manage social 
housing, legal action 
'aY be enough to influence development decisions. For private developers, a decision to build 
housing to a higher standard of security will involve additional factors such as costs and the 
Property's appeal to future house buyers. In attempting to increase the proportion of properties 
which are built to the SBD standard, the agencies and individuals involved in the decision 
"aking process must be considered. For social housing the owner/manager is usually a RSL or 
a Local Authority and the customer is an individual or family who contribute towards the 
management of the property through the payment of rent. For new build private housing the 
property will be designed and developed according to the developer's standards. In the majority 
Of cases, the customer will purchase a property once design decisions 
have been made. Their 
decision to either purchase or rent a private property will be based upon personal 
factors which 
may or may not include security. 
Selling the SBD scheme to decision makers must take account of these needs. In social housing 
the decision makers include RSLs, Local Authorities and individuals whose decision it is to 
accept or reject a property. Although not exclusive to high crime areas, social housing is more 
common in urban and inner city areas and these are in turn more vulnerable to crime (Dodd et 
a], 2004). Selling the scheme to social housing residents on the basis of its crime reduction 
potential should be straightforward. For the owners/managers of that housing, additional 
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factors will include costs, planning permission and customer appeal. For private developers and 
house buyers the appeal is not as obvious. For developers, there is a risk that the mention of 
high security may portray the impression to house buyers that the area is not safe. The other 
Primary factor will be costs. Developers who are selling the property (as opposed to living in it) 
will be concerned to maximise their profits, any additional costs relating to security must be 
recouped within the sale price. This chapter will investigate the levers which can be used to 
increase the proportion of housing which is built to SBD standard from the perspective of the 
social housing provider as well as private developers. 
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Chapter Six - Part Two 
Social Housing Providers 
Methodology: 
In an attempt to establish what particular incentives and disincentives currently exist for social 
housing providers to build their properties to the SBD standard, interviews were conducted 
With both RSLs and the Housing Corporation. RSLs because the decision to build these houses 
to SBD is theirs, and the Housing Corporation because they make national decisions regarding 
standards and funding which will ultimately influence the local housing providers. Ile sample 
Of Properties used throughout this thesis were owned and managed by fifteen RSLs and one 
Local Authority. Each of these fifteen RSLs and the one Local Authority were invited to take 
Part in a face-to-face interview to discuss their view on the existing incentives and disincentives 
to build to the SBD standard. They were selected because they owned and managed the SBD 
housing estates utilised within this thesis, for this reason, they were all based within the West 
Yorkshire region. Of the fifteen RSLs and one Local Authority included within the sample, only 
six RSLs were w! Uing to take part in the interview. Although the findings are extensive, they 
should be treated with some caution as they represent the views of less than half of the RSLs 
from the West Yorkshire region. The interviews were semi-structured with questions relating 
to company policy regarding SBD, views on the existing incentives and disincentives to build to 
S13D, as weU as the costs of building to SBD. (Appendix 3 contains the interview schedule for 
RSLs). 
Ih an attempt to expand upon the role of the Housing Corporation in influencing design policy 
for RSLs, an interview took place with the Housing Corporation's Head of Housing 
Procurement 
- Practice and Development. This respondent was selected through a process of 
contacting the Housing Corporation at a national level and requesting their advice on possible 
interviewees. It was the opinion of The Housing Corporation that the Head of Housing 
Procurement 
- Practice and Development, would have the most extensive knowledge on 
Policy issues such as the Scheme Development Standards (SDS). The interview took place at the 
Housing Corporation Headquarters in London and was semi-structured in nature. The content 
of the interview focused upon the issues raised within the interviews conducted with RSIs. 
These issues related to the Housing Corporation's SDS, funding, the costs of building to SBD 
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and any future policy changes. (Appendix 6 contains the interview schedule for the Housing 
Corporation). 
Results: 
Of the six RSI-s who took part in the interview, two stated that all new homes MUST be built 
to the S13D standard, whilst four stated that they only SEEK to achieve the SBD standard (one 
respondent did not respond to this question). The incentives of building to SBD discussed by 
respondents fell largely into three categories. These were customer satisfaction, funding from 
the Housing Corporation and the value of expert advice from ALOs. Of the six respondents 
Only five were willing to provide an answer to this question. Two respondents focused solely 
upon customer satisfaction, quotations from these respondents include: 
"Our customers welcome the improved levels of security that they feel 
as a result of SBD" (Yorkshire Metropolitan). 
"To provide a safe enviromnent for residents" (Headrow). 
A further two respondents focused upon the requirements of the Housing Corporation, 
Ivhereby RSLs receive additional funding if their housing is built to the SBD standard. 
Quotations from respondents include: 
"RSLs must develop to SBD standards as it a requirement of the Housing 
Corporation's Scheme Development Standards. Failure to comply would be 
picked up at the audit stage by the Housing Corporation which would be 
a serious breach of the Scheme Development Standards and could 
jeopardise development funding to the RSL in the future" (Jephson). 
"The incentive for RSLs to build to SBD is the requirement for safety and 
security in the Housing Corporation Scheme Development Standards" (Ridings). 
One respondent felt that the advice received from the police ALO when building (or 
attempting to build) housing to the SBD standard was a benefit and an incentive. 
'rhe audit process of having to liaise with an ALO is very useful as 
we value their advice and expertise on design issues" (Headrow). 
Only two of the six respondents felt that they could highlight any disincentives or constraints in 
huilding to the SED scheme. These fell into three categories: 1) Costs, 2) Design constraints 
and 3) Difficulties with inconsistent demands by ALOs. Two respondents expressed concern 
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about costs. One respondent expressed concern about ALO inconsistency and one respondent 
expressed concern about design compromises. Examples of quotations from respondents are set 
Out below: 
"If the Housing Corporation's Scheme Development Standards were 
taken away, we would not build to SBD standard .... 
financially we are 
squeezed from both ends and if we can find places to cut costs we will 
Without public subsidy it is difficult to meet the Scheme Development 
Standards" (Headrow). 
"We sometimes feel that there is an inconsistency between ALO 
demands. For example, we were developing an estate which had phase 
one and phase two. Phase two was simply meant to follow on from phase 
one, with no re-designing of the estate layout. However, the ALO 
demands had changed from phase one to phase two .... this made putting 
together a design brief very difficult" (Headrow). 
Complete interviews are available at appendix 4; the following table contains a summary of the 
information provided by respondents. 
Table 80: Summary of Company Policyq incentives and Disincentives 
Yorkshire We seek to achieve Our customers welcome the None are 
ý*4etropolitan certification on new improved levels of safety and obvious at this 
build schemes. security that they feel as a time. 
result of SBD. 
for residents. Corporation's 
Scheme 
The audit process of* having to Development 
liaise with an ALO is very Standards (SDS) 
useful as we value their advice were taken 
and expertise on design issues away, we would 
To help the development of a not build to S131) 
sustainable community where standard, 
people want to stay. 
is 
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an inconsistency I 
between ALO 
demands. 
Without public 
subsidy it is 
difficult to meet 
lephsoll SBD certification 
must be obtained 
for all schemes. 
RSI, s must develop to SBD 
standards, as it is a 
requirement of the Housing 
Corporation's SDS. Failure to 
comply would be picked up at 
audit stage by the Housing 
Corporation which would be a 
serious break of SDS and could 
jeopardise development 
funding to a RSI. in the future. 
None specified 
seek SBD 
certification; 
however, we 
recognise that in 
some 
circumstances, full 
SBD is not possible 
or practicable. 
ensures that the designers take 
full account of the security 
aspects of the design -- this is 
as important as getting the 
accreditation. 
some extra cost 
involved, or an 
insistence on full 
compliance may 
lead to 
consequential 
design 
compromises. If 
we build a 
scheme which 
fi ts all SDS 
requirements, 
we will be 
deficit for ab, 
10 years. 
Riding, Meeting the SBD The incentive for RSLs to Nonespecified. 
standards is a build to SBD is the 
requirement in our requirement for safety and 
company's design security in the Housing 
brief and it is a Corporation SDS. 
specification for all 
new ui 01.1ses. 
Sadch Lok Security provision None specified. None specified. 
for our tenants is of' 
prime importance 
when considering 
the design of our 
new build schemes 
and we aim to 
achieve SBD 
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The interview conducted with the I lousing Corporation (the complete interview can be seen at 
appendix 7) revealed that thcv ofler several funding related incentives for RSI-s to build their 
propertie's to the SIM standard. These are Social Housing Grants and a Supplementary 
ý"Ultiplier for Sustainability. The Housing Corporation's SDS document (Housing Corporation, 
2003) sets out the requiremenLs and recommendations for all housing projects which receive 
Social Housing Grants (SHG). Items set out in the document fall into two categories, these are 
essential and re-munt-nded. RSIs N%hich build schemes to a standard over and above the 
essential criteria to incorporate recommended items will achieve enhanced quality assessments. 
Enhanced 
quality assessments are reflected in the RSL's compliance audit results which can in 
turn influence the level of' future funding f'rom the Housing Corporation. Section 1.4 of the 
SDS document 
sets out both essential and recommended safety and security criteria. 
Housing Corporation Scheme Development Standards 
ecurity provision for internal anti external environments should be appropriate for it 
sac h cc m t' e location and building types and should reflect advice obtained from local 
In 
policee c Architectural Liaison Officers/Crime Prevention Design Advisors prior to 
s 
V, 
detailed planning stage 
S '; ecur 
" li ' 
In assessing the extent to which this standard has been met the Corporation will: 
ujc 
0 4, 
sm 
Liailse with Police authorities to ascertain the extent of 
liaison undertaken by 
s 
RSII -s and their partners; 
Have regard to the extent that the guidance in the relevant "Secured 
by Design" 
Guide has been incorporated. 
See the Further information section of SDS for contacts of the company set up to 
_operate 
Secured by Design nationally. 
Tests ýf Compliance - essential items: 
Scheme specific advice obtained from local police 
design advisers prior to detailed 
planning? 
1.4.2.2 
Secure side/rear fencing provided, any side or rear gates lockable and to full fencing 
height? 
1.4.2.3 
1 ayout avoids unnecessary through routes and minimises 
hiding places? 
1.4.2.4 
Site layout maximises natural surveillance? 
Ground floor and other easily accessible windows tested to BS 7950: 1997 - 
enhanced security? 
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1.4.2.6 Key operated locks or laminated 6.4mm glass to ground floor or easily accessible I 
windows? 
1.4.2.7 1 Not used 
1.4.2.8 1 Lxternal doors/ frames /fixing/ locking meet Secured by Design standards? 
Prompt Housing Quality Indicators (HQI) assessments carried out and data submitted to I 
www. hqiuk. com 
Tests of compliance recommended items: 
1.4.2.9 Fused spur for security alarm provided? 
I- 
. 4. -2-- 
10 
---, 
'Secured by Design' certification obtained? 
RSLs who require SHG funding to build housing schemes need to fulfil all essential criteria. 
Although these houses will not be S13D, they will have high levels of security. If RSLs wish to be 
looked upon favourably in terms of future funding from the Housing Corporation, they must 
build their housing schemes to a standard over and above the essential items, thus incorporating 
recommended items and hence building to SBD standard. 
The second Housing Corporation incentive relates to the multiplier for sustainable properties. 
The Housing Corporation's Total Cost Indicators, Grant Rates, Value Limits and Discount 
Amounts, Rent Caps and Administration Allowances for 200112002 (Housing Corporation, 
2000) came into force from the I' April 2001. The changes from the 200012001 Total Cost 
Indicators (TCls) include a new supplementary multiplier which has been introduced in order 
to encourage greater sustainability. Supplementary multipliers can be applied to new 
build and 
rehabilitation units when the accommodation is designed to meet the relevant standards set out 
in the Housing Corporation's SDS. In order to qualify for the Sustainability multiplier, two 
separate elements must be achieved. Firstly; Greening - In pursuit of the government's stated 
Policy of increasing energy efficiency and reducing levels of C02 in the atmosphere, an 
F-COHome rating of Good (second level) must be certified. Secondly, Security. In order to 
achieve this, SBD certification must be obtained (both Greening and Security must 
be present 
for the multiplier to apply). Depending upon the location throughout England (cost groups A, 
13, C, D or E), a RSL can achieve either an additional enhancement of Total Cost Indices of 
either 1.0 1 or 1.02. This equates to a I% enhancement. 
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'I'he interview with the Housing Corporation's Head of Housing Procurement also revealed that 
the Housing Corporation views SBD as an important factor in improving the quality of life of 
social housing residents. Although building to SBD is, at present, only a recommended 
criterion, it was stated that within a couple of years this will be a requirement of all social 
housing funded by the Housing Corporation. 
"SBD will be a requirement within a couple of years" (Housing Corporation). 
't was suggested that there are no technical reasons why SBD is not an essential criterion. "Me 
indication was that the requirement to build to SBD is being introduced on a gradual basis to 
allow the treasury to account for the additional costs. 
"Before the supplementary multiplier, if we stated that SBD was 
essential, the Treasury's costs would go from a very small percentage 
Of RSLs building to SBD to 100% - this would be a massive increase in 
costs- The way we have done it, it should go from a very small percentage 
to say 70% before it jumps to 100%. If in future I make it a requirement, 
it 'Will seem to cost the Treasury a very small amount" (Housing Corporation). 
SUM132ary: 
The incentives of building housing to SBD standard are largely associated with the funding 
provided by the Housing Corporation. RSLs who receive funding from the Housing 
Corporation 
must fulfil certain criteria (set out in the SDS) when building residential housing. 
Gaining SlaD certification is not essential, it is only a recommended item on the SDS. However, 
P'S" who build over and above essential criteria to include recommended criteria, Will be 
looked Upon favour-ably in terms of future funding from the Housing Corporation. This is 
referred to as 'enhanced quality assessments'. From the I' April 2001 the Housing Corporation 
'ntrOduced 
a second incentive for RSLs to build to SBD standard - the Supplementary 
ý4ult'Plier for Sustainability. This allows RSLs who build to SBD standard to achieve a 1% 
enhancernent. RSLs taking part in the interviews also felt that customer satisfaction and the 
1'enefits 
of receiving assistance and advice from ALOs when applying for the SBD scheme were 
ir'cent'ves in attempting to achieve the SBD standard. VVhilst there have been extensive moves 
towards increasing the incentives for RSLs to build to SBD standard, it should be borne in mind 
that a) not all housing built by RSLs is funded by the Housing Corporation, and b) not all 
housing is owned or built by RSLs. As a rneans of illustration, one RSL stated that only one 
third of their housing stork is funded by the Housing Corporation and that any housing which is 
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"lot funded by public subsidy would not be built to SBD standard. Whilst the incentives offered 
by the Housing Corporation should be applauded, incentives for the private sector must not be 
forgotten. 
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Chapter Six - Part Three 
The Private Sector 
The Only potential incentives for private developers to build their housing to the SBD standard 
are an increase in buyer appeal and an increase in profits following the sale of the property. As a 
means of establishing whether these incentives could be used to 'sell' the scheme to private 
developers two hypotheses had to be tested. First, that the crime reduction benefits of SBD 
Outweigh the additional costs of building to this standard. Second, that house buyers are 
attracted to homes which offer enhanced security and are willing to pay an additional cost for 
these benefits. 
DO the crime reduction benefits of SBD outweigh the additional costs of building 
to this standard? 
Methodology: 
In an attempt to establish whether building to SBD standard produces benefits over and above 
the additional costs, a cost-benefit analysis was undertaken. The additional costs of building to 
SBD were difficult to establish. An initial trawl of the fifteen RSLs and one local authority who 
owned the properties included within this thesis resulted in responses from five RSU, two 
architects, one quantity surveyor and one local authority. A follow up survey produced 
responses from an additional RSL, more detailed information from the original quantity 
surveyor, one architect and an additional local authority. Therefore, the additional costs of 
building to SBD standard are based upon the data provided by six RSLs, one quantity surveyor, 
three architects and two local authorities. (I"he cost information provided by respondents is 
available at appendiccs 4 and 5). 
T'le costs of crime figures utilised for this study were those published by Brand and Price 
(2000). These include the costs incurred in anticipation of victimisation (i. e. expenditure on 
security measures), as a consequence of victimisation (i. e. goods stolen, emotional costs, 
PhYsical costs and costs to the health service) and the costs incurred by society in responding to 
a crime (criminal justice system). Brand and Price (2000) estimate the average cost of a 
burglary in a dwelling offence to be E2,300. Other cost estimates include: 
* Common assault LS4-0 
* Robbery/mugging L4,700 
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"Meft L600 
Theft (not vehicle) L340 
Vehicle Theft L890 
Criminal Damage LSIO 
The costs of crime per household were calculated by multiplying the number of crimes 
experienced within a one year period (I' January 1999 to 31' December 1999) by the 
estimated cost for that crime and dividing this by the number of households within the sample 
area. The rationale for selecting a one year period relates to the different life-spans of each 
matched pair. As was discussed within earlier chapters, although each matched pair of SBD and 
Non-SBD Properties covered the same period of time, the whole sample of 2S pairs, covered 
different lengths of time. For this reason, crimes taldng place within this one year period were 
selected. 
Results: 
Information gathered from RSLs, quantity surveyors, architects and local authorities revealed 
that the mean additional cost of building to SBD standard was VOOO, with a median cost of 
L79S. However, this one off investment includes costs for a variety of measures such as road 
layout, fencing and foliage as well as the more obvious locks and bolts which although paid for 
at the development stage, will continue to reduce crime for a number a years. To transform 
this cost into an annual estimate involved dividing the one off additional cost by the number of 
Years for which that property would continue to protect against crime. The difficulty with 
calculating this figure being that although the layout of the estate may prevent crime for 
decades, features such as doors and windows have a shorter crime prevention life span before 
upgrading is required. Talcing a crude estimate of 20 years, if the total additional cost (; C 1000 
rnean or L79S median) is divided by 20 to produce a yearly additional cost for a SBD house, this 
figure would be L39.7S (median) or L49.97 (mean). It is estimated using these calculations that 
the saving achieved through prevented burglaries in building to the SBD standard would be 
L27.44 per year. In subtracting the yearly cost of building to SBD from this saving, the 
resulting figure is a negative (-L12.31 or -L22. S3) suggesting that in this instance (using 
burglary alone) the benefits of reduced levels of crime do not outweigh the additional costs of 
building to the SBD standard. The same result is achieved when considering the prevention of 
VeMcle theft (428.22 or -L38.44). However, using total crime as opposed to single crime 
categories revealed that building to SBD would save LS. 97 per year (using the median cost 
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quoted above), but would not break even if the mean additional costs were used in this 
calculation (4-4.27 per year). Table 82 below displays the costs for burglary, vehicle theft and 
total crime within the sample. 
Table 82: Annual costs of Crime ver Household 
each SBD each Non-SBD between 
Ilurglarv urgial 
' 
777 
L87 1-2 114.56 
1 
L27.44 
E 
Veh' d c T'eft 
_ 
ft CCt L2, T. 24.2 =7ý : =f- 3 5.8 O= Ll 1.53 
r r Ajj 
; ý. 
1T AII cirl rmn e L375.75 L421.45 L45.70 
Summary: 
Several 
complexities of cost-benefit analyses lead the author to urge caution regarding these 
figures. Firstly, economists would suggest that the additional costs of building to SBD 
have not 
taken account of discounting. Treasury guidelines (HM Treasury, 2003) state that costs should 
be discounted to account for social time preference and risk, at a rate of 3.5% a year. 
This 
means that spending Y-1000 today costs 3.5% more to society than spending LIOOO in a year's 
time. However, if the analysis is to take account of the changing costs of 
building to SBD, it 
"Ist take account of the changing costs of crime. As evermore expensive technological 
devices 
become 
cOrnmonplace in the household, the average cost of a burglary is likely to rise 
dramatically 
over the next two decades. A short trawl of British Crime Survey 
data reveal that 
the mean cost of items stolen in burglary offences did increase 
from L 1,181 in 1996 to L 1,416 
in 1998. However, this figure fell to L1,273 in 2000, suggesting that projecting the average 
cost of a burglary over the next 20 years may not be a straightforward task. 
Furthermore, 
findings discussed within Chapter three revealed that the crime reduction performance of SBD 
is increasing 
year on year when compared with matched Non-SBD estates. For this reason, the 
savings gained by building to SBD in terms of reduced levels of crime are likely to increase 
greatly over the next 20 years. For a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis these and other 
factors 
would need to be taken into account. The most prudent conclusion is that, currently, 
S13D costs are finely balanced with the anticipated costs of crime prevented. However, 
enhancements in the scheme's crime reduction benefits as well advancements in security 
rneasures should improve this position in the future. 
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Are house buyers attracted to properties which offer enhanced security? If so, are 
they willing to pay an additional cost for these benefits? 
Ainis: 
The data collection phase of this thesis involved many discussions with police ALOs and Crime 
Prevention Officers whose task it is to sell the SBD scheme to the public. Anecdotal evidence 
collected throughout this period suggested that the lack of enthusiasm for the SBD within the 
Private sector was due to the views of many private developers who felt that a) house buyers 
would equate the mention of high security with high crime areas and thus be 'turned off 
Purchasing a SBD property and b) house buyers would be unwilling to pay an additional 
Premium for properties with higher levels of security, therefore any additional costs would 
impact directly upon the developer's profit margins. Without evidence to support the contrary, 
there was little that crime reduction practitioners could do to convince them otherwise. 
Methodology: 
As a means of testing the hypothesis that house buyers are attracted to secure homes and are 
wal'ng to pay for these benefits, a national survey of house buyers was conducted. This phase of 
the thesis involved collaboration between two national estate agencies (Halifax Property 
Services and Royal and Sun Alliance Property Services) and West Yorkshire Police and took 
place in 2001. West Yorkshire Police contributed towards the printing costs of the 
questionnaire and the two major national estate agents agreed to distribute the questionnaire 
throughout their branches. The questionnaires were distributed throughout England and Wales 
to the local estate agency offices and were completed by customers who were in the process of 
purchasing properties from the agency, at the agency premises. The questionnaire was designed 
I'llith self-completion in mind, therefore the majority of questions were closed-ended and the 
numbers of questions were limited to enhance its appeal. 7he aim of the questionnaire was to 
establish whether enhanced security would appeal to house buyers as well as ascertaining 
whether they were willing to pay an additional pren-dum for these benefits, or whether such 
features were expected to be included within the original purchase cost. (A copy of the 
9uestionnaire can be found at appendix 8). 
In identifying which particular features of a property were important to house buyers, the two 
estate agents were asked to select six features (excluding security) which they felt impacted 
Upon a horne purchase decision. These were: fitted carpets, turf to front and rear gardens, 
built-in kitchen appliances, a garage, a separate downstairs toilet and en-suite facilities in the 
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'Master bedroom. To these six features was added the additional feature a 'secure environment'. 
A 'secure environment' was not defined in the questionnaire for a number of reasons: 
It is a contextual concept and, like the criteria for the SBD award scheme, is site 
specific. 
2. A definition that was applicable to every situation would either be extremely complex 
or banal and little different to the lay interpretation of 'secure environment'. 
3. It was always intended that the questionnaire would be relatively simple to complete, 
neither time-consuming nor overly complex. 
'rhe Utifisation of the term 'secure environment' was an attempt to broaden the focus of security 
frorn bolts and bars to something approximating the SBD scheme features. The author accepts 
that the use of 'secure environment' as opposed to a more explicit term has trade-offi and may 
have resulted in a difference in interpretation amongst respondents. It is recognised that a 
Secure environment to one respondent may translate to the presence of a burglar alarm, 
security li ghting and low levels of crime, whilst another may view a secure environment as the 
Si ght Of farnilies playing together. Whilst recognising this weakness, the author consulted 
extensively with both West Yorkshire Police and the estate agents involved, who both felt that 
thi's term was appropriate. 
111 an attempt to avoid influencing respondents' decision making process, the document was 
designed to appear as a University of Huddersfield research document, with no mention of 
West Yorkshire Police and their role in the survey. Any mention of police involvement may 
have influenced respondents towards the security related responses. Respondents were asked a 
number of questions relating to their socio-demographic and house buying status. These 
included; 
whether they were first-time buyers, whether they were considering buying a newly 
built Property, their current postal address area and the postal address area where they wished 
to live, gender, age and the composition of the family group moving into the new home. 
Respondents 
were asked to rank the seven features, previously described, in order of 
Preference, one being the most important and seven the least in terms of the house purchase 
decision. They were then asked to select which of those seven features they would expect to be 
"Icluded in the purchase price of their home at no additional cost. Finally, respondents were 
asked if a house was described as having 'high standards of security' would this a) influence them 
t' buy the house, b) influence them not to buy it, or c) neither. 
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Results: 
Respondents: 
Despite the commitment of the two national estate agencies, the number of completed 
questionnaires (n--: 233) was much lower than anticipated, a response rate of 9% of those 
distributed to the agencies. However, the response was still sufficient for most of the 
prospective analyses. Although the questionnaires were distributed on a national basis the 
responses were markedly skewed geographically. The level of response from the East Midlands, 
West Midlands, North West England and North East England were much higher than in the rest 
of the UK. The gender of respondents was fairly evenly distributed between males and females. 
41% of respondents were male and S6% female (3% of respondents failed to answer this 
Particular question). The responses were reasonably well distributed across the age groups. The 
group with the greatest number of responses were those aged 2S-34 years (37%) and the group 
'With the least number were those aged 45 -5S years (7%). The vast majority of respondents 
were moving to a new home in which two adults would be living (69%). 2S% of respondents 
were moving into a home in which just one adult would be residing. S4% of respondents were 
moving into a home in which one or more children would be residing. 
When Purchasing a New Home which Features are most important to you? 
Respondents were asked to rank the seven features (fitted carpets, turf to the front and rear 
gardens, built-in Idtchen appliances, a garage, a separate downstairs toilet, en-suite facilities in 
the master bedroom and a secure environment) according to their importance in influencing 
their decision to purchase a home (one being the most important and seven the least). The 
responses to this question were analysed in two separate ways. Firstly, in terms of first 
preferences which is a measure of their outright attractiveness to respondents. Thus, if a 
Particular feature had S3 respondents giving it a first preference the score for that feature would 
be 53. The highest score indicating the feature most attractive to the respondents. Additionally, 
they were examined in terms of their over-all attractiveness to the respondents by analysing the 
'UnI Of all their preferences. Given that the rating for the most preferred feature was one and 
the least preferred was seven, the total score for a particular feature was the sum of the scores 
'Cross all respondents. Thus, given n respondents, if all rated a particular feature as 3 the score 
for that feature would be 3n. The lowest overall score would indicate the feature with the 
greatest overall attractiveness to respondents. 
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The sub-categories with the least number of respondents and therefore where the results are, 
arguably, less persuasive are: the age group 45-54 years, the sub-categories moving into and out 
of high crime areas, the single gender sub-categories and the single gender with children sub- 
categories. Table 83 displays the results of the analysis in respect of first preferences indicated 
by the respondents. The most attractive feature for each category of respondent is highlighted. 
It can be seen that a secure environment is the most favoured option in almost all sub-categories 
-- the exceptions being 45-54 years, moving from a high crime area, single females with 
children, single males with children and single males. 
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Table 83: Respondents' First Preference 
Single 0000 
males + 
SIi; I 
childrLm 
ingIc 767251 
Inales 
* I)cn(Ites statistical significance at the level of 0.05 (using Chi-Square). P"Id Type indicates highest score. 
Table 84 displays the results of the analysis in respect of overall scores indicated by the 
respondents. Again the most attractive feature for each category is highlighted and it can be 
seen that secure environment is the most favoured option in most sub-categories. The 
exceptions being moving from a high crime area, single females with children, single females, 
sIngle males with children and single males. 
Table 84: Respondents' Overall Preference 
2j9 
Overall, 37% of the sample placed secure environment as their top priority, followed by fitted 
carpets (25%) and having a garage (17%). The features least likely to be considered a top 
Priority were downstairs toilet (5%), en-suite facilities to the master bedroom (6%) and turf on 
front and rear gardens (12%). The following analysis compares the importance of secure 
environment between the socio-demographic variables of respondents. 
Gender: 
There were very few gender differences in choice of top priority. Male respondents placed 
secure environment as their top priority (33%) as did female respondents (39%). 
Age Group: 
The analysis of age groups revealed that for all but the 45-54 year old age group, secure 
environment was the top priority when buying a new home. 43% of under-25s felt that it was 
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"III I ype indicates lowest (and therefore most preferable) score - 
the most important feature when considering the purchase of a new property, as did 40% of 2S- 
34 year Olds and 38% of 3S-44 year Olds. Respondents in the 4S-S4 age group felt that fitted 
carpets (3SO/o) were more important than a secure environment (29%). Secure environment 
was the most important feature for those in the SS+ age group with 30% selecting this feature 
as their top priority (however, this was only 3% more than those were who placed fitted 
carpets as the top priority). 
First Time Buyers: 
"'th first time buyers and non-first time buyers placed secure environment as their top 
Priority. 40% of first time buyers felt that it was the most important feature when considering 
the Purchase of a new home and 3S% of non-first time buyers felt it the most important 
feature. First time buyers appear to place a higher priority upon security than respondents who 
have owned properties before. 
Purchasers of Newly-Built Homes: 
'30tlI those who would consider buying a new build house and those who would not were most 
likely to place secure environment as their top priority. 44% of those who would consider a 
new build felt that secure environment was the most important feature when buying a new 
home. 34% of those who would not consider a new home felt that it was the most important 
feature. 
"igh Crime Areas: 
IVhen the movement to and from high crime areas was analysed a similar pattern. emerged. 
Those Moving to a high crime area placed secure environment as their top priority, however, 
t"'so rnoving from a high crime area placed fitted carpets as their top priority. It should, 
however, be stressed that the numbers of respondents included in this analysis was very small. 
131 House Buyers expect these features to be included within the purchase price 
If their home? 
ýVhen asked whether they expected certain features to be included in the purchase price of a 
new horne at no extra cost, the following results were revealed: 
S I% expected fitted carpets to be included at no extra cost; 
49% expected built in kitchen appliances to be included at no extra cost; 
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45% expected turf to the front and rear gardens to be included at no extra cost; 
42% expected a garage to be included at no extra cost; 
37% expected a secure environment to be included at no extra cost; 
25% expected a downstairs toilet to be included at no extra cost; 
021% expected an en-suite to the master bedroom to be included at no extra cost. 
Although having a secure environment is considered to be the most important factor when 
buying a new home, a low percentage (as compared to other features) expect it to be included 
in their Purchase at no extra cost. Of all ' 
features listed in the survey, the provision of a secure 
environment at no extra cost was the only feature to show a gender difference; only 28% of 
male respondents expected this compared to 43% of females. Those in the under-25 age 
category were most likely to expect a secure environment at no extra cost (45%); those in the 
2S-34 age group (40%) and 3S-44 age group (41%) were also likely to expect a secure 
environment. Those in the older age categories were least likely to expect a secure 
environment for no extra cost when purchasing a new home. Only 29% of 45-54 year olds had 
such an expectation, and only 27% of those SS+. There appeared to be very little difference 
between those buying their first home (39%) and those who are not (36%) in terms of whether 
they expect a secure environment for no extra cost. This suggests that first time buyers have a 
slightly higher expectation of security in their home than purchasers who have owned a home 
before. 'Mose considering buying a new build property are less likely to expect a secure 
environment (34%) than those looking at older homes (38%). The data suggest that those 
looking at older homes are more likely to expect all features at no extra cost (with the 
exception of en-suite facilities in the master bedroom). This may relate more to a general 
expectation of facilities in older homes as opposed to a relationship specific to security. 
Does Enhanced Security influence a purchaser's decision to buy? 
Respondents 
were asked whether a house being described as 'having high standards of security' 
would affect their decision when thinking about buying it. 47% said that it would influence 
then' to buy, 10% said that it would influence them not to buy and 42% said that it would not 
affect their decision. Figure 38 displays the male/female differences in responses. SO% of 
female and 41 % of male respondents felt that the mention of security would influence them to 
buy a house. Interestingly, a higher proportion of females than males also felt that the mention 
of security would influence them not to buy a home. 
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]Figure 38: Would the Mention of Security affect your Decision to Purchase a Property? 
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These data suggest that for females, security has a strong influence upon their perception of a 
home, 
whether this creates a negative or positive opinion appears to vary. However, for the 
vast majority, this is a positive influence. For male respondents, security does not appear to 
have as strong an influence. 52% of males suggested that security would not affect their 
decision. Only 36% of females felt this way. The mention of security would have a positive 
affect on the decision of all age groups with the exception of those aged 55+ for whom the 
largest 
proportion felt that this would not affect their decision. For 
first time buyers, the 
mention of security would be most likely to influence them to purchase a 
home (49%). This 
finding 
was also evident for non-first time buyers with 46% suggesting that the mention of 
security would influence them to buy a home. There was very little difference in the findings 
between those who are buying a first home and those who have owned a 
home before. Those 
considering a new build home were most likely to feel that the mention of security would have 
a Positive affect upon their decision (49%). The finding was the same for those not considering 
new build homes (46%). Although a positive finding, the results also suggest that a larger 
proportion of those looking at new build properties would find that the mention of security 
influenced them not to buy the house (14%), than those looking at older homes (9%). 
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Summary: 
Although the number of respondents was limited, this research challenges the view that there is 
no demand for enhanced security and that homes advertised as such will not attract buyers. "Me 
findings from this research suggest that a secure environment is the most important factor 
(excluding location) in determining whether a person will purchase a particular property. in 
addition to this finding, a secure environment was also one of the factors least expected to be 
Provided at no extra cost, suggesting that house-buyers are willing to pay an additional 
Premium for enhanced security. It is hoped that these findings have proved the hypotheses that 
house buyers are not only attracted to secure homes, but are also willing to pay for these 
additional benefits, thus supporting crime reduction practitioners in attempting to increase the 
security demanded amongst privately owned homes. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
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Chapter Seven - Part One 
Summary of Findings 
'Me last two decades have seen increasing recognition of the contribution which the design of 
products and services can make to crime reduction. This has nowhere been more true than in 
the design of buildings and the spaces between them. From the initial work of Jacobs (196 1) 
and Newman (1973,199S) in the USA, and Poyner alone (1983,1988) and with Webb (199 1) 
in the UK has grown a clearer understanding of the crime-reductive design of homes. Its most 
significant Practical manifestation in the UK has been the SBD award scheme which seeks to 
encourage developers to design out crime at the planning stage. Set within a current climate in 
which agencies previously excluded from the crime reduction agenda, as well as those 
traditionally considered to be responsible for its management, have been tasked with 
demonstrating their ability to work together to reduce crime and disorder, the SBD scheme has 
the potential to flourish. It not only approaches the crime problem from a holistic perspective, 
rer"Oving suitable targets, introducing capable guardians and removing likely offenders, it also 
requires the commitment and the co-operation of a variety of multi-agency partners. 
At the commencement of this thesis, the SBD scheme was being offered as a tool for crime 
reduction partnerships, yet no independent evidence existed to support its claims. W11ilst 
focusing upon addressing this deficit and identifying to what extent the scheme actually reduced 
crime, disorder and the fear of crime, this thesis was concerned with more than simple 
evaluation of a crime reduction measure. its primary focus lies in the production of practical 
find'ngs which will assist crime reduction practitioners in their task of reducing the impact of 
crime and the fear of crime. The thesis aims to offer means through which the SBD scheme can 
be improved, enhanced and subsequently promoted to a wider audience. 
71'e findings revealed throughout this thesis suggest that SBD is currently acting as an effective 
crime reduction measure, yet there exist weaknesses within its design and application. As well 
as evaluating SBD in its current position, the thesis offers what is hoped will be an enhancement 
to the existing scheme. A simple, usable risk assessment checklist to be used by practitioners in 
identifying properties which will become vulnerable to crime if built (therefore allowing them 
to Challenge planning applications) or in the case of properties already developed, allowing 
resources to be directed towards those at most risk of future victimisation. Like risk assessment 
'neasures designed to predict an individual's vulnerability to future involvement in crime (for 
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example, Identification, Referral and Tracidng), it is hoped that the Burgess checIdist will allow 
early intervention in identifying risk within the built environment. 
'Vhilst it is accepted that conflicting research will always exist, the current debate surrounding 
the criminogenic features of permeable design has not only diverted practitioner and policy 
makers' attention from the immediate task of reducing crime, the lack of standardisation for 
measuring the elusive permeability has meant that claims that a proposed development is 'too 
Permeable' can neither be measured nor tested. The time invested in the collection of local 
data to establish a development's risk can be reaped in preventing the consumption of 
Practitioner hours expended in debating the indefinable, as well as the prevention of future 
crime associated with the production of criminogenic housing. Having identified what it is 
hoped will be the future implementation of the Burgess checklist, the author will reconsider the 
methods through which it was developed, as well as additional findings revealed throughout 
this thesis which fall largely into the categories of evaluating, improving and selling the SBD 
scherne. 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of SBD: 
Chapter three focused upon the current performance of the SBD scheme and revealed mixed, 
Yet on balance, positive findings. The analysis of police recorded statistics included three levels 
- estates which had been refurbished to the SBD standard, newly built estates compared with 
Matched Pairs which were as similar as possible in terms of age, housing tenure, location and 
environmental features, and newly built estates which were simply compared with the nearest 
Non-SED 
estate. 
-Me two estates which had been refurbished to SBD saw reductions in the total crime levels of 
550,40. The crime pattern on the Cherry Court complex appeared straightforward, with 
immediate reductions in crime following certification to the SBD standard. However, this was 
not the case for Appleton Gardens/Saville Court where an immediate reduction in the crime 
rate was followed by a rise in crime to levels higher than those seen prior to the introduction of 
tlýe scheme. This rise in crime in the year following certification 
'to SBD standard was not 
rnaintatined, and crime soon fell to (and remained at) levels lower than those revealed pre- 
certification. Explanations offered for this pattern include a delay in the crime reduction effects 
of certain measures introduced by the SBD scheme, an increased police presence on the estate 
(th's an increase in the number of offences actually being detected) and an increased willingness 
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to report crime to the police due to rejuvenated levels of pride or increased feelings of 
confidence in the Criminal Justice System. 
The refurbished estates involved a simple comparison of pre and post certification crime rates. 
However, this was not possible for the majority of SBD estates which were newly built to the 
S13D standard. The analysis of police recorded statistics on newly built SBD estates took place 
on two levels - detailed and broad based. The detailed level of analysis involved a detailed 
Matching process of 2S SBD and Non-SBD pairs to ensure that as far as possible, the only 
difference between the pair was that one was SBD and the other was Non-SBD. This detailed 
matching process was designed to ensure that any difference in the crime rates could be 
attributed to the SBD status, as opposed to any extraneous variables such as the age of the 
Properties or the tenure of the residents. The results of this analysis revealed that the incidence 
rates (number of crime events divided by the number of properties) of both total crime and 
burglary alone were lower within the SBD sample. The total crime rate was 34% higher within 
the Non-SBD sample and the burglary rate was 71% higher within the Non-SBD sample. 
Although the differences between the rates within the two samples were not statistically 
significant at the level of 0.05, they did verge on statistical significance (probabilities of 0.1 for 
total crime and 0.16 for burglary). The findings were very similar when the analysis of 
incidence was replaced with prevalence (the proportion of dwellings which were offended 
against at least once). The results revealed that both total crime and burglary rates were higher 
within the Non-SBD sample. The total crime rate was 19% higher within the Non-SBD sample, 
and the burglary rate was 78% higher within the Non-SBD sample. Although these results again 
did not reveal a statistically significant difference, the difference did verge upon statistical 
significance (probabilities of 0.06 for total crime and 0.1 for burglary). 
In contrast to the detailed level of analysis, the broad-based level of analysis simply compared 
So SBD estates with the nearest 50 Non-SBD estates irrespective of intervening variables such 
as housing tenure or age of property. The results were much less positive for the SBD scheme 
and revealed very little difference between crime rates within the SBD and Non-SBD sample. 
Incidence rates for total crime and burglary were very slightly higher within the SBD sample, 
however, these differences were not statistically significant (probabilities of 0.43 for total crime 
and 0.21 for burglary). Prevalence rates showed a very similar pattern, with both total crime 
and burglary rates slightly higher within the SBD sample. Again these differences were not 
statistically reliable (0.21 for total crime and 0.12 for burglary). 
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Although the results of the detailed analysis (the level of analysis with the most rigorous 
methodology) were positive, overall findings were not as substantial as might have been 
expected. Further analysis of the burglary rates, paying particular attention to the year in which 
the S13D estates were built, revealed that SBD estates built prior to 1996 were experiencing 
much higher levels of burglary than their Non-SBD matched pairs. Yet, the estates built in 1997 
and 1998 were experiencing less than half of the burglaries of the Non-SBD sample. As many of 
the standards of physical security required within SBD dwellings were upgraded in 1999, it is 
likely that a sample selected from a more recent time period would have revealed much more 
Positive findings than those presented within this thesis. 
In an attempt to avoid a focus upon police recorded statistics, a victimisation survey was 
conducted with a sample of 2SO SBD and 250 Non-SBD residents selected from the estates 
utilised within the detailed analysis. The results supported the findings of the detailed analysis 
and revealed that burglary, theft of vehicle, damage to motor vehicle and theft from outside the 
dwelling were higher within the Non-SBD sample. The only differences verging on statistical 
stnificance were burglary (0.06) and theft from outside the dwelling (0.08). The crime 
categories theft from vehicle and theft of pedal cycle were higher within the SBD sample, but 
these differences were not statically significant. As well as measuring crimes experienced by 
residents, the survey asked questions relating to fears and concerns about crime and disorder 
issues. The results revealed that SBD residents felt safer than their Non-SBD counterparts 
wh"stWalking alone on the streets as well as at home alone at night. The difference between 
levels of fear experienced by SBD and Non-SBD residents whilst walking alone on the streets at 
night was statistically significant (O. OS), whilst the differences in levels of fear whilst home 
alone at night was not (0.18). SBD residents were less worried about becoming a victim of 
burglary or vehicle crime than their Non-SBD counterparts. However, they were more worried 
than their Non-SBD counterparts about becoming a victim of mugging or racially motivated 
attacks. SBD residents were more likely than Non-SBD residents to feel that both noisy 
, e'ghbours and teenagers hanging around were a very big problem. However, SBD residents 
'were less likely than their Non-SBD counterparts to feel that vandalism or drug use were very 
big problems on their estate. 
Ile findings from the residents' survey revealed that SBD residents experience lower levels of 
burglary, theft of vehicle, damage to vehicle and theft from outside the dwelling - supporting 
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the findings of the detailed analysis. As well as experiencing lower levels of crime, SBD 
residents appear to feel safer in their home and on the streets surrounding their home than 
Non-SBD residents and worry less about becoming a victim of property crimes such as burglary 
and vebicle crime. 
Improving the SBD scheme: 
Alive to the dangers of luxuriating in the success of a crime reduction measure without seeking 
to Maximise understanding and consequent improvement of performance (and even 
Maintenance of current performance in the face of changing crime threats and opportunities), 
the thesis proposed to identify current weaknesses within the scheme and to develop its value as 
a clime reduction tool. 
'Me perceived need to identify the current weaknesses within the SBD scheme, and to offer 
tools for improving its current status, evolved throughout the thesis and whilst the original aims 
'aY have remained the same, the methodology of painstakingly recording the environmental 
attributes of IOS8 homes provided the author with the insight to offer a simpler, more user 
friendly system for practitioners who would be assessing this number of properties on a regular 
basis. That is not to say that the final product compromises on quality, rather it is designed with 
Inore understanding of the practical issues at stake. 
Several immediate methods for improying the scheme were identified. The first lay in the 
identification that although the SBD scheme was designed with CPTED principles in mind, 
these had not been exhaustively implemented within the sample selected for this analysis. 
Analysis of the sample of 1058 SBD and Non-SBD homes revealed that although they 
experienced lower levels of crime and disorder, they were achieving this in spite of, rather than 
because of the environmental factors measured in the OERF checklist. When the Burgess 
Scores 'Which were awarded to each property, based upon the criminogenic environmental 
factors which it possessed, were aggregated to the level of SBD status, the results revealed that 
the SBD sample had consistently higher Burgess Scores than the Non-SBD sample. For all crime 
categories, the mean Burgess Score for the SBD sample was +4.8, for the Non-SBD sample it 
was 4.4. When burglary alone was analysed, the results revealed again that the SBD sample 
had a higher Burgess Score (+3.3) than the Non-SBD sample (-4.9). As analysis had validated 
the Burgess Score as a method for identifying likelihood of victimisation, this finding suggests 
that the SBD scheme has been swimming against the tide - reducing crime whilst estates 
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Possess a greater presence of the environmental factors which are associated with the risk of 
"ictimisation. A more rigorous implementation of its own principles would act to further 
reduce the crime levels amongst SBD estates. The question of why SBD works is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but in the writer's view, the results suggest that high quality security 
features are imphcatcd. 
A second point upon which the scheme could be improved relates to the findings of the MO 
trawl. Whilst SBD clearly reduces opportunities for crime, offenders are still succeeding in 
`ffending against SBD properties. Analysis of offenders' Mo revealed that the same proportion 
Of SBD as Non-SBD properties were broken into through an insecure door or window. 
Therefore, the issue of improvement is not necessarily to increase crime prevention advice and 
education. Window and door locks were being jemmied, ground floor windows were being 
smashed with unsophisticated tools such as bricks, stones and even garden gnomesl Should this 
be Possible? Those who certify products to the standards required by SBD suggest that rigorous 
testing ensures that doors and windows should not be easily overcome. Are offenders' methods 
so very different from those employed by the testers? If so, should they seek advice from 
Offender accounts? Are landlords failing to replace broken windows and doors with those of the 
required standard? Are they failing to install them in the first place? Or are MO accounts 
inaccurate, with residents reluctant to admit that they left the door open for fear of nullifying 
insurance claims, thus stating that the offender broke in rather than sneaked in? At present, a 
housing estate awarded SBD status by the local ALO becomes a statistic (one more SBD 
development) but no longer warrants concern. Although resources are limited, measures 
should be introduced to allow spot-checks upon SBD developments to ensure that standards are 
being maintained (if they were implemented in the first place). Without the threat that the 
award can be revoked, standards, and therefore the overall performance of the scheme, may 
fade. 
A final suggestion for improvement relates to the ability of the SBD scheme to prevent and 
therefore reduce repeat victimisation. The findings from this thesis suggest that whilst SBD 
"Orks to modestly reduce rates of initial victimisation, once that crime has occurred SBD 
Properties become more vulnerable than their Non-SBD counterparts. The detailed analysis of 
2S SBD and 2S Non_SBD estates revealed that repeat burglary (but not repeat total crime) was 
higher within the SBD sample. The findings from the Broad-Based analysis revealed higher 
levels Of total crime concentration within the SBD sample (but not repeat burglary). These 
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findings were further supported (and explained) through the analysis of environmental risk 
factors which preceded the development of the Burgess Checklist. 10S8 properties were 
assessed using the OERF table to establish which features were present. Environmental factors 
were cross tabulated with prior victimisation to establish which features were associated with 
crime prone homes. Although the findings from the analysis of first burglary and first 
victimisation were comparable, the analysis of repeat victimisation revealed complex findings. 
The results revealed that 13 environmental factors were associated with the risk of burglary (at 
the statistical significance level of 0.1) and 17 environmental factors were associated with the 
risk Of victimisation (all crime). These included being located adjacent to open space, being 
located on a leaky cul-de-sac or a through road, being located on an estate with high levels of 
litter and graffiti and being located within the awareness space of others. However, the findings 
relating to repeat victimisation were not straightforward. Factors which were associated with 
single victimisation were either absent when analysing repeat victimisation, or they were 
statistically significant yet the relationship was in a different direction. For example, there was 
a statistically significant relationship between a property being victimised and it NOT being 
overlooked at the front. When multiple victimisation was analysed, the results revealed that 
there was a statistically significant relationship between victimisation and BEING overlooked at 
the front. 
At first glance these findings appear contradictory; however, once considered in more detail, 
they make intuitive sense and are supported by other criminological research (Ellingworth et a], 
1997, Ashton et al, 1998). Offenders often select a target based upon external cues such as the 
Proximity of the property to a nearby footpath - 'how easily can I escape unnoticed from this 
target? This explains the presence of environmental factors relating to access, occupation and 
surveillance in the list of significant features associated with first burglary and first victimisation. 
However, once the offender has burgled the property, they can base their decision to re-offend 
upon internal cues such as lifestyle and wealth, explaining the absence of external cues within 
the list of significant features associated with repeatedly victimised homes. These findings have 
practical implications. The principles of environmental criminology upon which SBD is based 
appear to be restricted to preventing initial and not repeat victimisation. If SBD is to provide a 
complete crime reduction package, it must address this deficit by introducing measures to 
reduce repeat victimisation which extend being the limits of design of the environment. Police 
forces currently implement measures to prevent repeat victimisation, ensuring that SBD estates 
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are Prioritised in the delivery of repeat victimisation packages would address this weakness 
within the scheme. 
'Vhilst recognising the effectiveness of the SBD scheme and the potential for improvements 
Upon its current crime reduction performance. The thesis aimed to enhance its value amongst 
crime reduction practitioners through developing a simple, transparent risk-assessment 
checklist to identify properties which are vulnerable to victimisation. Although there exists an 
abundance of literature and practical tools for identifying the risk of offending and victimisation, 
such tools are relatively scarce when concerned with the vulnerability of the built environment. 
Although risk-assessment tools do exist within the field of designing out crime, it was felt that 
SUM 'cient justification existed for the development of an additional measure. The Burgess 
Checklist was based upon the Burgess method of data analysis. This process was described in 
S'rnOn (1971) and an application in a criminological context was described in Nuttall et a]. 
(1977). Essentially, the score is derived from the difference between the mean rate of crime 
suffered generally, and the rate of crime suffered by homes with a particular characteristic. 
"Me analysis involved selecting the environmental risk factors which showed statistical 
"gnificance, subtracting the average risk from the percentage risk associated with each feature, 
awarding a Burgess Score to each environmental factor and then validating this method by 
ensuring that the properties with the highest Burgess Scores actually experienced the highest 
incidence and prevalence of crime. The resulting checklist, presented within this thesis will 
allow Practitioners to score proposed properties and make decisions regarding their suitability, 
" to score existing houses and offer advice to residents, landlords and ultimately the police 
regarding the most effective means of directing crime reduction resources. 
Selling the SBD scheme: 
The benefits of the SBD scheme may appear obvious to those who are tasked with reducing and 
F"Ienting crime, but for those whose primary concerns are not crime reduction (profits/buyer 
aPPeal/aesthetics), how can policy makers increase the appeal of this scheme? Analysis of 
current incentives to build properties which are designed to reduce crime revealed that social 
housing providers are currently offered financial incentives by the Housing Corporation. These 
include Enhanced Quality Assessments as well as the Supplementary Multiplier for 
Su'tainability. Further investigations revealed that for those whose properties are funded 
through the Housing Corporation, building to SBD is likely to become an essential criterion. 
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Whilst there have been extensive moves towards increasing the incentives for RSLs to build to 
the S13D standard, those developing housing for the private sector appear to have been 
forgotten. Potential incentives for private developers include buyer appeal and increased 
profits. 
In relation to the cost-effectiveness of this crime reduction initiative, the most prudent 
conclusion is that, currently, SBD costs are finely balanced with the anticipated costs of crime 
Prevented. The reader is, however, reminded that the body of this thesis is based upon the 
notion of the significant improvability of SBD performance. That being so, any progress has the 
Potential to make the initiative cost-effective, providing capital costs do not increase 
siglif"cantly. As SBD practice becomes more refined, economies win become possible. As new 
security technologies become more widespread and cheaper, they can reasonably be 
incorporated into SBD specifications while remaining ahead of the game in cost terms. 
'V&Ist these findings may render it difficult to sell the scheme to private developers on the 
Premise that additional costs will be reaped, the analysis of buyer appeal revealed extremely 
Positive findings. House buyers were asked to rank the seven features: fitted carpets, turf to the 
front and back gardens, built-in kitchen appliances, en-suite facilities in the master bedroom, a 
separate downstairs toilet and a secure environment according to their importance in 
influencing their decision to purchase a property. They were also asked whether or not they 
would expect these features to be included in the purchase price. The results revealed that not 
Only is secure environment the most important feature when purchasing a property, but house 
buyers do not expect this benefit to be included at no additional cost. The suggestion that a 
rn'tion of increased security may be equated in a house buyer's mind with a high crime area, 
'as refuted with the finding that for 47% of respondents, the mention of high levels of security 
would actually influence them to buy the property -a further 42% stating that it would not 
a'Tect their decision. These findings suggest that far from being dissuaded by the mention of 
high security, house buyers view a secure environment as the most important feature when 
Purchasing a property, are content to pay an additional premium for this benefit and would be 
influenced to buy a property following the mention of enhanced levels of security. 
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Chapter Eight 
Lessons Learned 
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Chapter Eight - Part One 
Implications of Findings 
Research presented within this thesis suggests that houses built to SBD standards are less 
vulnerable to crime. There is however, a need to avoid complacency and to ensure that SBD 
standards continue to evolve and improve. This thesis was improvement oriented. The desired 
result being an improved clarity regarding the environmental factors which predict 
I'ictimisation, a clearer understanding of the enablers and constraints involved in building to the 
SBD standard and a focus upon ways in which existing standards can be improved. 
For those whose job it is to make decisions about planning applications regarding the design and 
layout of residential housing, there still remains a conflict in both advice and demands. Whilst 
criminological research warns of the dangers involved in increasing access and permeability, 
design gyidance encourages the walkable neighbourhood (Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, 1998). In many instances communication and discussion between 
Planners and ALO/CPDAs has led to a sensible compromise, Uking into account both 
sustainability and the need to encourage pedestrian movement whilst at the same time avoiding 
unnecessary victimisation risks. What appears to be an initial conflict can result in agencies 
realising that they are singing from the same hymn sheet and that their ultimate aim is the same. 
"'Other instances the contradictory guidance has led to conflict. Section 17 requires CDRPs to 
"exercise their functions with due regard to ... the need to 
do all that they reasonably can to 
reduce crime and disorder within their area" (Great Britain, 1998a). Criminological research 
suggests reducing unnecessary footpaths, minimising access and egress and limiting 
Permeability. Planners are advised to ensure that neighbourhoods are permeable and encourage 
tIlrOugh movement from pedestrians. Being stuck between a rock and a hard place will not aid 
the reduction of crime and only wastes the precious time of crime reduction practitioners. 
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will not only clarify the position regarding 
environmental factors and crime risk, but that they will assist in the future enhancement of the 
S13D scheme as well as identifying the levers through which to encourage its use. Issues to be 
addressed include ensuring that SBD standards are implemented in the field, incorporating 
repeat victimisation packages into its standards and considering the threat to revoke the scheme 
for developments found failing to maintain the SBD standards. Levers to be used to encourage 
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its use include its effectiveness as a crime reduction measure as well as its appeal to potential 
house buyers. Finally, it is hoped that the introduction of the Burgess Checldist as a risk- 
assessment tool, will allow crime reduction practitioners to standardise the measurement of 
risk, as well as directing resources towards properties most vulnerable to crime. 
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Chapter Eight - Part Two 
Contributions to the flield 
Smith (2000) highlighted the appeal of SCP interventions over long-term, resource intensive 
offender based interventions in the persuasive statement that 'It is easy to see that happy 
families tend not to produce criminals. It is hard to see how public policy can decree that family 
relationships be constructive and positive" (p. 149). It is hoped that this thesis has identified the 
risk factors associated with crime-prone homes, but more importantly, offered practitioners a 
tool to address these. Although much has been written on the subject of designing out crime, 
"nany studies still fail to inform practitioners of what actually works. As Laycock (2001) 
highlights, many academics "simply refuse to say what works" (p. 2 1). 1 sincerely hope that this 
thesis has avoided this weakness and has provided a clear message as to what has been tested, 
lvhat has been found and how this can be applied in practice. Although such conjecture leaves 
itself open to refutation, hiding behind what Laycock (2001) refers to as "impenetrable text" 
(p. 6) is neither valuable nor helpful, and as Popper (1963) suggested, we learn the most from 
'Dur Mistakes. 
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Chapter Eight - Part Three 
Methodological Reflections 
One of the frustrations of conducting a piece of work over a five year period is looking back and 
"Vishing that you had known then what you know now. I have evolved with this thesis and 
Othough I believe that the methodology is sound, there are several areas which could have been 
improved. Although these have been highlighted at the relevant points throughout the text, 
they are repeated as a summary below. 
7he housing estates included within this sample were selected almost five years ago. To ensure 
that sufficient crime data e3dsted post-development, they were, even at that stage, at least two 
Years old. SBD standards have improved throughout this ensuing period and so too has the 
experience of ALO/CPDAs, many of who would refuse an estate in 2004 which had been 
granted SBD status in 1999. For this reason, it is suggested that future research should bring this 
evaluation up to date, covering SBD properties built between 1998 and 2004. 
Axiother criticism of this thesis may be that it has spread itself too thinly and rather than 
conducting a more detailed evaluation of the SBD scheme, it has focused upon whether the 
scherne works, how it can be improved and how it can be marketed to a wider audience. The 
trade-off between evaluation and improvement was a difficult decision to make and as the thesis 
progressed so did its aims. Following months of visiting over a thousand residential properties it 
soon became clear that a simple 'yes it works', or 'no it does not work', would be a wasted 
opportunity. It became clear that practitioners (who spend almost every day carrying out the 
task' which I conducted over a few months) needed a tool to help predict and avoid risk, and 
t1lat for this tool to be used it must be simple, clear and transparent. 
Other methodological weaknesses include the use of the term "secure environment" within the 
house buyers' survey, which could be open to misinterpretation from different respondents. 
The restriction of variables in matching the 2S pairs to housing tenure, environment risk 
factors, age and location, rather than including socio-demographic variables or RSL housing 
allocation policies also leaves the positive findings open to the criticism thatalternative variables 
may have influenced the differences in crime rates. 
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linally, a larger sample would have been preferable for the analysis of recorded crime data as 
well as the residents' survey. Several environmental factors showed a statistically significant 
association with victimisation, yet the sample of properties containing those variables were too 
small to warrant a valid analysis. Again, the limit to 2S SBD and 2S Non-SBD estates for the 
majority of the research involved a trade-off between quality and quantity. The time taken to 
conduct individual assessments of over one thousand properties would not have been possible 
With a larger sample. 
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Chapter Eight - Part Four 
Suggestions for Further Research 
As has been referred to, additional research would compliment the findings of this thesis. 
Suggestions for further research include updating the sample to include houses built post- 1998, 
conducting a more thorough analysis of the crimes committed against SBD homes (as compared 
to Non_SBD homes) covering temporal differcrices, an in-depth analysis of the property stolen 
frOrn S13D and Non-SBD properties, carrying out a more comprehensive cost-effective analysis 
and developing a standard measure of permeability. The fixidings revealed within this thesis also 
indicate that ffirther research into the influence of SBD upon offender decision malcing, 
Particularly in relation to the influence this has upon selected point of entry and escape, would 
be beneficial. 
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Chapter Eight - Part Five 
A final word 
It feels appropriate to conclude this thesis with a note on what I have learned both personally 
and Professionally from this journey. When I began this thesis almost five years ago, I was a 
recent graduate working as a Research Assistant at the University of Huddersfield. My youth 
gave me the passion and enthusiasm for the subject area, as well as the determination to 
Produce a thesis which would be practical, as opposed to a tome gathering dust on a shelf, or 
Worse still -a doorstop in somebody's office (it has been knownl). Working alongside 
esteemed criminologists provided the inspiration and the practical advice needed at the onset of 
such a task, and most importantly, this period allowed me the time required to conduct the 
`najoritY of the fieldwork. By Chapter four, I was no longer a recent graduate (three years to 
write three chaptersl) and working as a Senior Consultant for a crime reduction charity, 
Providing training and consultancy support for multi-agency partnerships. This provided an 
insight into criminology in practice and gave me an understanding of what practitioners want, 
and more important, Y, what they do not want. By Chapter five, I had become a mum. This gave 
Ine perspective and was a period in which I re-captured the passion I had felt when I began. I 
could see why I had started this task and what the implications could be for society. Finally, as I 
"'as completing Chapter eight I developed a mystery illness (initial indications suggest Guillan 
13arr' Syndrome). Tlds taught me that my timing has always been lousyl Above all, I have 
learned that conducting a PhD is an honour and a privilege. The ability to spend five years 
Perfecting one research project, of being solely responsible for every element from knocking on 
doors and stuffing envelopes, to analysing results and developing conclusions is surely a luxury 
unlikely to be repeated (I hopel). 
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Appendix I 
Current SBD Standards 
DOORS & LOCKS 
11S: PAS 23-1: 1999: General peiformance requirements for door assemblies. Part 1, single 
leaf, 
external door assemblies (presently excluding annexes). 
An environmental performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set, 
is fit for purpose. The security element is basic and not sufficient for police and insurers 
Purposes. The environmental protection element is relevant to the police requirement for PAS 
24. 
13S: EN 1303: 1998: Building Hardware Cylinder for locks requirements & specified test 
"'ethOds. The minimum standard for lock cylinders for multi-point locking on external or 
entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police 
service - The effectiveness of the lock depends on the quality of the door, frame and other 
hardware 
not covered or tested by this standard and which may fail before the cylinder. 
HS 3621: 1998: Specification for thief resistant locks. The minimum standard for locks on 
elternal or entrance doors acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police 
service. The effectiveness of the lock depends on the quality of the door, fi-ame and other 
hardware 
not covered or tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock. 
13S: PAS 24-1: 1999: Enhanced security performance requirements for door assemblies. Part I 
single leaf, external door assemblies. An attack test standard for door sets which certifies that a 
particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests based on 
'rnmon methods of burglary using defined sets of tools and attack time. This is the minimum 
police requirement for SBD homes. 
LPS 117S: Issue 4,1998: Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of 
building 
components, strong-points and security enclosures. This includes doors for 
cOr"mcrcial premises and Mgher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the 
Police. The standard has categories 1 -6; Cat. 1 being simple attack tests and Cat. 6 relevant to 
extreme attack risk. See note under General Security. 
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WINDOWS 
IRS: 7950: Specification for enhanced security performance of casements, tilt/turn windows for 
domestic applications. This is the standard required for all SBD windows to meet the security 
specifications for domestic premises. 
The fOllowing BS references are fit for purpose standards required to support BS: 79SO 
certification for relevant SBD windows. 
13S 4873: 1986: Specification for aluminium windows. 
IIS 7412: 1991: Specificati. for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles. 
HS 644-1: 1989: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types. 
"VVIF: TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme. 
HS 6S 10: 1984: SPecification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors. 
LPS 117S: Issue 4,1998: Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of 
building components, strong-points and security enclosures. This includes window security for 
higher risk premises. See under General Security. 
GENERAL SECURIIY 
CO"*IPUTERS: LPS 1214: Issue 2: 1996: Specification for testing and classifying physical 
Protection devices for personal computers and similar equipment. 
')ATAHASE REGISTRATION: LPS 1224: issue 2,1999: Requirements for secure database 
r-s database registers for the 191sters. Specifications to ensure the viability and effectivene s of 
recording of property and its owner. It ensures the database is available 24 hours a day and that 
data is held securely and in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
PROPERTY AURKING: LPS 122S. - issue 3,1999: Specification for testing and classifying 
asset n1arking systems. Specifies requirement for the composition and performance such that, 
'ý'hen used according to manufacturers instructions the system may: Enable the marked asset to 
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be traced to the legal owner via a secure database register linked to the system employed and 
act as a deterrent by virtue of its existence. 
SECURITy OF BUILDINGS: LPS 1175: Issue 4,1998: Specification for testing and 
classifying the burglary resistance of building components, strong-points and security 
enclosures. Caters for any product or system designed to prevent unlawful access to buildings 
by mechanical means. The standard has categories 1-6, Cat. 1 being simple forms of attack and 
Cat. 6 relevant to extreme risks. The attack time and type of tools used increase with the 
category rating. The criteria were developed to satisfy the security needs of Insurers, police, 
901'ernrnent or other specifiers. 
SA10KE GENERATING DEVICES: BS 7939: 1999: Smoke Security Devices - Manufacture, 
installation & maintenance. Devices which, on intrusion to premises, generate non-toxic smoke 
to disorientate intruders and prevent or reduce loss. 
VEHICLE SECURITY 
STOLEN VEHICLE TRACKING: THATCHAM Q Report: An evaluation and test 
confir'Ming that a stolen vehicle tracidng system is accurate, effective, fit for purpose and meets 
criteria to gain a police response to recover the vehicle following theft. 
Note: 13S refers to British Standards, LpS refers to Loss Prevention Certification Board 
Standards. BWF: TWAS refers to the British Woodworldng Federation TWA Standards, and 
"hatcharn 
refers to the Motor insurance Repair Research Centre 
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire Utilised in Residents' Survey 
"This questionnaire is part of a research pr-qject 
devigned to ascertain YOUR opinions on the 
levels of crime and divorder in thiv area. 
Please couldyouspare 5 minutes to tell me 
about YOUR experiences qf crime 
and disorder in this area and YOUR. /eelings of 
sqp. ýy in this house and neighbourhood 
e b0ormation thalyou give me will be treated 
as completety cot? fidential andwill 
tWreme& valuable as part of'a project which 
covers the whole of If est Yorkshire. 
I hope you willfindthelime it) take parl in 
this survoýjy and would like lo lhank you 
In advance. /or your help and co-operation 
Rachel Armitage (Researcher, Universitý%, of 
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Questionnaire Number 
TIIE'FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATE TO IIOUSFI fOLD DETAI LS 
Q Que uestioll 
How many years have you 
lived at thts'address'? 
(please tick relevant box) 
Less than I year F-7 
I but less than 2 Years 
1-7 
' but less than 5 Years E-7 
5 but less than W years 
17 
10 years or ni ore F-I 
How many male adults live 
in this household 
(16 or over) 
Question 3 
How many female adults live 
in this household 
(16 or over) 
Question 4 
How many children under 18 
live in this household I1 
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Question 5 
During the last 13-14 months, have you or anyone else Yes 
1-7 
in your household had their car, van, motorcycle, or other 
motor vehicle stolen or driven away without permission No El 
Question 6 
_ 
(If Yes) How many times has it happened 
Question 7 
During this time period, has anyone ever made an attemr)t Yes 
to steal a motor vehicle belonging to you or anyone else 
in your household No 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened 
I 
During the last 13-14 months have you or anyone else in Yes F-1 
your household had anything stolen off their vehicle or 
out of it(e. g. parts of the vehicle, personal possessions) ? No 
17 
Question 10 
(If yes) How many times has this happened 
3 
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rhe following questions concern things that may have happened over the 13-14 month period 
-since March 1998 in which you may have been the victim of a crime or offence 
Question 11 
During this time period, has anyone ever made an attempt Yes 
to steal from a motor vehicle belonging to you or anyone 
else in Your household ? No 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened 
Question 13 
During the last 13-14 months have you or anyone else Yes El 
in your household had their vehicle tampered with or 
dam aged by vandals or people out to stcal ? No 
F-I 
Question 14 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened ? 
During this tim e period, has anyone made an attempt Yes ED 
to damage or tamper with a vehicle belongirig to you 
or anyone else in your household ? No 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened ? 
QjTuestion 17 
During the last 13-14 months have you or anyone Yes F7 
else in your household had a bicycle stolen ? 
No F-1 
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(If Yes) How many times has this happened 
Question 19 
During this time period, has anyone made an attempt o Yes F--j 
steal a bicycle that belonged to you or somebody else in your ho h ld ? F 7 use o No 
- 
Question 20 
(If Yes) How many times has 0-iis happened 7 
Question 21 
During the last 13-14 months has anyone broken into Yes 
Your house/flat without permission and stolen, or 
tried to steal anything ? No F7 
Question 22 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened ? 
Question 23 
During the same time period, has anyone made an attempl Yes E-1 
to break into your house/flat 
No F-I 
Question 24 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened ? 
5 
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Question 25 
During the last 13-14 months has anything that belonged Yes F7 
to someone in your household been stolen from OUTSIDE 
the house/flat e. g. from garage, shed or garden ? No 
E: 1 
Do not include mi&- bottle theft 
Question 26 
(If Yes) How many timcs has this happcned ? 
Question 27 
During the same time period, has anyone made an attemr)t to Yes 
17 
steal something from OUTSIDE your house/flat ? 
No F1 
u! estion 
(If Yes) How many times has this happened 7 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATE TO YOUR FEAR OF CRIME 
Question 29 
V f El How safe do you feel walking in this area after dark ? ery sa e 
(please lick relevant bcx) Fairly safe El 
A bit unsafe 
Very unsafe 
6 
251 A 
I 
Question 30 
How safe do you feel when you are alone in your Very safe 
home at night ? 
(please tick relevant box) Fairly safe 
A bit unsafe 
ED 
Very unsafe 
F-7 
6 th Uig 
Mos' 6f us'ýrOrxy at some time or other ýbouf bemg'a'vict "of crinie, 'Using o e' fe fbllOWi 
Phmse's, ý 6ouldiod let'me kýioA how wor'riiedý'ou arý about c-ertain ýrimes, ý 
Question 31 
How worried are you about having your home 
broken into and something stolen ? 
(please lick relevw2t box) 
Question 32 
Very worried 17 
Fairly worried 
F7 
Not very worried E71 
Not at all worried 
E-1 
How worried are you about having 
Your car stolen ? 
(please fick relevant box) 
7 
Very worried F-I 
Fairly worried 
r1 
Not very worried ED 
Not at all worried E-7 
(Not applicable) 17 
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Question 33 
How worTied are you about having Very worried 
r7 
things stolen from your car r7 
Fairly worried 
(please tick- relevant box) 
i d F7 Not very worr e 
Not at all worried 
(Not applicable) r 
-7 
Question 34 
How wonied are you about being Vezy wozTied 
F-I 
mugged or robbed ? 
Fairly worried 
E7 
(please lick relevant box) Not very worried F] 
Not at all worried ED 
Question 35 
How worried are you about being subject Very worried 
to physical attack because of your skin colour 
ethnic origin or religion ? Fairly worried 
Vease fick relevant box) Not very worried 
Not at all worried ED 
8 
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Question 36 
How much of a problem are Very big problem 
F] 
noisy neighbours or loud parties '? 
Fairly big problem I C, (plea. 5e tick relevant box) 
Not a very big problem F-I 
Not a problem at all F7 
Question 37 
flow much of a problem are Very big problem E-1 
teenagers hanging around the street 
Fairly big problem 
(please tick relevwzt box) 
N ta ver bi r ble 
F-7 
o y gp o m 
Not a problem at all F7 
Question 38 
How much of a problem is vandalism, Very big problem F7 
graffiti and deliberate damage to 
bl F i l b El property .9 
ig pro em a r y 
(please tick relevani box) Not a very big problem 
F] 
Not a problem at all 
F] 
9 
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Question 39 
How much of a problem are racially 
motivated attacks 'ý 
(please tick- relevant box) 
Very bi-, problem F 
Fairly big problem F] 
Not a very big problem 
El 
Not a problem at all E: -:: ] 
Question 40 
How much of a problem are people 
using or dealing in drugs 'ý 
(please tick relevant box) 
Very big problem E-1 
Fairly big problem 
F] 
Not a very big problem E-ý] 
Not a problem at all 
Ej 
Do you feel safer in the house in which you Yes 
are now living, compared to the previous 
Household in which you lived No 
TheSame F-I 
Question 42 
Do you feel safer in the neighbourhood in which Yes El 
you are now living, compared to the previous 
neighbourhood in which you lived? No 
(e g walking to and from the shops, F7 
10 
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Appendix 3 
RSL Interview Schedule 
Name: 
! ýOsition: 
.7 What is vour comnanv's )olicv regarding SBD 
ýýsin E 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the 
incentives of building residential 
ho * ýý to the SBD standard? 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the 
disincentives of building residential 
housing 
to the SBD standard? 
9"- 4: Have you experienced any problems with clashes 
between dilTerent 
sPec'f"Icational requirements of the Housing Corporation's 
SDS, the NHBC and 
th 
-týuirements of SBD? 
If could you t3lease describe. 
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Qu. 5: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard? 
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Appendix 4 
Interviews with RSLs 
Ly , orkshire Metropolitan Housing association I 
Position: 
. 
211- 1: What is your company's policy regarding SBD housing? 
in general terms we have adopted SBD specification and sought to achieve certification on new build schemes. We support the scheme and note the changing requirements of the housing 
corporation 
Qu. 2: What would vou consider to be the incentives of building residential 
"housin t hc SBD standa dI 
Ur Cs com e -urity that they 
feel a: sa 
ýresu: lto-ý 
y21m curit 
[0, 
Cus 
C 
el e the ipe: d le 
: 
el , of safety andT., %'C 
7ý-U, : 
1a'v i(Y. 
our 
, tom rwm ro 
I vel , 
13D yout s/y areas for ch 
: 
ho: m: e sfecurity 
ty that ey fe 
D- ren (I 'S B, 
,pII 
S- ext 
I= 
la 
, secure gardevn pla 
0tr 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of 
building residential 
h usin to SBD standard? 
There are none obvious at this time. 
Qu. 4: Have you experienced any problems with clashes between (lifTercnt 
SPCcificational requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and 
the requirements of SBD? 
7 Ir 809 could you please describe? 
I he NHBC specification is far lower than the Housing Corporation's SDS. Private 
developers 
appear less aware of the requirements and can prove inflexible or require additional costs. 
What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD? 
It is very difficult to quantify this but the extra staft and liaison time is significant. Un the 
sPecificational side many SBD requirements are now with the Housing Corporation's SDS so it 
could be argued that they are not "additional". At a push these could vary 
between LSOO - 
L. 2,000 per home - depending on existing specification 
for doors, windows, fencing, locks and 
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Company: 
association 
Ru- 1: What is your company's policy regarding SBD 
No answer provided. 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the incentives of building residential 
Lh- Ousing to the SBD standard? 
1) To provide a safe environment for residents. 2) The audit process of' having to liase with an ALO is very useful as we value their 
advice /expertise on design issues. 3) Help development of a sustainable community where people want to stay. --- 4- 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of building residential h US - Ousin too the SBD standard? 
I do not 
rThese 
are not really disincentives, more like negative i&sues. 
C 
o on us in 
I do not think that our clients are aware of what SBD is, therefore they make no demands 
n us in relation to what they require in terms of the property that they want to live in. The 
residents tend to go on word of mouth as to whether an area is good to live in. If the area is bad, building to SBD would not make these people change their minds and move in. 2) We do not market SBD. 3) Costs: If SDS standards were taken away, we would not build to SBD standard. 4) We have financial pressures from both ends. The housing corporation have reduced their 
grants (especially in the north), they are also limiting the level of rent that we can charge 
(from next year it will be in line with local earnings etc. ). This means that we are squeezed 
from both ends and if we can find places to cut costs we will. 5ý We 
-sometimes feel that there. is an inconsistency between ALO 
demands. For example, we 
were developing an estate which had phase I and phase 2. Phase 2 was simply meant to follow on from phase 1, with no re-designing. However, the ALO demands had changed from phase I to phase 2, and for phase 2 they were demanding windows in gable ends etc. 
This makes putting together a design brief ver-y difficult. 6) This year, 2 thirds of our properties will be Non-Housing Corporation funded and I third 
Housing corporation funded. The non-Housing Corporation housing will not be up to SI)S 
7) 
standards. Without public subsidy it is difficult to meet SDS standards. 
We feel that there is a north/south divide. Grants are higher in the south, and they are not 
as badly affected by the rent re-structuring. 8) Housing corporation subsidies have been reduced. If we build a scheme which fits all SDS 
_ requirements. we will be in deficit 
for about 10 years. 
Qu. 4: Have you experienced any problems with clashes between different 
sPecificational requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and th rce uIjrementsofSBD? 
Wa veUno! exnerienred anv nroblems 
Could you pleasc describc? 
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Examples might be refurbishments whcre the existing layout places constraints on what you can 
achieve. 
can do in terms of 
Qu. 5 What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard? 
What is required of'SBD has become part of what we do i. e. our design brief would aim for 
SBD. We cannot, therefore breakdown the costs 
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Company: 
association 
ýOsitiolrl: 
Qu- 1: What is your company's policy regarding SBD? 
I-Iousing environments should be safe and secure and the need for privacy must 
recognised as an important element in layout design. 
Security 
provision for internal and external environments should be appropriate for scheme location 
and building types, and should reflect advice obtained from local police ALOs. 
1r, particular, the following items should receive attention: 
a) Gates to the rear should he lockable and anti-climb fencing provided. h) Layouts should avoid through routes and hiding places. 
C) I-ayouts should maximise natural surveillance. d) Secure opening window lights should be provided. 
e) Mortice deadlocks to solid core external doors should be provided. 
need for privacy must be recognised as a most important factor in layout design. 
the public side of the dwelling, no footpath should pass within 4 metres of a 
living room 
"w Ivithout screening in the form of a wall, structure or landscaping. 
Particular reference 
Id be made to The BRE Housing Handbook and SBD. 
'BD certification must be obtained for all schemes. - Early consultation with the 
Local Crime 
Prevention Officer is advisable, prior to planning permission being obtained. 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the incentives of building residential h( - L'u-sing to the SBD standard? 
- ir-ý R'SLII must develop to SBD standards, as it is a requirement of the 
Housing Corporation's SDS. 
Failure to comply would be picked up at audit stage by the Housing 
Corporation which would 
he a serious break of SDS and could jeopardise development 
funding to a RSI. in the future. 
W. hilst small schemes do not qualify for SBD certificates, RSLs must still 
develop to the 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of 
building residential 
housing to the SBD standard? 
Qu. 4: "ave You experienced any problems with clashes 
between different 
sPecificational requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and 
the requirements of SBD? 
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No answer 
lf'O, Could you please describe? 
Q11- 5: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to SBD 
standard') 
1 detail below the extra over costs involved in SBD compliance. 
The costs are based upon extra over sums anticipated fi-om general private specification housing, for a dwelling with a net internal floor area of 85 metres square. It also assumes a plot 
siý'e of 22m x 9m (3-bedroom house). 
1- Upgrade 2 No. external doors to PAS 24 standard L294 2. Increased glazing to ground floor windows to laminated glass L 76 3. To provide a spur for future alarm and 2 No. external security lights 
L140 
4. Increased specification and height to rear fencing 
L285 
L795 
The above costs are specific to Cemetery Lane, where there has been no requirement 
for car 
parking areas to be enclosed. 
should be highlighted that the extra over cost for any scheme is site specific and can only be 
rifled once the comments of the Police ALO have been received. 
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LýIP Developments Ltd (part of Places for People Group) 
Position: 
Qu. 1: What is your company's policy regarding SBD housing? 
We specify that all our developments should be designed with advice 
from police ALOs and/or 
Crime Prevention Officers. All schemesshould seek SBD certification. 
"Owever, we recognise that in some circumstances, full SBD is not possible or practicable, 
therefore what we say is that even if we cannot get SBD certification on a particular point, all 
other features required to comply must be provided. For example, there may 
be over-riding 
design requirements that mean that access to rear gardens might not 
be SBD compliant. 
This is backed up by particular requirements on (e. g. ) entrance 
doors specifying level of 
security, as well as general advice on natural surveillance and self-policing 
layouts. 
North British/Places for People Building Standards: 
0 Site Layout: 
All open spaces to be well lit with vandal resistant lighting. 
Avoid pedestrian through routes. 
Designed to encourage natural surveillance and self-policing. Create secure private areas around individual dwellings. Paths generally to follow vehicular access routes. 
Avoid hiding places created by dense, tall planting, 
high walls anti hedges, dark comers and 
recesses. 
* Windows: 
All glazing below 800mm shall be laminated glass 
double glazing. 
0 Doors: 
All external doors to he SBIJ standard to BS1 PAS 
24-1: 1999, with all security and 
Performance testing undertaken by a UK Accreditation service 
test house. 
Doors to be minimum 4-4mm thick and door frames to 
be metal cramp fixed to structure at 
minimum 600mm centres. "ang external doors on 1 1/2 pairs of butts with secured pins. Entrance 
or front door to be fitted with automatic deadlocking rim 
lock ritted 1/3 from top of 
door, and a mortice deadlock and boxed keep kiternarked 
BS 3621: 1998, fitted 1/3 from 
bottom 
of door. 
All lock cylinders to BSEN 1303 Grade 3 incorporating anti-drill and pick resistance. 
180 degrees security peephole in main entrance 
door, together with letter plate with internal 
screen and security chain. Rear entrance doors to have mortice sash lock and 
boxed keep to BS 3621: 1998 with key 
operation to both sides and 2 key operated mortice 
bolts top and bottom, avoiding construction 
joints. 
All schemes should be designed to seek SBD certification. 
Notwithstanding a technical 
failure to achieve certification, all those other features required 
by certification shall be 
provided. 
Fencinj! shall be equivalent to BS 1722 Part 5, or Part 
6, with conc-rete posts. 
263 
Front gardens to houses and bungalows shall be enclosed with walls or railings and with 
metal gates. 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the incentives of building residential 
housin to the SBD standard? 
Goin Going through the process ensures that the designers take full account of the security aspects o 'c of 
the design -- this is as important as getting the accreditation. Also, SBD accreditation may be 
[helpful 
in marketing a site. 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of building residential 
ýOusing to the SBD standard? 
There MAY be some extra cost involved, or an insistence on full compliance may lead to 
Difficult to be specific, as we specify compliant fittings (windows, doors, 
locks) anyway. There 
must be some design cost but I think it is insignificant. 
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LThe Ridings Housine association 
I 
Position: 
Business E 
Qu- 1: What is your company's policy reording SBD housing? 
Meeting 's design brief and it is a the St st7atýdards a requirement in our company 
sPe, cirication for all new build houses. 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the incentives of building residential housing to the SBD standard? 
The incentive for RSLs to build to SBD is the requirement for safety and security in the Housing 
Corporation SDS. To obtain grant funding RSLs have to comply with SDS. An essential 
requirement in SDS is for external doors, frames, fixings and 
locking to meet SBD standards 
'-A .-.. II 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of 
building residential 
hOusine to thec%RD hv nesion standard? 
lf so, could you vlease describe? 
QIJ- 5: What are the additional costs of building residential 
housing to the SBD 
standard') 
The additional costs in building to SBD standards on average is L750 per property, 
depending 
on the floor area. 
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Qu. 4: Have you experienced any problems with clashes between different 
sPecificational requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and 
the requirements of SBD? 
Sadeh Lok f lousin(-, association 
Position: 
Development Officer 
Qu. 1: What is your comEanZ's policy regarding SBD housing? 
Security provision for our tenants is of prime importance when considering the 
design of our 
new build schemes and we aim to achieve SBD certification. 
We confirm to the Housing Corporation when bidding for a grant that our new build schemes 
Will achieve SBD certification at which point it becomes auditable. 
Qu. 2: What would you consider to be the incentives of 
building residential 
housing to the SBD standard? 
Qu. 3: What would you consider to be the disincentives of 
building residential 
housing to the SBD standard? 
Qu. 4: Have you experienced any problems with clashes 
between different 
sPe-ciricational requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and 
line requirements of SBD? 
W, So, cou I'd" you lease describe? you p 
Qu. 5: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard? 
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Appendix 5 
Cost Information Provided by Architects 
and Quantity Surveyors 
-Ms ofthe general layout, SBD would not influence our costs. We would go about it in 
way as a 00,000 3 bedroom private property. 
Fhe additional costs would include: 
I) Fencing (1800 mrn on the boundary but not on the intermediate fencing); 
2) PAS 23/34 doors. These cost about L4-500. Non-SBD doors would cost half this price; 
3) Windows on ground floor would be laminate, these would cost about 50% more than 
standard glazing; 
4) Gates (with padlocks); 
5) Trellising; 
6) Natural Surveillance /layout of the estate is no extra cost. We know at the start that we 
have to fit 116 4 bedroom properties in and there is no question over that, so we just make 
sure that we design with natural surveillance in mind right from the start; 
7) Change in the road colour/texture (no extra cost); 
3) 1 would estimate that it costs approximately L1 000 -L1,500 extra per dwelling. 
In term-, of our personnel costs, it would be almost no extra cost now that we have been doing 
it for 5/6 years. A few years ago, when we first started, it might have been something like an 
extra 2 hours (LSO an hour) for researching what was required etc. 
do not add any money on to the fees fbr doing a SBD estate. 
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Qu. 1: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard') 
Seeger, Moorhouse A 
Qu. 1: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard? 
cost of building to SBD standard is approximately L2,500 - L3 
Walls & Railings for in-curtilage parking. 
Car parking space. 
1800mm fencing at rear. 
Alarm. 
Lighting. 
Windows/Doors. 
OU do not lose out in terms ofhouse density - 
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Company: 
Borough Council 
Qu. 1: What are the additional costs of building residential housing to the SBD 
standard? 
i ne interviewee is respOnSiblejoT the external development oj'SBD and Non-SBD housing estates, 
the injýrmation is limited to costs such as lighting, parking, landscaping andjencing. 
All information relates to the below example of a semi-detached property on a regeneration 
, scheme within Bradford (plot 18). 
1.8 metre wooden fencing surrounds the rear boundary of the property. 25milimetre gaps 
between each paling, this has 2 functions, 1) To allow wind through, 2) To allow visibility 
both in and out, i. e. to avoid the problem of intruders getting in and feeling that they are 
then free to carry on unobserved. The palings are on the outside to remove the step ladder 
effect of the horizontal wooden strips. I. Orn fencing (non-SBD option) would cost L26.40 
per m2 (this includes 25% & 11% on-costs i. e. this is the total cost including labour etc. ). 
The total cost of 1.8m fencing (SBD option) is L33.38 per m2, the difference being 
L6.98 per m2. 
The 1.8m lockable gate would cost L53.32 each (inc. on costs), there would be no gate on 
a non-SBD property. So this total is an enhanced cost. 
All -street lighting would be upgraded on adopted highways. This would include the post 
and the lantern. This is a difficult cost to attribute solely to SBD, for example, if the Local 
Authority were upgrading lighting as part of their maintenance program, this is the standard 
they would upgrade to. However, in this case there were no foreseeable plans to upgrade 
so the costs were attributable to SBD. The cost per lamppost including column, 1 50-watt 
lamp and Yorkshire electricity supply /maintenance would be VOOO per lamppost. i 
lamppost is required for every 30 metres of road. 
In-curtilage parking costs approximately L1200 per house. The double gates to the 
driveway would cost L228.75 
Front fencing. This would be metal fencing (durability) and is not strictly a SBD necessity. 
This would cost L68.45 (inc. on costs) per m2. 
The legal costs of closing a footpath on a refurbishment estate is approximately LIOOO per 
footpath. 
No extra costs for change in road colour. 
A typical property length would be: 
Wooden fencing (1.8m) = 32 metres. 
1 gate. 
1 pair of metal gates. 
0 19 metres of metal fencing at front. 
There are no extra personnel costs involved in building to SBD standard. 
There are no reductions in cost involved in building to SBD standard (excluding the benefits of 
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Appendix 6 
Interview Schedule - Housing Corporation 
Date: 
Nalne: 
POsition: 
Can You explain the process of applying for Housing Corporation funding? 
At present SBD is only a recommended itcm on your SDS. What arc the reasons 
for it beinL: y excluded from the list of Essential Criteria? 
Uan you give any examples of wherc achieving the SDS would not be possibic? 
Are you aware of any problems with clashes between different specificational 
requirements of the Housing Corporation's SI)S, the NHBC and the requirements 
Of SBD? 
IF ý 
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Lan You explain the decision to after the SDS? 
Are there any plans to chanee the SDS in the near future? 
VVould it be feasible for the Housing Corporation to withdraw funding/demand 
action if RSLs did not maintain standards? (For example, I have seen extremely badly managed estates which are still labelled SBD, who should be responsible for thi, -n 
Several RSLs have mentioned 'financial pressures from both ends' i. e. reduction 
Of grants (especially in the North), plus limits to the level of rent that they can 
charge. The phrase 'squeezed from both ends' has been used. What is your 
? 2, inion of this? 
Another RSL stated that due to reductions in Housing Corporation funding, 
When they build a scheme to SDS, this leaves them in deficit for 10 years. What is 
Your view of this comment? 
fý 
other comments: 
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F..! 
Vhat, in your view, are the additional costs of building to the SBD standard? _ 
Appendix 7 
Interview with Housing Corporation 
Date: 
Position: 
At present, SBD is only a recommended item on your SDS. What are the reasons for it being excluded from the list of Essential Criteria? 
are no reasons whv SBD cannot be an essential criterion. We have been waitine for 
get a good press. For example, some people are very positive, others are very negative. 
31se managing the scheme will look at a checklist and say 'you've only done 95% of the things 
this list so you cannot be awarded SBD' and you get nothing. This is a frustration for many 
:i the, emergence of ACPO CPI Ltd., I feel more confident that if a client has a complaint 
oi 
tuht 
b ng turned down for SBD they have someone to appeal to. I feel that SBD is very different 
now to the position it was in 10 years ago. 10 years ago SBD (lid not deal with 
customer satisfaction; ACPO CPT ltd. has gone some way towards this. 
One thing ACPO CPI Ltd. have not listened to is my suggestion to introduce a gold, silver and bronze 
standard where if people do not quite achieve SBD they still achieve something. The 
Problem with having the systein whereby you get SBI) or nothing is that people who are 
refused may feel that their hard work has been for nothing and will not try again. ne attitude 
should be: Is this RSL doing as much as they reasonably can? If they are, they should be given 
some recognition. 
Ilefore we make SBD an essential item, there needs to be improvements in things such as a database 
of SBD houses. What percentage are social? What percentage are private? ACPO CPI Ltd. need to get this information up to date before I can make it an essential criterion. There 
are no other technical reasons why we cannot make it an essential criterion. 
Before the TCI Supplementary multiplier was introduced, if we simply stated that SBD was 
essential, the treasury's cost would have gone from a very small percentage building to SBD to 
100%. This would be a massive increase in costs. The way we have done it i. e. phasing it in 
with the multiplier, it should go from a very small percentage to say 70%, before it jumps to 
100%. If ill future I make it a requirement it will seem to cost the treasury a very small amount. 
SBD will be a requirement within a couple of years. 
Can You give any examples of where achieving the SDS would not be possible? 
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Are you aware of any problems with clashes between different specificational 
requirements of the Housing Corporation's SDS, the NHBC and the requirements 
of SBI-)? 
Any reasons given to you by RSI-s are excuses not reasons. 
One conflict is the fire regulations; these are statutory so if there are any conflicts they will 
Would it be feasible for the Housing Corporation to withdraw funding/demand 
action if RSLs did not maintain standards? (For example, I have seen extremely badly managed cstates which arc still labelled SBD, who should be responsible for thi. 01 
Une problem with this is that everything is done on an impersonal basis these days, for 
example, rent is paid by giro, therefore, RSLs do not have to go to the estates to collect money 
and they do not see most of these problems. 
Our grant is based upon providing dwellings to live in. If estates are badly managed it will 
reflect badly upon each RSL in the future. However, SBD isn't meant to cure all of these 
problems. Management is a subsidiary issue; we cannot do anything about this. 
Several RSLs have mentioned Ifinancial pressures from both ends' i. e. reduction 
Of grants (especially in the North), plus limits to the level of rent that they can 
charge. The phrase 'squeezed from both ends' has been used. What is your 
2PInjon of this? 
I have absolutely no sympa; 
-hy 
whatsoever. We are talking about providing housing for their 
tenants who are generally in fear of crime. It needn't cost them anything extra. 
Another RSL stated that due to reductions in Housing Corporation funding, 
when they build a scheme to SDS they are in deficit for 10 years. What is your 
"icw of this comment? 
a more imr)ortant issue is the quality of service for their client. 
Can you ex lain the TO Multiplier? -. 4- - ýVe introduced a supplementary multiplier under the heading of sustainability. Each RSI, could 
get an extra I% if they achieve this. 
'hat, in your view, are the additional costs of building to the SBD Standard? 
RSLs bring SBD into the thought process at the beginning, achieving SBD need not cost them 
Ything extra. By investing a little at the start they are saving in the long run. There is a 
rception that it is going to cost them more money, this may not be the case. 
costs of doors and windows are moving anyway as people demand more quality. 10 years 
the -standard was wood, now a client would not be 
happy unless their windows were 
V. At year I the cost of SBD may be more, but by year 3 the expectations have moved. 
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Other Comment,.. 
We are auditing (compliance audit) RSLs on their compliance with our SDS. We inform the 
Police as to which RSLs are going to be building in the near future, we then want feedback from 
the police as to how co-operative each has been and whether or not they have actually contacted 
them for their advice. 
Another failing of some RSI-s is that they try to shirk responsibility so in their specifications 
they say 'will get SBD' and then do nothing to progress this. For example, they ask the 
contractor to build to SBD, and as the contractor thinks that no one will check, they build the 
development without consultation from the police ALO. Then when they are asked for 
certification they go to the police to ask for a certificate and the police say 'no way'. The RSL 
then moan about how much it costs them to rectify this and to bring the scheme up to the 
required standards. RSI, s have to take responsibility for checking their developments 
throughout the process. They need to state before plans are finalised that they will be 
thoroughly checked for SBD compatibility. 
We need to be careful that RSI. s do not have bad experiences with ALOs. What You do not 
want is for RSI. s tn qtirt rnmnkinino to each other about their experiences of the SBD process. 
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Appendix 8 
Questionnaire Utilised in House Buyers' 
Survey 
S m 
Please complete this questionnaire by placing a tick in the 
appropriate boxes to reflect your preferences 
University of 
HUDDERSFIELD 
Q1 Q2 Are YOU a first time buyer? Yes No Are you considering buying Yes No 0 EJ a newly-built house? 
1-1 1-1 
03 Please give your current 04 Please give the favoured 
Postal area e. g. LS26. postal area of your new 
(not full post code) F-T= home e. g. LS 18 (if known). 
Q5 When purchasing your next home, which of the following features would be most important to you? Please rank Your Preferences by placing a number into each of the boxes below. 1 being the most important and 7 being the 10ast Important. 
Fitted carpets 
Turf to the front and rear gardens 
Secure environment H 
Built-in appliances in kitchen 
Garage 
Separate downstairs W. C. F] En-suite facilities to the master bedroom rý 
06 Which of those features would you expect to be 
included in the purchase price of your home at no extra 
cost? Please tick any that apply. 
Fined ca"ts 
Turf to front and rear gardens 
Secure environment 
Built-in appliances in the kitchen 
Garage 
Separate downstairs W. C. 
En-suite facilities to master bedroom 
07 What would be your initial reaction to a house described as having 'high standards of security? E. g. quality door d i an w ndow security. 
...................................................................................... .............................................................................. 
08 Would a high standard of security influence your decision to buy? 
Yes 
1: 1 
No 
El Would influence you not to buy 
Q9 The Person completing this questionnaire is: 
MaIeF] Female 
Q10 The age group of the person complefing this questionnaire is: 
Und 45 - 54 55 and over er 25 25 - 35 35 - 44 
Q11 The size of Yamily group'living in the now home is: Please tick the appropriate boxes. 123 4 or rnore 
Number of adults F7 El 0 El - Number Of children F1 El El 1 1 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
SUýV 2 
111111111 
paw: I 
11111111 M 
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